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THE PROCEDURAL DEFENSE IN SELECTIVE SERVICE
PROSECUTIONS: THE VIEW FROM WITHOUT
AND WITHIN
Robert Allen Sedler*
The Vietnam war has been a significant factor in the rise of draft
resistance litigation. In ever increasing numbers, attorneys through-
out Iowa and the nation are being approached by young men seeking
guidance concerning their legal rights vis-a-vis local draft boards. This
article is designed to acquaint attorneys with the Selective Service
System. Professor Sedler emphasizes the procedural aspects of the
system and the myriad of regulations to be followed by local boards.
It is his contention that many local boards are failing to respect legally
established procedural safeguards for registrants. His victory before
the Supreme Court in 1970 in Mulloy v. United States is evidence of
his expertise in this area.
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THE PROCEDURAL DEFENSE
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PRocEDuRAL DEFENSE nq CONTEmPORARY CONTEXT
One of the many consequences of this nation's military involvement
in Vietnam has been the profound change in the attitude toward
military service on the part of the young men who are to render it.
Not only is military service no longer equated with patriotism,' but
the avoidance of such service is perfectly respectable and indeed a
high priority objective.2  The "physically unacceptable" classification,
which branded one as a sexually inadequate pariah during World
War 11 days, is probably the most sought-after classification today.
Instead of flocking to the recruiting station in response to the "Uncle
Sam Wants You" posters, the present attitude is that "Uncle Sam
will get me only if I have a low lottery number and he can catch me."
Military service, then, is not viewed by the present generation of
young Americans as something to be performed voluntarily for the
benefit of the national state, but as something that is exacted from
unwilling conscripts by the very real threat of 5-year prison sent-
ences.3 Indeed, as Professor Kenneth E. Boulding has suggested, the
requirement of compulsory military service may have caused many
young people to question the legitimacy of the national state itself as
an institution.4 If military service cannot be avoided, the great
majority of young men will literally submit to induction. If they
IDuring the last few years I must have been consulted by hundreds of college
students whose political views ranged the spectrum from radical to rather con-
servative, and who have come to me with one thing in mind-how could they
legally avoid the draft. Other draft counselors report the same experience, and
it is not limited to college students. I have discussed this point with state selec-
tive service officials and they reluctantly agree.
2It may be true as the poet Horace has said, "Dulce et decorum est no7i
patriae" (Sweet and fitting it is to die for one's country). The attitude of most
young men today, however, is better expressed by the following language from
Joseph Heller's popular novel, Catch 22:
... Open your eyes, Clevinger. It doesn't make a damned bit of differ-
ence who wins the war to someone who's dead.
Clevinger sat for a moment as though he'd been slapped. 'Congratula-
tions!' he exclaimed bitterly, the thinnest milk-white line enclosing his
lips tightly in a bloodless, squeezing ring. 'I can't think of another atti-
tude that could be depended upon to give greater comfort to the enemy.'
'The enemy,' retorted Yossarian with weighted precision, 'is anybody
who's going to get you killed, no matter which side be's on . . . ' J.
HELLER, CATCH 22, at 136 (1962).
sThe practice of all of the federal judges in Kentucky has been to impose 5-
year sentences routinely. In fiscal 1969 the average sentence for Selective Service
Act violations was 36.3 months. 2 SEL. SEzv. L. REP. 65 (1970). See also Note,
Sentencing Selective Service Violators: A Judicial Wheel of Fortune, 5 COLuI.
J.L. & Soc. PRoB., 164, 178 (Aug. 1969).
4 Boulding, The Impact of the Draft on the Legitimacy of the National State,
in TRE DaAmn A HANDBooK OF FACTS AwD ALTmNATimS 191 (S. Tax ed. 1966).
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seek any legal relief, it will be by means open to persons in military
service, such as by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.5
There is an ever-increasing minority, however, who will not submit.
Some in this group flee to Canada or other countries which will not
extradite draft resisters to the United States. But most of them "take
their stand at home" and thus face criminal prosecution for their
refusal to submit to induction.6 Many of these will have tried pre-
viously to obtain classification as conscientious objectors and perform
alternate civilian work in lieu of induction;7 they will have been
unsuccessful. Others will have been unsuccessful in their efforts to
obtain other exemptions or deferments." Because of this resistance
in the face of increased draft calls necessitated by the Vietnam war,9
there has been a sharp rise in the number of selective service prose-
cutions. 0 With this rise in prosecutions, there has developed a cadre
5 Practically all of the defenses that can be raised in a criminal prosecution can
be raised by habeas coraus after the registrant has submitted to induction. A
person in the military whose request for a discharge has been denied by military
authorities may also seek judicial review by way of a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. This has given rise to a substantial amount of litigation on the
part of "in-service C.O.'s," who are persons who claim to have become con-
scientious objectors following their entry into service. See generally Hansen,
Judicial Review of In-Service Conscientious Objector Claims, 17 U.C.L.A.L. REV.
975 (1970).
0 Military Selective Service Act of 1967 § 12(a), 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (Supp.
V, 1970) [hereinafter cited as MSSA].
7MSSA § 6(j), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (Supp. V, 1970). A registrant who is
found to be opposed only to combatant service rather than to participation in war
in any form is classified I-A-0. See 32 C.F.R. § 1622.11 (1971). He is inducted
along with I-A's, 32 C.F.R. § 1631.7 (1971), and his classification is relevant only
to the duties which he performs while in military service. Since this is so,
boards are far more willing to give the I-A-O classification. Sometimes they
are so "willing" that they have improperly denied a clearly valid 1-0 claim.
See United States v. Washington, 392 F.2d 37 (6th Cir. 1968). In practice boards
are very hostile to purported claims of conscientious objection. The National
Advisory Commission on Selective Service (Marshall Commission) reported
that in one state 55 percent of local board members said that no conscientious
objector classifications should ever be given. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
Cosn~ssroN oN SELECTIVE SERWvCE 19 (1967) [hereinafter cited as MARSHALL REPORT].
s The most commonly claimed exemptions and deferments in this regard are
ministerial (usually Jehovah's Witnesses), occupational, and hardship. Prior to
the 1967 amendment making undergraduate student deferments mandatory, student
deferments were sometimes denied. The classifications are listed in 32 C.F.R. §
1622.2 (1971).
Draft calls increased from 101,300 in 1965 to 336,530 in 1966. The subsequent
yearly figures are: 1967 -. 288,900; 1968 - 343,000; 1969 - 263,800; 1970 - 209,300.
R. FRimN, THE WISE MiNoRnv 179-80 (1971).
10 In fiscal 1970, 3,873 Selective Service prosecutions were begun, 2,901 were
concluded, and there were 968 convictions. 3 SEL. SEsv. L. REP. 54 (1970). There
were 3,305 prosecutions commenced in fiscal 1969, compared to 1,826 begun in
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of lawyers who-often without remuneration and almost always with
an abiding conviction of the rightness of draft resistance-will defend
them." It is to the "selective service" or "draft resistance" bar, as
I prefer to call it, that this article will be of primary interest, and to
whom, in a sense, it is dedicated.
The article is written from the perspective of an academician who
also attempts to be a "part-time draft resistance lawyer,"'2 and who in
the latter capacity has litigated some selective service cases13 and
has counseled quite a number of young men about their draft prob-
lems. I do not doubt for a moment that this involvement and identifi-
cation on my part has interfered with my ability to analyze the subject
dispassionately and objectively. Unlike the dispassionate and objec-
tive legal scholar, I have done something other than read all the cases
and literature on the subject and I have not arrived at my conclusions
solely in the "cloistered groves of academe."' 4  On the other hand,
perhaps there are insights to be gained by participation, involvement,
and identification, which no amount of reading of cases and law re-
view articles can supply. Perhaps there is an existential as well as
an analytical component to legal scholarship. Perhaps there is a real
fiscal 1968. 2 SE.. SEuv. L. REP. 33 (1969). In fiscal 1967, there 1,648 cases, which
was more than three times as many as in fiscal 1965. Ginger, Minimum Due
Process Standards in Selective Service Cases (pt. 1), 19 HAST. L.J. 1313 (1968).
Prosecutions during the Korean War years were far less. Those figures are:
1951 - 338; 1952 - 659; 1953 - 771; 1954 - 1015; 1955 - 477.
"1 In some of the larger cities such as San Francisco and New York, Selective
Service Lawyers' Panels have been formed. In smaller cities the members of the
draft resistance bar generally work closely together.
2 Jn an earlier article I referred to myself as a "part-time movement lawyer."
Sedler, The Dombrowski-Type Suit as an Effective Weapon for Social Change:
Reflections from Without and Within (pt. 1), 18 U. KAX. L. RuV. 237, 239 (1970).
Many of the movement lawyers are also draft resistance lawyers.
13 This article will discuss four cases involving the procedural defense. In
United States v. Pratt, 412 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 91 S. Ct. 1246
(1971). The author contended that the present selective service law is unconsti-
tutional as beyond the powers of Congress under art. I, § 8, and as violative of due
process of law. Id. at 427. The "Nuremberg" defenses were also raised. Id. The
Sixth Circuit gave these arguments short shrift. The defendant, through the
author, petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari in September 1969, and the
case is still pending there. Pratt v. United States, No. 45 (U.S., October Term
1970).
14My "extracurricular activity" has not met with approval among many mem-
bers of the "establishment bar;" nor has it met with the approval of the Governor,
who is also chairman of the University's Board of Trustees. When I instituted a
suit against him in 1968 challenging the Kentucky Un-American Activities Com-
mittee, he announced to the press that he was "distressed" that a University of
Kentucky law professor was involved as counsel in the case and observed that,
"We are going to have to take a long hard look at some of the people to whom
our youth are exposed."
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difference, for example, between the way a case or a legal problem
looks when it appears in the homogenized form of a judicial opinion
and the way it looks in real life, particularly from the firing line.
Obviously I believe that there is, or I would not be doing it and
writing about my experiences in this way.:5 In any event, it is impor-
tant that the reader understand the perspective and the bias from
and with which this article is being written.'6
The subject of the article is the procedural defense in selective
service prosecutions. Functionally this means any defense other than
that there was no "basis in fact" for the classification 7 or that the
board classified the registrant under an erroneous interpretation of
law.'8 More specifically, it involves defenses based on the failure of
the local board or the appeal board to follow the procedures set forth
in the Military Selective Service Regulations 9 for classifying and in-
ducting registrants, or violations of those elements of fair play and
fair hearing which are embodied in the concept of due process of
law. 20 If the procedural defense is sustained, the order to report for
induction, or the order to report for civilian work in the case of con-
scientious objectors, is invalid and a registrant cannot be convicted
for its violation.2 ' At the trial level the court must order a judgment
of acquittal 22
12The Dombrowski article was my first venture in this regard. See Sedler,
note 12 supra and accompanying text.
16 It is also hoped that this article will provide a handy reference tool for draft
resistance lawyers.
17 See MSSA § 10(b) (3), 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b) (3) (Supp. V, 1970). See also
Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
1SAs to the "erroneous interpretation of law" defense, which I consider a
variation of the '%no-basis-in facf' defense, see Sicurella v. United States, 348
U.S. 385, 391 (1955); United States v. Tichenor, 403 F.2d 986, 988 (6th Cir. 1968);
United States v. Carroll, 398 F.2d 651, 655 (3d Cir. 1968).
19 The Selective Service regulations are contained in 32 C.F.R. §§ 1600-90 (1971).
They are supplemented by Local Board Memoranda and other directives from
the National Headquarters of the Selective Service System.
20 Sometimes the courts refer to a violation of the regulations as depriving the
registrant of due process of law. See Stain v. United States, 235 F.2d 339, 343
(9th Cir. 1956). As will be pointed out, certain violations can also occur at the
induction center, in which case it is Army regulations which are being violated.
The effect is the same.
2 1 Mulloy v. United States, 398 U.S. 410, 415, 418 (1970).
22 The existence of the procedural defense will ordinarily be determined by the
judge if the case is tried before the jury, as it involves a "matter of law" within
the meaning of Cox v. United States, 332 U.S. 442, 452-53 (1947). The jury,
however, may determine whether the board denied the registrant a fair hearing.
See Niznik v. United States, 173 F.2d 328, 336 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S.
925 (1949). If the judge sustains the procedural defense and grants a judgment
of acquittal, the government cannot appeal. See United States v. Sisson, 399
U.S. 267, 291-99 (1970). See also United States v. Weller, 91 S. Ct. 602 (1971).
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The procedural defense has its genesis in a little-remembered sen-
tence found in the opinion in Estep v. United States. 23 In recognizing
a limited power of judicial review over selective service proceedings,24
the Court referred to the jurisdiction of selective service boards and
stated that "[t]he question of jurisdiction of the local board is
reached only if there is no basis in fact for the classification which
it gave the registrant."25 It preceded that sentence, however, by ob-
serving that "[t]he decisions of the local board made in conformity
with the regulations are final even though they may be erroneous."
26
That sentence would imply that when the board has violated the regu-
lations, its decisions are not final and its action may be invalidated on
that ground apart from whether or not there was a basis in fact for
the substantive classification.2 7
In the cases which arose between 1946, when Estep was decided,
and the time of the Vietnam resistance (I will use 1966 as the starting
point),2s which in comparison to the Vietnam-produced cases were
relatively few in number despite some increase in the Korean war
period,29 the procedural defense was recognized and sometimes sus-
tained. In Simmons v. United States,30 for example, decided in 1955,
the Supreme Court held that the failure of the Department of Justice
to furnish a registrant with a fair resume of an FBI report that the
Department was considering in passing on his conscientious objector
claim, deprived him of the fair hearing to which he was entitled under
23 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
24This review has been described as the "narrowest known to the law."
Blalock v. United States, 247 F.2d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 1957).
25327 U.S. at 122-23. Similar language is contained in MSSA § 10(b) (3), 50
U.S.C. App. § 460(b) (3) (Supp. V, 1970).
26 327 U.S. at 122 (emphasis added).
27 There has been an unfortunate tendency on the part of courts to use the
basis-in-fact language when referring to action allegedly invalid on procedural
grounds. In Mulloy, as will be pointed out, the Sixth Circuit applied the basis-
in-fact test to determine whether the board abused its discretion in failing to
reopen. United States v. Mulloy, 412 F.2d 421, 426 (1969). It was my argument
that "[i]t is the function of the courts to determine whether the board has
followed the regulations, not whether there was a basis in fact for their refusal
to do so." Brief for Petitioner at 25, Mulloy v. United States, 398 U.S. 410 (1970).
As to the difference between the basis-in-fact test when applied to judicial review
of a substantive classification and the basis-in-fact test applicable to review of
procedural error, see the discussion in Petrie v. United States, 407 F.2d 267, 274
(9th Cir. 1969). The term "basis in fact" should be limited to review of the sub-
stantive classification.
2 8Based both on increased draft calls and increased prosecutions. See R.
FRIEmAN, supra note 9, at 179-80.
29 See authorities cited note 10 supra.
20 348 U.S. 397 (1955).
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the statute.31 In Gonzales v. United States, 32 decided the same day,
the Court held that. the failure of the Department to furnish the reg-
istrant with a copy of its recommendation to the appeal board and to
give him a reasonable opportunity to reply was improper, and directed
that his conviction for refusing to submit to induction be reversed.3 3
While these were the only two Supreme Court decisions going off on
procedural grounds, and were decisions limited to the procedures then
in effect for processing conscientious objector claims,34 lower federal
courts were also holding that procedural violations on the part of the
boards furnished a defense to a criminal prosecution. These decisions
are best illustrated, I think, by Olvera v. United States, 35 in which the
local board refused to reopen a registrant's classification because it
felt that it did not have to.36 The district judge held that this furnished
no defense to the prosecution because, if the board had reopened the
classification, "it should and would have refused the classification
asked."37 In reversing, the Fifth Circuit stated:
While at the time the district judge wrote his opinion deciding this case,
there may have been warrant in the decided cases for his decision, we are
in no doubt that the decisions of the Supreme Court, handed down on
31 Id. at 404-05. Under the procedure in effect at that time, the Department of
Justice was required to hold a hearing with respect to the character and good
faith of a registrant seeking conscientious objector status. It then made a
recommendation to the appeals board. The Department of Justice hearing pro-
cedure was eliminated in the 1967 Act.
32 348 U.S. 407 (1955).
33Id. at 417. The Court cited the provisions of section 451(c), referring to "a
system of selection which is fair and just," in support of its conclusion. Id. Cf.
United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1953) ("fair hearing" did not entitle
registrant to disclosure of secret F.B.L reports). The same day the Court decided
Simmons and Gonzales, it decided two other Jehovah's Witnesses cases. In
Sicurella v. United States 348 U.S. 385 (1955), it invalidated a classification on the
ground that the board had applied an erroneous standard of law. Id. at 391. In
Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955), it found that there was a basis in
fact for the classification and affirmed the conviction. Id. at 383. In Gonzales
v. United States, 364 U.S. 59 (1960), the Court held that the registrant was not
entitled to see the hearing officer's report to the Department of Justice. Id. at
63-64. In United States v. Purvis, 403 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968), the court explained
that case on the ground that the Department's recommendation was not based
on the hearing officer's report, but on the local board's statement, which was in
the registrant's file. Id. at 561. The court found that in view of the circumstances
present there, it was unfair to deny the registrant access to the report. Id. at 562.
34Since the Department of Justice hearing procedure was only repealed in
1967, cases may still arise involving registrants who were denied conscientious
objector classification under that procedure. Today conscientious objector claims
are processed in the same manner as other claims.
30 223 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1955).
36 Id. at 881 n.1, 883.
37 Id. at 881 n.1.
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March 14, 1955,[381 taken together, have made it clear that this warrant no
longer exists. Indeed the principle finally established by the Supreme
Court, in its struggle to reconcile the fundamental principles of liberty
and due process with the failure of the Selective Training and Service
Act to make specific provision for judicial review of board action and for
a jury trial on the controlling issue makes it certain that this is so. The
principle, that when every requirement of due process has been observed
by the board, its fact decisions, unless wholly unsupported, are not
subject to review, makes it certain that this is so. Under this principle,
it is of the essence of the validity of board orders and of the crime of
disobeying them that all procedural requirements be strictly and faithfullyfollowed, and that a showing of failure to follow them with such strictness
and fidelity will invalidate the order of the board and a convictio based
thereon s9
The procedural defense was effectively asserted in other lower court
cases, usually revolving around the failure of the board to reopen a
classification or its denial of an appeal.40
It was not until the Vietnam-produced cases, however, that the
procedural defense truly came into its own4 ' and, in my opinion,
became more significant from a practical standpoint than the no-basis-
in-fact defense. The view is shared at least among draft resistance
lawyers of my acquaintance that the lawyer should first try to find
procedural violations and fall back on no basis in fact only as a last
resort. In other words, the feeling is that it is much easier to win
cases by showing a procedural violation than it is by showing that the
classification has no basis in fact.42  The procedural defense is one
which has been developed by the draft resistance lawyers. What has
happened is that the lawyers defending these cases have discovered
procedural errors which a registrant's board has committed and try
them out on the court, so to speak. If the defense is successful, that
knowledge will be shared with the other members of the draft resist-
38Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955); Sicurella v. United States, 348
U.S. 385 (1955); Simmons v. United States, 348 U.S. 397 (1955); Gonzales v.
United States, 348 U.S. 407 (1955).
39 Olvera v. United States, 223 F.2d 880, 881-82 (5th Cir. 1955) (emphasis added).
40 See, e.g., Townsend v. Zimmerman, 237 F.2d 376, 378 (6th Cir. 1956); Stain v.
United States, 235 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1956); United States v. Vincelli, 215
F.2d 210, 213 (2d Cir. 1954). See also Bejelis v. United States, 206 F.2d 354, 358
(6th Cir. 1953); Davis v. United States, 199 F.2d 689, 691-92 (6th Cir. 1952). Not
infrequently, however, the courts would hold alleged procedural violations to be
insufficient without any discussion. Registrants were also held barred from
asserting procedural defenses because of failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.
41 For this reason we will concentrate on the Vietnam-produced cases although
we will in some instances refer to earlier cases. Realistically, many of the older
cases may no longer be good law, and in practice most draft resistance lawyers
do not pay much attention to them.
4 2 This is important when a lawyer is counseling a registrant on his alternatives.
When a registrant asks whether he has a good case, the lawyer is not likely to
respond affirmatively if the only defense is no-basis-in-fact.
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ance bar at least in the same locale, who will then use it in their
cases. The publication of the Selective Service Law Reporter by the
Public Affairs Institute 3 has made such information available to
draft resistance lawyers throughout the country.44 It has also served
as a way of making most selective service decisions available to the
courts.4 5 Some of the defenses are totally new in the sense that they
were not raised in the pre-Vietnam days. Of these some have been
fully accepted by the courts46 while others have had a mixed reception
at best.47 The substantial number of acquittals on procedural grounds,-8
however, attests to the overall success of the defense.
The fact that the defense has been so successful cannot necessarily
be attributed to the extraordinary legal skills of the draft resistance
bar. Its success must be analyzed with reference to present societal
attitudes toward the Vietnam war and the Selective Service System.
As one commentator has pointed out:
An analysis of draft cases decided by the Supreme Court during and
after World War I and the Korean War indicates that by and large cases
decided during wartime yield to the demands of the military for an ex-
peditious form of conscription. Only after hostilities were terminated was
the judiciary receptive to contentions that classification procedures had
been defective andi that a reasonable measure of judicial review should
be available. But while the Vietnam War continues unabated, the
Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have repeatedly strengthened
the hands of registrants against Selective Service.49
It is difficult to believe that the opposition to the war, which, for one
reason or another, is becoming increasingly widespread, has not
43It has now reached three lengthy volumes. See the discussion of its im-
portance in Asimow, Introduction to Symposium, Selective Service 1970, 17
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 893, 905-06 (1970).
441 seriously doubt that I would have been aware of the no-meeting defense
that I successfully asserted in United States v. Crump, No. 10,709 (E.D. Ky., Sept.
17, 1969), if it had not been for the availability of the Selective Service Law
Reporter. See notes 442-46 infra and accompanying text.
45This is particularly true of district court decisions, which are often not re-
ported in the Federal Supplement Reporter.
40 In this category I have placed the giving of reasons for the classification,
failure to meet, and the giving of misleading advice.
4 7 In this category I have placed improper composition of the local boards and
violation of the order of call regulations.
4 8 As to acquittals generally, the conviction rate for fiscal 1970 was 33.4 percent
compared to 47.2 percent for fiscal 1969. In fiscal 1970, 1,901 cases were concluded,
and there were 968 convictions. 3 Sm. SEav. L. Rni'. 54 (1970). I am not aware
of any studies indicating how many acquittals were due to no basis in fact or
erroneous interpretation of the law defenses and how many were due to the
successful assertion of the procedural defense. All I can say is that the cases
indicate a large number of procedural defense acquittals, and my personal view
is that they by far exceed the number of no-basis-in-fact acquittals.
40 See Asirnow, supra note 43, at 895-96.
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permeated at least some sectors of the federal judiciary and has not
influenced the trend of favorable decisions in draft cases.5 0
Equally significant, I think, has been the increasing opposition to
compulsory military service5' and the serious disenchantment with
the administration of the Selective Service System.5 2  Its glaring
deficiencies and the frequent unfairness and arbitrariness on the part
of the boards were well documented in the Marshall Report.5 3 This
would also b& reflected in the cases coming before the courts for
decision' A judge's sense of procedural fairness could not avoid
being traumatized upon seeing some of the things which boards have
done during the classification process25  On occasion judges have not
hesitated to give vent to their feelings on' the matter.55  Thus, even
judges who were not particularly sympathetic to draft resisters could
50 May it not also be significant that the great majority of draft resisters are
white, middle-class youth, whom at least sdme judges may be reluctant to brand
as "criminals. ' See the discussion in Tigar & Zweben, Selective Service: Some
Certain Problems and Some Tentative Answers, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 510, 531-33
(1969).
51 This view finds support in different ideologies, as signified by the Goldwater-
Hatfield bill to repeal the draft. For an economistfs view, see Friedman, Why
Not a Volunteer Army, in THE DRAFT, supra note 4, at 200; Oi, The Costs and
Implications of an All-Volunteer Army, in THE DRAFT, supra note 4, at 221. It
may be significant that the Nixon administration has promised zero draft calls
by 1973. Noterthat zero draft calls are not the same thing as repeal of the draft,
since the structure still exists and draft calls can be increased whenever the
President wants to commit the nation to another Vietnam. As to the relationship
between the existence of the draft and our Vietnam involvement, see Sedler,
Book Review, 57 Ky. L.J. 302, 311-2 (1969).
52This disenchantment was symbolized by its venerable Director, Gen. Lewis
B. Hershey. The "firing" of General Hershey constitutes presidential recognition
of this disenchantment. His successor, Curtis W. Tarr, has tried very hard to
create a very different public image. There have been no Tarr Directives, for
example.
5 3 STTAPuHai REPoaT (1967). The Commission proposed a complete overhaul
of the system, recommending specifically a consolidated selective service system
under more centralized administration. Id. at 31. This and most of its other
recommendations were studiously ignored by Congress when it enacted the
Military Selective Service Act of 1967.
54The "built-in procedural deficiency" of the system is well demonstrated in
Ginger, note 10 supra. See also Tigar & Zweben, note 50 supra.
55 See Walsh v. Local Board No. 10, 305 F. Supp. 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
The draft board's overzealous, highhanded and erroneous handling of this
young man's plight hardly inspires confidence in the system. Rather, it
is this kind of mistreatment which has alienated the youth of the nation,
bred disrespect for law, sparked the disorders which have torn a gap
between generations and ripped open the very structure of society. It
feeds the clamor for abolition of the whole selective service system, from
top to bottom, not only by mounting numbers of defiant young men, but
also by the President and many members of congress, where no less than
43 bills to change the draft law are pending. At the very least, those
entrusted with the awful power of conscripting the nation's young men
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see their way clear to strike down arbitrary and improper action
on the part of draft boards.56
In terms of a more conventional legal explanation, recognition of
the procedural defense has been fostered by the very narrow scope
of review of the substantive classification. As one court has observed,
"The procedural framework of the draft classification process and
the narrowly limitecl judicial review available to draft registrants
make adherence to procedural safeguards crucial to the maintenance
of basic fairness."57 Moreover, the courts feel more at home in evalu-
ating procedural fairness than they do when dealing with the sub-
stantive validity of the classification. By invalidating the action on
procedural grounds they do not have to come to grips with the sub-
stantive classification and will not be put in a position where they
have to usurp the function of the Selective Service System.
All of the above factors, as well as the innovative efforts of draft
resistance lawyers, have contributed to the increasing effectiveness
of the procedural defense. So, too, the fact that there are so many
regulations coupled with the nature of the system and attitudes toward
procedure, would indicate that procedural violations are likely to
occur. This was explicitly recognized by the Ninth Circuit in Oshatz
v. United States,55 where it was stated:
A myriad of regulations specify the procedural steps which must be fol-
lowed by a registrant, the local board, the appeal board, and military
personnel in order to accomplish the induction of a young man into the
armed forces, or his exclusion therefrom. Because there are so many
regulations, which are often complex, and because the individuals who
are expected to comply -with the regulations are not legal experts, pro-
cedural irregularities are frequent. Even the most casual glance at the
case law will reveal a staggering array of deviations from the regulations
which have been advanced as defenses to prosecutions for refusal to sub-
mit to induction. The defenses have been unsuccessful where the pro-
cedural irregularities are minor and the registrant has not been prejudiced
because of them.... Courts have responded to the necessity of 'balancing
between the demands of an effective system for mobilizing the Nation's
manpower in times cf crisis and the demands of fairness toward the in-
dividual registrant. [citing Simmons v. United States] Accordingly,
into the armed forces in time of war or other military venture owe a
duty of the most searching examination of the facts, scrupulous fairness,
sensitive care, compassionate hearing, patient consideration, cautious
action and deliberate and rational decision within the law. We afford no
less to the worst crininal in our society. Id. at 1279.
561 have also felt that lurking in the back of the minds of some judges, at
least, has been an adversary's sense of giving defense counsel something to work
with. Since all the government has to prove is the I-A classification, the issuance
of the order, and the failure to respond, the defense counsel is severely handi-
capped unless he is given something of this sort. Unconscious motivation is
always a dangerous thing to fool with, and I am not all that serious about this
suggestion. Nonetheless, it is something to think about.
s7 United States v. Freeman, 388 F.2d 246, 248 (7th Cir. 1967).
58 404 F.2d 9 (9th Cir. .968).
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defenses based upon irregularities resulting in substantial prejudice to
registrants have been sustained.59
In retrospect, then, it would seem that the draft resistance lawyers
have had many things going for them in their efforts to establish the
procedural defense. As the discussion in Oshatz demonstrates, those
efforts have met with considerable success.
The successful assertion of the procedural defense, however, does
not necessarily mean that the draft resistance has been successful.
In theory, the matter goes back to the Selective Service System,
which can start over again using the proper procedure. If a no-basis-
in-fact defense is successful, on the other hand, the registrant will
have to be given the desired classification and cannot be ordered for
induction. In practical terms, then, some question may be raised as
to how valuable it is to prevail on procedural grounds.
The immediate answer, of course, is that the registrant has been
acquitted of the criminal charge and, as in any criminal prosecution,
that must be the primary objective. Sufficient unto the day is the evil
thereof. The next time around the draft board may be more sympa-
thetic toward the registrant and more disposed to grant the requested
classification, particularly if the members have been "put through
the wringer" during the trial.60 Even if they are not more sympathetic
and the registrant is inducted again, the no-basis-in-fact defense is
still available, as are other possible procedural errors that the board
may still commit.6'
A more important benefit of the procedural defense can often be
realized, however. By the time the criminal case has been finally
resolved, the registrant may have passed his prime period of eligi-
bility and will no longer be subject to induction. In my own case of
Mulloij v. United States,62 for example, the Supreme Court's decision
was handed down on June 15, 1970. Joe Mulloy's twenty-sixth birth-
day was celebrated on June 1, 1970. He had, therefore, reached the
age of 26 without ever having been "legally" ordered to report for
induction, and went to the bottom of the priority list63 so as to be
effectively immune from induction. This is even more significant
in the case of registrants who are covered by the one year maximum-
exposure rule of the present lottery selection system.64 Such a regis-
59 Id. at 12.
6 0 Defense counsel will frequently subpoena the board members not only to
establish procedural errors, but to establish erroneous interpretation of the law.
6 1 In United States v. Crump, No. 10,709 (E.D. Ky., Sept 17, 1969) "left unused"
was the defense of misleading advice as well as the defense of "erroneous interpre-
tation of law."
62 398 U.S. 410 (1970).
63 32 C.F.R. § 1631.7 (b) (6) (1971).
6432 C.F.R. §§ 1631.5, 1631.7(b) (2)- (4) (1971).
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trant, who was acquitted in a criminal prosecution, would probably
remain subject to induction only if the criminal case were completed
and processing began anew in the same year in which he was ordered
to report for induction.65  This is not very likely.66  Because his
number was reached during his prime year of eligibility, he was
classified I-A, and he was ordered inducted during that year,6 7 the
05 It is that year in which he is in the First Priority Selection Group. 32 C.F.R.
§ 1631.7(b) (3) (1971).
00 Although selective service prosecutions are to take precedence, MSSA § 12a,
50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a), (Supp. V, 1970), there is frequently a backlog of cases
in urban areas, and the ability of the legal system to promote delay needs no
documentation. If the conviction is reversed on appeal, this would be a practical
impossibility.
67The regulation makes provision for an Extended Priority Selection Group,
which consists of registrants "who on December 31 were members of the First
Priority Selection Group whose random sequence number had been reached but
who had not been issued Orders to Report for Induction." 32 C.F.R. § 1631.7 (c) (1)
(1971). Since our registrant was issued such an order, it would not seem that he
would fall into the Extended Priority Selection Group. The only way that he
could fall into that Group is if it was said that he was not issued an order to
report, because the order to report was invalid due to the procedural violation.
This gives a strained meaning to the words of the regulation and is inconsistent
with the "one-year maximum exposure" approach that the lottery selection was
supposed to herald.
But if the boards were to interpret this differently, and if the courts were to
uphold that interpretation, the registrant would fall into the Extended Priority
Selection Group, which generally means that the registrant is liable for induction
during the first three months of the year following. 32 C.F.R. § 1631.7(d) (5)
(1971). However, it is also provided by that subsection that a registrant in the
Extended Priority Selection Group who would otherwise have been ordered to
report for induction before April 1, but who "could not be issued orders," remains
liable and shall be ordered for induction as practicable. The circumstances that
would prevent such an order, it is provided, "shall include but not be limited to
those arising from a personal appearance, appeal, preinduction physical examina-
tion, reconsideration, judicial proceeding, or inability of the local board to act."
It could be argued that "judicial proceeding" includes a pending selective service
prosecution, but a more logical reading would refer to an ordinary criminal
prosecution, since the pendency of such a prosecution prevents issuance of an
induction order in the stne manner as an appeal and the like. And, of course,
our registrant has already been issued an induction order.
I think that I am correct in my interpretation of the regulation and that the
registrant would not fall into the Extended Priority Selection Group. But even
if I am not, he would le liable for only three months more unless I am also
incorrect in my interpretation of the proviso to 32 C.F.R. § 1631.7(d) (5) (1971).
It would seem that if the liability of persons who were already inducted, but
whose induction was invalid, was to be extended, the regulation would have
done so specifically, since it was pretty specific about everything else. I have
hedged my statement only because this position has not been clearly established
yet, and perhaps may never be. But, as a working hypothesis, I will assume that
the successful assertion of the procedural defense on behalf of a registrant subject
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registrant's prime period of eligibility will have passed at the end of
that year. As to registrants covered by the present lottery system,
then, it would seem that the successful assertion of the procedural
defense would mean that the draft resistance could almost always
be completely successful.
This is not necessarily true for the registrant who was subject to
induction under the former system and who had been ordered for
induction before the present system went into effectos If such a
registrant were acquitted on procedural grounds, he would remain
subject to induction until he reached 26. If he were acquitted after
the present system went into effect and had not yet turned 26, it
would seem that he would come under the present system. 69 If he
had a high lottery number, he would, of course, be effectively immune.
If he had a low lottery number, he would remain subject to induction,
and his prime year of eligibility would be the year in which he was
acquitted. If processing began anew during that year, it is possible
that he could be ordered for induction (if retained in class I-A) when
processing was complete, either during that year or during the first
three months of the following year.
70
In other words, the successful assertion of the procedural defense
today will very likely mean that the registrant can avoid military
service entirely. If the registrant were inducted under the present
system, it is not probable that he would be subject to a second go-
round.7 1 It would be a fairly rare occurrence, given present con-
ditions, that the prosecution could be completed during the same
year in which the induction order could be issued.7 2  If he were
- inducted under the former system, he might be subject to a second
go-round only if he had not turned 26 at the time of acquittal and
had a low lottery number.
It would be interesting to do an empirical study of what happened
to registrants who had successfully asserted the procedural defense
to the present lottery selection system means, as a practical matter, that the
"draft resistance" will have been completely successful.68 If the registrant was ordered for induction under the former system and his
induction was postponed, he remained liable notwithstanding his number under
the new system.
69 This is because he would have attained his nineteenth year but not his twenty-
sixth prior to January 1, 1970. See 32 C.F.R. § 1631.5 (d) (1971).
70 He would be in the Extended Priority Selection Group, since he would not
have been issued the order to report during the year that he was in the First
Priority Selection Group.
71This assumes that I am correct in my interpretation of the regulation. See
note 69 supra.
72This would only occur if he were brought to trial during the same year and
acquitted at the trial.
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in the "pre-lottery" days. My own guess would be that the number
of registrants who successfully asserted the procedural defense and
who were ultimately convicted of draft refusal would be relatively
smalL73 As previously indicated, if the registrant overlapped the
present system, his vulnerability to subsequent induction would de-
pend on his lottery number, and some may have escaped by getting
a high lottery number. Since the order of induction under the former
system was oldest first74 the chances of the registrant reaching 26 by
the time the case was disposed of were substantial 7 5 particularly if
it were disposed of at the appellate level. In any event, whatever
the effect of the successful assertion of the procedural defense during
that time, it is likely that the successful assertion of the defense today
will enable the registrant to avoid military service entirely.
II. SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION
AND INDUCTION PROCESSES
Before proceeding further with a discussion of the procedural de-
fense it would be helpful to review the operation of the Selective
Service System and is classification and induction process. This will
help to explain when and how procedural errors can occur and per-
haps why they do occur with such frequency. The Selective Service
System consists of more than 4000 local boards, an appeal board in
each of the federal judicial districts, a National Selective Service
Appeal Board, a director for each state, district, and territory, and
a National Director of Selective Service.7 6 Classification and induction
are carried out primarily by the local boards; the role of the directors
is primarily advisory.7 7 The composition of the boards is very inter-
esting. Although the ethos of the Selective Service System is that
boards are made up of "little groups of neighbors", 7 the neighbors on
the boards are hardly representative of the general population. About
half of the local board members are at least 60 years old, 79 two-thirds
73One distinguished registrant, the founder of the Gearey doctrine, was so
convicted.
74 See 32 C.F.R. § 1631.7 (a) (1) (1970).
75 Many of these registrants formerly had student deferments and did not make
their claim for other classifications until they had completed school.
7 0 This is described in Tigar & Zweben, supra note 50, at 511.
77 They do have specific powers, however. The state director, for example, may
direct a board to reopen a classification, 32 C.F.R. § 1625.3 (1971), and may also
appeal from any determination of a local board at any time. 32 C.F2R. § 1626.1
(1971). He may also appeal to the President. 32 C.R. § 1627.1 (1971). The
National Director is given the unbelievable power to direct that a registrant shall
be classified or reclassified without regard to his eligibility for a particular
classification. 32 C.F.R. § 1622.60 (1971).
78 See United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1, 8 (1953).
7 9See Rabin, A Strange Brand of Selectivity: Administrative Law Perspectives
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are veterans, and about 70 percent are in white collar occupations.8 0
About one-third are college graduates, compared to less than 10 per-
cent of the general population's comparable age group.s1 Fully 96
percent are white,8 2 and practically all are male, the latter being re-
quired by regulation until recently. 3 In practice, boards tend to be
self-perpetuating bodies, with retiring members selecting their own
replacements.
8 4
The boards are left largely on their own in determining classifica-
tions. They receive certain information from the National Director
and from the state directors in the form of Local Board Memoranda
and the like, but the extent and frequency of such information varies
a great deal from state to state, and during the course of a year some
boards may receive no guidance and others very little.8 8 Moreover,
as the Marshall Commission observed, "[b]ecause the System offers
wide latitude for critical judgment by the boards themselves, this pro-
fusion of guidance does not always articulate a clearly defined policy
to the board."S16 The board members are unpaid volunteers whose
only professional assistance is provided by relatively low-ranking civil
servants. Very few of the board members are lawyers.8 7 It should
not be surprising, therefore, that there is a tremendous lack of uni-
formity in the decisions of the more than 4000 boards,88 so that the
classification which a particular registrant receives may depend en-
tirely upon the board with which he is registered.8 9
on the Processing of Registrants in the Selective Service System, 17 U.C.LAL.
Rnv. 1005, 1007 (1970). At the time of the Marshall Report the average age of
board members was 58, with one-fifth over 70. MARsHAmL REPORT 19. Under
current regulations no board member may serve for more than 25 years or after
he has attained the age of 75. 32 C.F.R. § 1604.52(d) (1971).
80 See Rabin, supra note 79, at 1007-08.
81 MARSHAL. REPORT 19.
82 See Rabin, supra note 79, at 1008. At the time of the Marshall Report only
1.3 percent were Black. MARsHAm REPORT 19.
83 See Rabin, supra note 79, at 1008.
84 See J. DAvis & K. DoLB-ARE, LnTTLE GROUPS OF NEIGHBORS: THE SucEVE
SERvicE SYsTEm 67 (1968).
85 MARsHMLL REPORT 27. Perhaps in recent years the guidance has become more
specific. But query, do the board members read the material coming in from
state and national headquarters, or do they rely on the clerk to do so?
86 AVLssHAm REPORT 27.
8 7 The Marshall Commission reported that 13.5 percent of metropolitan board
members and 3.3 percent of non-metropolitan board members were lawyers.
MARsHALL REPORT 75.
88 See MARSHAL REPORT 26-28. See also Note, An Examination of Fairness in
Selective Service Procedure, 37 GEo. WASH. L. Rsv. 564, 566-569 (1969).89 The registrant retains the same local board irrespective of subsequent changes
of residence.
1971] 1137
The classification process begins when a young man registers with
his local board at the age of 18.9 At that time he completes a classifi-
cation questionnaire which ordinarily is the basis for his initial classi-
fication. If it does not appear that he is entitled to one of the exemp-
tions or deferments specified by the statute or regulations,9 ' he is classi-
fied I-A.9 2 The burden is on the registrant to claim exemption or
deferment, and he must supply the board with sufficient information
to substantiate his claim.93 After the board has classified the regis-
trant," he is notified of his classification and advised that he has the
right to have a personal appearance before his board and the right to
take an appeal to the appeal board.95 If he does not exercise either
right within 30 days, the initial classification stands.
The purpose of the personal appearance is to give the registrant the
opportunity to discuss his classification with the board and try to per-
suade them that he should have been given the classification he re-
quested. He is specifically denied the right to have counsel present
at the personal appearance,9 6 and may call witnesses only at the dis-
cretion of the board.Y1 While he is entitled to see his file,93 the only
way that he can know the reasons for the board's decision is if the
board members tell him.9 9 Following the personal appearance, the
board must again classify him, and if it retains him in the same classi-
90 See the discussion ol the registration process in Ginger, supra note 10, at
1319-22. As to liability for failure to register, see Toussie v. United States, 397
U.S. 112, 114 (1970).
92 For a list of the deferments and exemptions with their attendant classifica-
tions, see 32 C.F.R. § 1622.2 (1971).
92 See 32 C.F.R. § 1622.10 (1971).
03See 32 C.F.R. § 1622.1(c) (1971), to the effect that the mailing of a classifica-
tion questionnaire is notice that unless information is presented to the local board
which will justify the registrant's deferment or exemption, he is to be classified
I-A.
04 The board must vote on the classification. 32 C.F.R. § 1604.56 (1971). As to
the responsibilities of the board during the classification process, see the dis-
cussion in Ginger, supra note 10, at 1324-25.
95 See 32 C.F.R. §§ 16241, 16262 (1971).
06 See 32 C.F.R. § 1624.1(b) (1971). Most lower federal courts have upheld
the denial of counsel in selective service hearings. E.g., United States v. Dicks,
392 F.2d 524, 528 (4th Cir. 1968); Nickerson v. United States, 391 F.2d 760, 762
(10 Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 970 (1968); United States v. Capson, 347 F.2d
959 (10th Cir. 1965). However, the denial of counsel to registrants in selective
service proceedings was held unconstitutional in United States v. Weller, 309 F.
Supp. 50, 56 (N.D. CaL 1969), appeal dismissed, 401 U.S. 254 (1971). Although
the holding was grounded on lack of statutory authority, the opinion contains
strong constitutional overtones. Id. at 54-56.
97 See 32 C.F.R. § 1624.1(b) (1971).
08 See 32 C.F.R. § 1670.8 (1971).
00 We will subsequently discuss the procedural defense of "giving of reasons."
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fication, he has a further right of appeal to the appeal board, which
he must exercise within 30 days after receiving notice of the board's
action.10 0 The appeal board reviews the classification de novo' 01 on
the basis of the registrant's file,10 2 and may aflurm or reverse the de-
cision of the local board. If it votes unanimously to retain him in the
same classification, he has no further right of appeal within the Selec-
tive Service System. If a member of the appeal board dissents, how-
ever, the registrant may appeal to the National Appeal Board. 0 3
Obviously no classification is permanent. 0 4  The board itself wil
reclassify a registrant when it appears that he is no longer entitled to
his deferment or exemption, and he is required to advise the board of
any changed circumstances which might affect his classification. 0 5 The
registrant in turn may request that he be reclassified and given a par-
ticular deferment or exemption. When he makes such a request, the
board first must decide whether it will reopen the classification. If the
classification is not reopened, the registrant has no further appeal
rights. 0 6 If the board does reopen the classification and denies the
request on the merits, the registrant has the same right of personal
appearance and appeal as he did with respect to the initial classifica-
tion.0 7 As will be seen, the failure of the board to reopen a classifica-
tion has been a fertile ground for the assertion of the procedural
defense.
The registrant who is classified I-A is usually ordered for a pre-
induction physical and, if found acceptable, is subject to induction.08
Induction quotas are prorated for each state, usually according to the
number of registrants in that state classified I-A. The states in turn
divide their quotas for each local board. 0 9 Registrants are inducted
according to a specified order of call, now based primarily on the regis-
100 See 32 C.F.R. § 1626.2(c) (1971).
101 See 32 C.F.R. § 1626.26(a) (1971).
'
0 2 The registrant or any other person appealing is entitled to "attach a state-
ment specifying the matters in which he believes the local board erred," and
may "direct attention to any information in the registrant's file which he believes
the local board has failed to consider or to give sufficient weight, and may set
out in full any information which was offered to the local board and which the
local board failed or refused to include in the registrant's file." 32 C.F.R. § 1626.12
(1971).
10332 CFF.R. § 1627.3 (1971).
104 32 C.F.R. § 1625.1 (a) (1971).
105 32 C.F.R. § 1625.1(b) (1971).
'Or See United States v. Beaver, 309 F.2d 273, 277 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 951 (1963). See also 32 C.F.R. § 1625.4 (1971).
10732 C.F.R. § 1625.13 (1971).
208 See the discussion of the physical examination in Ginger, supra note 10, at
1337-38.
109 See 32 C.F.R. §§ 1631.1-.6 (1971).
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trant's number in the Selective Service lottery.1 0 If a registrant re-
fuses to comply with an order to report for induction or refuses induc-
tion at the induction center,' 1 he is subject to criminal prosecution."12
Errors which will provide the basis for the procedural defense can
and do occur at any step in this classification and induction process.
The likelihood of error is compounded by the way the Selective Serv-
ice System operates in practice and by what may be called the institu-
tional attitude toward procedure. As pointed out previously, board
members are unpaid, volunteers who generally meet only for a few
hours each month, ad most board members are not lawyers. The
day-to-day operations are supervised by the clerk of the board, who is
a full-time civil service employee of the Selective Service System."
3
It is the clerk's responsibility to structure the monthly workload of
the board and to keep the board members informed about the rules,
regulations, and other directives which are supposed to establish the
guidelines for classification decisions." 4  The clerk also serves as a
"buffer" between the registrant and the board members, and it is the
clerk to whom the registrant must come for advice."'5
The caseload varies greatly from board to board."6 While in a rural
community there may be a degree of personal familiarity with the
cases,"17 this simply will not be so in an urban area."8 In the urban
situation the board members must rely on what is contained in the
file, the assessment of the case by the clerk, and any personal appear-
ance the registrant may have had, in arriving at their classification
decisions.:" Of course the great majority of classifications are rou-
tine.Y20 A substantial number, however, do require discretionary de-
220 See 32 C.F.R. § 1631.7 (1971).
"'1 The procedure at the induction center is governed by U.S. Army regulations.
1 2 See MSSA § 12(a), 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (Supp. V, 1970).
113 See 32 C.F.R. §§ 1605.1, 1605.31 (1971).
124 See the discussion in Rabin, supra note 79, at 1008.
"x0 There is discretion on the part of the National Director to appoint advisors
to registrants. 32 C.F.R. § 1604.41 (1971). But even where they are appointed,
the registrant is likely to rely on the clerk.
110 As to the disparities between workloads of local and appeal boards, see
5MAIaI . RoRT 17, 28.
"17 As has been said, the ethos of Selective Service is that the registrant will
be classified by "little groups of neighbors." See authority cited note 78, supra.
I's At the time of the Marshall Report, there were 63 boards in New York City,
which average 20,000 registrants each. The board in North Hollywood, California,
had over 54,000 registrants. TR sHALL REPORT 17 & n.4.
"19 See the discussion in Rabin, supra note 79, at 1009.
120 As pointed out previously, if the registrant does not establish eligibility for
any other classification, he is classified I-A. The largest number of deferments
today is student, I-S. Prior to the elimination of the fatherhood deferment, HI-A,
that deferment was the largest.
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cision making, and the system itself is not structured in such a way as
to allow adequate time for those decisions and to ensure that the board
has considered all of the relevant information.12' When it comes to
following the procedures provided for in the regulations, the board is
likely to rely on what the clerk says,'12 2 and if the clerk's working
procedure does not conform to the requirements, the clerk is likely to
lead the board members into error.
As might be expected in an administrative system which specifically
excludes lawyers from participation and which is exempted in the
main from the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act,
1 23
proper procedure is not given high priority. The keystone of selective
service operations is informality, 24 which, as every lawyer knows, is
a way of saying: "We can't be bothered with procedure." There is,
moreover, an under the gun attitude carrying over from World War 11
days, that men must be drafted expeditiously or national defense will
crumble and the enemy will be upon us.1'5 And since the official
policy of Selective Service is that deferments and exemptions are
matters of privilege and not right, 26 there is little sympathy with the
notion that a registrant has procedural rights when seeking the Sys-
tem's largesse.
2 7
The fundamental unfairness of the procedures employed in Selective
Service processing have been fully documented and discussed else-
where. 2s The thrust of that discussion has gone to proposed reforms
which would eliminate the fundamental unfairness. From the perspec-
tive of a draft resistance lawyer, however, it is precisely because the
procedure employed is fundamentally unfair and precisely because of
the institutional indifference toward procedure that the procedural
defense has been so effective. The injustice which this has produced
121 For an interesting analysis of "time spent" on classifications, see Margolis,
Trying a Case Under the Selective Service Law, 26 GtDnr PRAc. 100, 103-04 (1967).
See also Rabin, supra note 79, at 1008-09.
'
2 2 See the discussion in Rabin, supra note 79, at 1008-09.
123Universal Military Training & Service Act § 13(b), 50 U.S.C. App. § 463(b)
(1964). It is subject only. to the public information requirements of section 3.
124 This would be expected when one is dealing with "little groups of neighbors."
12This frequently is given as the justification for denying procedural safe-
guards such as the presence of attorneys. See Note, The New Draft Law: Its
Failures and Future, 19 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 292, 319-20 (1968).
126 See the discussion in Tigar & Zweben, supra note 50, at 527-28.
127 Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
128 See Ginger, supra note 10, at 58; Tigar & Zweben, supra note 50, at 5; Note,
note 88 supra; Note, The Selective Service System: An Administrative Obstacle
Course, 54 CALnr. L. REV. 2123 (1966); Note, Procedure and Objectives within the
Selective Service System, 2 JoHN MARsHTAI J. PRAC. & PRoc. 122 (1968); Note,
Fairness and Due Process Under the Selective Service System, 115 U. PA. L. RP-.
1014 (1966).
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for registrants as a class has served to benefit those registrants who
have chosen to embark upon the path of draft resistance. The system
then has fallen upon its own sword and provided an effective weapon
for those seeking to avoid its toils. 129
I]I. THE PROCEDURAL DEFENSES
For purposes of analysis the procedural defenses can be divided into
seven broad areas, some of which require extensive discussion and
others of which do not. There also will be some overlapping. These
areas are as follows: (1) reopening of the classification; (2) stating
reasons for the classification; (3) improper action of the board
during the classification process; (4) the administrative appeal; (5) the
validity of the order to report; (6) improper composition of local
boards; and (7) procedures employed at the induction center. I want
to emphasize that this functional division is my own and does not
have independent significance.
A. Reopening the Classification
It is necessary here to distinguish between reopening of the classifi-
cation prior to the issuance of an order to report and reopening follow-
ing the issuance of such order. The applicable regulation, section
1625.2, requires this distinction because it provides that after an order
to report has been issued the board may not reopen the classification
unless it first specifically finds that there "has been a change in the
registrant's status resulting from circumstances over which the regis-
trant had no control."1 30 The matter of pre-induction reopening was
definitively treated by the Supreme Court last term with its decision in
MulIoy v. United States.'31 Post-induction reopening was before the
Court this term in Ehiert v. United States, 32 where the Court upheld
the distinction between pre-induction and post-induction reopening,
in the case of conscientious objector claims, but as will be pointed out,
did not clarify the meaning of "circumstances over which the regis-
trant had no control."
The matter of reopening is very important because of the effect
which a reopening has upon further procedural rights of the registrant.
If the board refuses to reopen the classification, the registrant cannot
appeal that decision.2 3 But if it does reopen and denies the claimed
120 It is an interesting question whether boards subsequently correct the errors
vhich have formed the basis of the procedural defense. Even if they do, there
is a "time lag" in that cases coming up today will involve processing which
occurred perhaps over a year in the past.
3032 C.F.R. § 16252 (1971).
131 398 U.S. 410 (1970).
132 Ehlert v. United States, 91 S. Ct. 1319 (1971).
'33 See 32 C.F.R. § 1625.4 (1971).
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classification on the merits, the registrant has the same rights of per-
sonal appearance and appeal as in the case of the original classifica-
tion.134 For the board to refuse to reopen, then, deprives the regis-
trant of an essential procedural right, that of further review within
the Selective Service System.135 The board cannot issue an order to
report so long as the registrant has the right to a personal appearance
or an appeal notwithstanding that he may be classified I-A. 36 Since
this is so, it is not surprising that boards often are not sympathetic
to requests for reopening, 37 and may be tempted to deny the claimed
classification on the merits under the guise of refusing to reopen. 3 8
Since the regulation reads "may reopen," the board may interpret it
to mean "we have discretion; we can reopen if we want to, but we
don't have to." The registrant will contend that the board was re-
quired to reopen his classification and that its failure to do so deprived
him of essential procedural rights. The stage is set for the assertion
of the procedural defense in its clearest form.
1. Pre-Induction Reopening and Mulloy v. United States:
The View from Within
a. Factual Background and the District Court
Since Mulloy v. United States, 3 9 the definitive case on this subject,
was my case from beginning to end, this is a particularly appropriate
area for me to approach in terms of "the view from within." Joe
Mulloy was born in the West End of Louisville, Kentucky, in 1944.
The West End is populated predominantly by blacks with some low-
income whites. It comes within the jurisdiction of Selective Service
Local Board No. 47. When Joe turned 18 he registered with that
board, a few years after another registrant by the name of Muhammed
Ali, whose classification by the board has also been before the Su-
preme Court.1 40 At Joe's trial the clerk testified that in her 17 years
with the board, no registrant had ever been assigned to civilian work
as a conscientious objector.241
134 32 C.F.R. § 1625.13 (1971).
135 Mulloy v. United States, 398 U.S. 410, 415 (1970).
13632 C..R. §§ 1624.3, 1626.41 (1971).
1"7 Prior to the present lottery system of selection, a registrant who turned 26
while an appeal or personal appearance was pending went to the bottom of the
order of call and was effectively immune from induction. This is not so today
under the recent amendments to 32 C.F.R. § 1631.7 (a) (1971).
138 See the discussion in Note, Fairness and Due Process Under the Selective
Service System, 114 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1014, 1024-26 (1966).
'39 398 U.S. 410 (1970).
340 Clay v. United States, 397 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1968), vacated sub nom.
Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 310 (1969) cert. granted, 91 S. Ct. 457 (1970).
'41 Ideally her testimony should have been that no registrant had even been
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After leaving college in 1966, Joe went to work for the Appalachian
Volunteers, an anti-poverty organization operating in eastern Ken-
tucky. He was granted an occupational deferment, which expired in
May 1967 and was not thereafter renewed. Joe tried to appeal the
resulting I-A classification at that time, but the clerk, claiming that she
did not understand he was trying to appeal,14 2 failed to send his file to
the appeals board. He was ordered to report for induction on June 17,
but this was cancelled when the matter was brought to the attention
of the State Director, who ordered the board to process the appeal.
On August 16 the appeals board voted 5-0 to retain him in the I-A
classification.
Joe had been actively engaged in the fight against strip-mining in
Pike County, Kentucky, where he was working. On August 11, 1967,
his home was raided and he was arrested and charged, along with
Alan and Margaret McSurely, with the offense of "teaching sedition."
I was involved in the case, McSurely v. Ratiff,14 3 as attorney for the
Kentucky Civil Liberties Union, and have discussed it in detail "from
within" elsewhereY41 Suffice it to say that a three-judge federal court
found that the prosecutions were undertaken at least in part for the
purpose of inhibiting organizing activities in Pike County and that the
statute in question was unconstitutional on its face. 4 ' On Septem-
ber 14, 1967, the court enjoined all prosecutions under the statute.
Joe and his wife, Karen, had been pretty shaken by the experience and
went to the home of Karen's parents in Rhode Island to recuperate.
When Joe got back to Kentucky, he found that on September 21 the
draft board had issued another order to report. This was despite the
fact that the sedition charges were still pending, since the right of the
state officials to appeal did not expire until November 17. A charge
of flourishing a deadly weapon, which was subsequently dismissed,
was also pending against him in Pike County. Because of the pending
prosecutions the second order to report for induction was illegal, and
again, at the instance of the State Director, the board cancelled it.
given a conscientious classification. This bombshell, however, came about when
I was questioning the clerk as to orders to report for civilian work. She testified
that she had never had such orders in her board. I decided to let well enough
alone.
142 In Joe's letter of Alay 19, 1967, he said, "This letter is an official appeal to
you to review and reconsider my request for an occupational deferment." After
he had been ordered to report for induction, the clerk wrote him a letter asking
whether he wanted a personal appearance or an appeal. The correspondence
continued until the state director intervened.
343 282 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Ky. 1967).
144 Sedler, The Dombrowski-Type Suit as an Effective Weapon for Social Change:
Reflections from Without and Within (pt. 2), 18 KAN. L. REv. 629, 631-639 (1970).
141 Id. at 638.
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While Joe was in Rhode Island he came to grips with the question
of his draft status, and, as he wrote in his letter to the board, "after
much thinking, seeking, and questioning of my own religious upbring-
ing and political experience I have concluded that I am a conscientious
objector and I am therefore opposed to war in any form." I know the
kind of person Joe is and I am aware of the internal struggles that
many young men go through in deciding whether they will claim con-
scientious objector status. I also know that some decide that they
cannot in good faith make the claim."46 Some local board officials do
not have this knowledge and may assume that if a registrant fails to
make his claim for conscientious objection when he first registers at
age 18, he cannot be sincere. This clearly was the attitude of Joe's
board and probably was the attitude, at least toward Joe, of the district
judge, who stated when sentencing Joe to five years imprisonment
and a fine of $10,000, that Joe had "suffered an instant conversion
when [he] realized that the platoon sergeant was about to blow his
whistle. "147
Joe completed the Selective Service System Form 150 and returned
it on October 26, 1967. His claim was that of a "conventional C.O."
based on his Catholic religious beliefs and, as the Supreme Court ob-
served, ". . . it is clear that the petitioner's SSS Form 150 and the
accompanying letters constituted a prima facie showing that he met the
statutory standard for classification as a conscientious objector .... ,11,8
Joe gave very detailed answers to all of the questions on the form,
stating among other things that he believed in a Supreme Being and
that his religious training taught him that it was "against God's law
to kill." He further stated that to be a member of the armed forces
of any country would oblige him to kill or indirectly assist in killing.
Among the supporting letters was one from a Catholic priest. 49 When
Joe submitted the form, he also requested a personal appearance be-
fore the board and was advised that, although he was not entitled to
appear before the board, the board would grant him a "courtesy
interview."
The courtesy interview took place on November 9 and lasted about
10 or 15 minutes.'5  Three out of the four board members were pres-
ent. Joe claimed that the board members were very hostile and that
he was asked questions such as: "Why didn't you file for conscientious
146 Don Pratt was one of these.
'147 United States v. Mulloy, 412 F.2d 421, 426 (6th Cir. 1969) (court of appeals
quoting the district court judge's remarks with approval).
148 Mulloy v. United States, 398 U.S. 410, 417 (1970).
149The Supreme Court discussed the form and supporting letters in some
detail. Id. at 412-13.
250 Id. at 413.
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objector status earlier? . ..Aren't you just filing to get out of the
draft? ... Don't you feel any obligation to your country?" The board
members denied this and in fact testified that they did not ask any
questions at all. It is interesting to note that Joe's draft file contained
all of the clippings on the sedition case and on his other activities. At
the conclusion of the interview, according to the chairman, "The board
came to the conclusion that there was no merit to his contention that
he was entitled to conscientious objector status." A formal vote was
not taken at that time, however, because there was still some question
as to the pending charges against Joe in the state courts.151 A few
days later Joe sent a strong letter to the board, detailing his beliefs
more fully, stating his opposition to the Vietnam war, and saying
among other things:
I feel that you are going to try to draft me anyway, regardless of my
feelings. I have not made up my mind as yet. If I decided to go into the
Army I will of course do everything in my power to teach my fellow
soldiers the truth about Vietnam and Non-violent principles. I will
actively organize resistance. If I choose not to go into the Army I will
resist induction and make the biggest stink about it possible. I must do
this to bear witness to my beliefs and to cause my fellow citizens to think.
I will discuss more about the courtesy interview and this letter later.
In any event, the board met again on January 11, 1968, with four
members present, 15 2 and, as was noted on the Face Sheet, "All infor-
mation in the file was considered including claim of Conscientious
Objector. All Members present felt this information did not warrant
re-opening of I-A class." When Joe received notification of the board's
action, he wrote to the board on January 21, stating that he considered
his case to have been reopened, and that he wanted to appeal its fail-
ure to classify him I.-O. On January 23, the board replied that it did
not consider his case to have been reopened and that he had no right
to appeal. At the same time he received an order to report for induc-
tion on February 23, 1968. At this point Joe asked me if I would take
his case.1 3 I agreed and thus began a career of sorts as a draft resist-
ance lawyer.
I had a student assistant do some quick research, and this indicated
to me very clearly what would be our essential position: (1) since
Joe presented a prima facie case for classification as a conscientious
objector, the board was required to reopen the classification; (2) the
15 The board apparently realized that it could not induct him in these
circumstances.
152 This meeting included one member who had not been present at the courtesy
interview.
263 As I said earlier, Joe did not consult me until after the board had denied
the request for reopening. If I had been advising him during his dealings with
the board, I think I would have tried to tone down the letter-at a minimum I
would have eliminated "stink."
1146 IOWA LAW REVIEW [VCOL 56
THE PROCEDURAL DEFENSE
board could only refuse to reopen the classification by deciding the
claim against him on the merits, and if it did that there was a .de facto
reopening; (3) either way he was entitled to an administrative appeal.
It was that position which was ultimately sustained by the Supreme
Court some two and a half years later. 54
Since the Sixth Circuit had previously allowed a pre-induction
suit to challenge a failure to reopen in Townsend v. Zimmerman,'1 5 I
assumed that I could bring one now unaffected by Section 10(b) (3)
of the Selective Service Act.56 I did so on February 8, 1968, and the
court scheduled a hearing on February 16. At that time the govern-
ment argued that the suit was barred by 10 (b) (3) and that on the
merits, (1) the board did not in fact reopen, because it assumed the
truth of Joe's allegations and assumed that he was sincere, and (2)
that he was really renewing the previously rejected request for an
occupational deferment and so did not make out a prima facie case
for classification as a conscientious objector. I put on the testimony
of Joe and the chairman of the board, and Joe's file was introduced
into evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district judge
denied relief and dismissed the complaint on the utterly incredible
ground that the request for classification as a conscientious objector
was made after Joe had been ordered to report for induction on Octo-
ber 16, totally ignoring the fact that this induction order had been
cancelled as having been improperly issued. Even the government
had not argued that this was a post-induction claim, and this issue was
not raised subsequently. In any event, we were now out of court and
faced with an order to report for induction, which Joe was not going
to obey. I will not speculate on why the judge did what he did,5 7
except to say that I could not believe it at the time. I immediately
filed a notice of appeal to the Sixth Circuit along with a motion for an
interlocutory injuction pending appeal. That motion was denied on
February 22, 1968, and the next day Joe refused to submit to induction.
Joe was indicted by the grand jury on March 11, and was arraigned
on March 18. At the time of arraignment I moved to dismiss the in-
dictment on the ground that the order to report for induction was
invalid because of the procedural violations. 58 We stipulated that the
1
54 Mulloy v. United States, 398 U.S. 410, 418 (1970).
15 237 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1956).
156 The courts are presently divided on this question. See notes 606-17 infra and
accompanying text.
157 1 should have been forewarned. When I spoke to the judge in chambers
seeking a hearing after I had filed the suit, his first statement was, "So you have
a client who is trying to get out of the draft."
158 1 also raised the same constitutional challenges which I raised in United
States v. Pratt, 412 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1969). See note 13 supra.
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record in the civil suit should form a part of the record in the criminal
proceedings, so that the judge trying the criminal case, who was not
the judge who heard the civil suit, could rule on the procedural de-
fense independently. On March 22, 1968, the judge entered an order
overruling the motion to dismiss, stating that the actions of the board
were proper in all respects.
The case was tried before a jury on April 5. I had unsuccessfully
challenged the composition of the jury panel,'5 9 and perhaps by way
of excuse for my poor performance, since the jury was out no more
than seven minutes before returning a verdict of guilty, I want to say
something about that composition.' 10 The median age of the jury panel,
purportedly Joe's "peers," was 56. There were three who were above
80 years of age, and nine who were above 70, contrasted with three
who were under 40 and one who was under 30. Roughly classified by
occupation, there were six corporation officials, including three presi-
dents, six business proprietors, five farmers, eleven professional per-
sons, seven "other business and employees," eight government em-
ployees, and five "blue collar workers," consisting of a secretary, a
retired shoeshiner, a maintenance worker, a packer, and a retired
domestic worker. Of- the 68 members from Louisville, 42 lived in the
East End, which is the upper-income area with a much smaller popu-
lation than the West End (lower income and black) or South End
(predominantly white, lower middle-class). It was before a jury
selected from this pamel that I tried to put on the defense that the
draft board was biased and that it did not give fair consideration to
Joe's claim.
I had hoped to show that the board members were prejudiced
against Joe because he was an activist and an anti-poverty worker, as
demonstrated by the fact that they had collected all the clipping on
the sedition case and Joe's other activities in the file. I was not able
to build up much of a record in this regard at all and subsequently
abandoned the issue. However, the examination of the draft board
members did reveal that they had never really read Joe's file and
perhaps had not even read the Form 150. It also revealed that they
did not have the faintest understanding of what a conscientious ob-
jector was. Thus, I had what I later called my broad-based defense,
namely that Joe was denied a full and fair hearing (1) because the
board members refused to give full and fair consideration to his claim,
in particular by refusing to read with some care his Form 150, and
100 The Sixth Circuit also dismissed the challenge. United States v. Pratt, 412
F.2d 426, 427 (6th Cir. 1969). I did not pursue it in my Petition for Certiorari
in either case.
10oThe composition of the panel was clearly reflected in the jury before whom
the case was tried.
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(2) because they lacked a minimum understanding of the applicable
statute and regulations so as to be able to pass intelligently on his
claim.
As I said earlier, the courtesy interview lasted about 10 or 15 min-
utes, and after it was over the board made the effective decision to
deny the claim. What stood out clearly from the trial record was that
Joe's file, particularly the Form 150, was not carefully examined by
any member prior to the interview or at any time thereafter. Board
member Downes, for example, testified as follows:
Q. Prior to the meeting did you read his file, his Selective Service file?
A. The file is available before he presented himself, yes.Q. And you read it?
A. I scanned it because I am the newest member on this particular board
and I was not familiar with what was in his file at all.161
He did not remember having read the Form 150. The board chairman
made it clear that the only consideration of the file that took place, if
at all, was that which occurred immediately preceding the interview.
He testified that the board members "looked over his file before he
came in as we do anybody else."162 He too did not remember reading
the Form 150. Mr. Downes also testified that "[t]he only time I would
have had an occasion to even consider the file would have been during
one of the Board meetings or before the meeting started." His .decision
was based, he said, "on the basis of what was discussed, what we were
able to glean from his own statements."'163
When it came to knowledge of the applicable law, the testimony of
the board members is equally revealing. I asked board member
Downes whether he was "thoroughly familiar with the regulations
governing classification of conscientious objectors," and he answered:
"I can't say that I'm thoroughly familiar. As I indicated to you before,
I am perhaps the youngest person on the particular board." He then
stated that he had an understanding of "what a conscientious objector
is" in a general sense. This was:
Well it is my understanding that if a person declares that he is a con-
scientious objector that rather than going into the military he could serve
in some other capacity.164
I observed in my brief that if a registrant could obtain conscientious
objector status simply by "saying" that he was one, Joe would not
have been under a sentence of five years' imprisonment. The dialogue
continued:
161 Appendix to the Briefs at 75, Mulloy v. United States, 398 U.S. 410 (1970)
(emphasis added).
162 Appendix at 91.
16 3 Appendix at 80.
164 Appendix at 78.
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Q, Well, the draft board has to make that decision, doesn't it? He can'tjust do it on his own.
A. The draft Board, I thought now, was involved primarily with de-
termining the availability of people.'6 5
Board member Woling did not know what classification was to be
given to conscientious objectors. He also seemed to think that by
signing Form 150 Joe had stated that he would not perform alternate
civilian service.1 60
The board chairman, an attorney, was completely confused regard-
ing the distinction between classification in class 1-0 and in class I-A-0.
He did not know if a board could classify a person as qualified for
non-combatant service only and thought that if the board had found
that Joe was a conscientious objector, he would be classified I-A-O.1('
His understanding of a conscientious objector was "one who has con-
scientious scruples against taking another person's life even under any
circumstances.'168s This is patently erroneous, since the statutory defi-
nition is based upon opposition to war, and one who would take human
life in self-defense may still be classified as a conscientious objector.16 9
I think that I did build up a very good record demonstrating that
Joe had been denied a fair hearing. This had just the reverse effect
on the jury, who obviously identified with their peers on the board,
and seven minutes later they were back with a verdict finding Joe
guilty. A few days later Joe was given the absolute maximum sen-
tence of five years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. Then the judge
added an interesting fillip. He ruled that Joe stood committed to pay
the fine, and imposed as a condition for his admission to bail upon
appeal that he post a supersedeas bond in the amount of $10,000 guar-
anteeing payment of the fine if the conviction were affirmed. This was
in addition to the $2000 bail bond. Such a condition was clearly
improper, even without regard to the Bail Reform Act,'70 and the
Sixth Circuit later ordered that it be stricken. But this was six weeks
later. Thus, Joe Mulloy, who eventually was acquitted, ended up
spending some 39 days in jail because of an illegal condition imposed
upon his admission to bail.17'
165 Appendix at 78.
1O6 Appendix at 85.
167 Appendix at 90-91.
168 Appendix at 90.
60 Taffs v. United States, 208 F2d 329 (8th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
928 (1954).
270 See Cain v. United States, 148 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 329 U.S.
760 (1946).
171The same condition was imposed upon Don Pratt's admission to bail. The
Sixth Circuit issued an order admitting both Joe and Don to bail upon the
posting of the $2000 bond "and without other conditions." It did not indicate
that the district judge erred.
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b. The Sixth Circuit Appeal
When the case came before the Sixth Circuit, I fully expected to
obtain a reversal on the issue of reopening. The argument was the
same one which I had made all along: the board either abused its
discretion in failing to reopen since Joe had made out a prima facie
case for classification as a conscientious objector, or it reopened in fact
by engaging in evaluative consideration of the merits of the claim
under the guise of refusing to reopen. Either way Joe was entitled to
an administrative appeal, which was denied to him. I felt, as did the
Supreme Court ultimately, that there was abundant authority to sup-
port my position. On the question of duty to reopen upon the present-
ment of a prima facie case, I relied heavily on the Seventh Circuit's
decision in United States v. Freeman1 2 and the Sixth Circuit's own
decision in the earlier case of Townsend v. Zimmerman.73 In Freeman
the defendant gave rather sketchy answers to the questions in the
Form 150. He did state, however, that he believed in a Supreme Be-
ing, that he was a member of the Islam religion, and that by reason
of his religious beliefs he was opposed to participation in war in any
form. There was nothing more, and according to the dissenting judge,
"[m]ost of this data comes from statements appearing in the printed
form which were adopted by the defendant by mark or signature."'174
The court held that what he had stated was sufficient to make out a
prima facie case for classification as a conscientious objector, "[s]ince
he presented new information in the SSS Form 150 which, if true,
entitled him to reclassification."' 17 The conviction, therefore, was re-
versed. In Townsend, written by then Judge Potter Stewart, the reg-
istrant had been given a III-A classification when he was living with
his wife and children. After he and his wife separated, he was reclas-
sified I-A. They later became reconciled and he orally informed the
board chairman of this fact. The board failed to reopen his classifica-
tion on the basis of that information. This was held to be improper,
the court observing that section 1625.2 of the regulations required,
"when the basis of an application is not clearly frivolous, an inquiry
designed to test the asserted facts sufficiently to give the board a
rational base on which to put decision."'' 76 His induction was ordered
enjoined.
Other pre-Mufloy cases had clearly taken the same position, 177 and
as the Supreme Court observed in Mufloy:
-12388 F2d 246 (7th Cir. 1967).
173 237 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1956).
174 388 F.2d at 250.
175 Id. at 249.
176 237 F.2d at 377.
177 See, e.g., Application of Kansas, 385 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v.
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While differing somewhat in their formulation of precisely just what show-
ing must be made before a board is required to reopen, the courts of
appeals in virtually all Federal Circuits have held that where the registrant
has set out new facts that establish a prima facie case for a new classifica-
tion, a board must reopen to determine whether he is entitled to that
classification..7 8
In its brief the government was able to cite cases referring to a board's
discretion and sustaining a refusal to reopen, but could not cite cases
rejecting the prima facie case test.
The second prong of the argument, that the board in fact reopened by
engaging in evaluative consideration, was best demonstrated by the
Ninth Circuit case of Miller v. United States. 170 There the registrant
submitted his Form 150, as in Mulloy, after an improper order to re-
port for induction had been cancelled. The board refused to reopen
on the ground that "[t]he information submitted did not warrant
reopening of the classification." It noted that he had previously ap-
plied for enlistment in a reserve program, for which he had not been
accepted, and as a result, "it was the opinion of the board that the
registrant was seeking to avoid induction." In reversing the conviction
the court stated:
It cannot be held that the statements and information in appellantfs
letter and executed form No. 150, if true, would not be able to provide
basis for a conscientious objector classification and so could not justify a
consideration of the question of change in his classification. . . . [W]hat
the board actually did, as the implications of its minutes reflect, was to
engage in evaluative consideration and judgment that, regardless of the
prima facie sufficiency of the information submitted, it was not, when
probatively weighed against other elements in the situation, entitled to
credence as fact.
It [the board] shortcut the ... consideration of whether appellant was
entitled to a conscientious objector classification on the merits of the
probative elements of its file. It weighed the information contained in
the appellant's form against other probative factors (such as his attempted
reserve enlistment during the month preceding) and arrived at the judg-
ment that he was not in truth a conscientious objector but was merely
seeking to avoid induction. 8 0
Burlich, 257 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); United States v. Majher, 250 F. Supp.
106 (S.D.W. Va. 1966); United States v. Hestad, 248 F. Supp. 650 (W.D. Wis. 1965).
As to pre-Vietnam cases, see note 40 supra. By the time Mulloy was at the
Supreme Court level, the following cases could be added. United States v.
Turner, 421 F.2d 1251 (cd Cir. 1970); Davis v. United States, 410 F.2d 89 (8th Cir.
1969); Howze v. United States, 409 F.2d 27 (9th Ch-. 1969); Robertson v. United
States, 404 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'd on other grounds en banc, 417 F2d 440
(5th Cir. 1969).
17s 398 U.S. at 415.
170 388 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1967).
180 Id. at 975-76. A de facto reopening was also stressed by the panel discussion
in Robertson v. United States, 404 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'd on other grounds
en banc, 417 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1969). See also United States v. Melrose, 314 F.
Supp. 346 (D.S.D. 1969).
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I argued analogously that the board here weighed the information
contained in Joe's Form 150 and in the supporting letters against other
probative factors based on the information contained in the entire file,
principally his previous claim for an occupational deferment, and con-
cluded that he was not in truth a conscientious objector but an anti-
poverty worker seeking to avoid induction under the guise of being a
conscientious objector. After the Sixth Circuit decision in Mulloy, the
Fourth Circuit held in Unitecl States v. Grier,181 that a board had en-
gaged in evaluative consideration and had caused a de facto reopening
by making an extensive investigation into a request for reopening
on hardship grounds.182
On June 10, 1969, the Sixth Circuit unanimously affirmed the con-
victionL.8 3 It first pointed out that under section 1625.2 of the regula-
tions the board possessed discretion to determine whether or not it
would reopen a classification, but that under section 1625.4 it could
not reopen the classification when it was of the opinion that the facts,
if true, would not justify a change in the classification.184 The court
then said that we had contended that in determining whether to re-
open, the board was limited to consideration of only the Form 150.1"'
This was not a fair statement of our position, which was that the
Form 150, coupled with the supporting letters, demonstrated a prima
facie case for classification as a conscientious objector, which necessar-
ily required a reopening. In any event, the court went on to say that
the board had the duty to consider the entire file and to determine the
truth of the registrant's allegations. It used the example of an allega-
tion that the registrant was living with his family and said that the
board was not required to reopen on the basis of that allegation, but
that using its investigative powers under section 1625.1 (c), it could
determine whether or not the allegation was true.188 It is difficult for
me to see what determining verifiable facts has to do with determining
conscientious objector status, but I am admittedly biased. The court
next referred to the letter that Joe sent to the board after the inter-
view, quoting from it at length, and said that this letter "indicated
rather clearly that his objection to serving in the Armed Forces wasf
[sic] based on essentially political, sociological or philosophical views
and his conscience rather than on religious training and belief."'1 7 So
181 415 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1969).
'
8 2 The board requested a report on the registrant's family from the county
welfare department. It also requested that the registrant's brother meet with
the board and questioned him about the family situation.
383 Mulloy v. United States, 412 F.2d 421 (6th Cir. 1969).
184 Id. at 424.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 425.
187 Id
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too, it said, the board could consider the fact that Joe had not filed for
conscientious objector status when he first registered with the board
in 1963. The court referred to a letter from Joe's brother in which it
was said, "I believe my brother to be sincere concerning his feelings
and he has maintained this position for a number of years," and asked,
"If this were true, why did he wait so long to inform the Board?' 18
In determining whether the board abused its discretion, the court ap-
plied the basis-in-fact test which is applicable to review of a substan-
tive classification, and found that there was a basis in fact for the
board's action in refusing to reopen.18 9 As to Miller and Freeman, on
which it had said I relied, it observed -that they "involved different
facts and were inapposite."'90 The court concluded:
We are of the opinion that there was a rational basis for the Board's de-
termination that Mulloy had not established a case of conscientious ob-jection, and that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying his
request to reopen the classification. In our judgment he did not make
out a prima facie case of conscientious objection, and the additional in-
formation that he supplied did not justify a change in his classification....
In our judgment, the courtesy hearing granted did not constitute a re-
opening of the classification. Other claims of error have been considered
and are insufficient to warrant reversal.291
To say the least I was stunned by the decision.
An analysis of why a court decided a case the way it did may be
questionable when it comes from the losing lawyer. It is clear, I think,
that the Sixth Circuit believed that Joe was not a conscientious ob-
jector, and I argued in my Supreme Court brief that they engaged in
the same evaluative consideration of the claim on the merits as did the
local board. The questioning from the bench showed that at least one
judge on the Sixth Circuit was incensed by the letter that Joe sent to
the board, and it may be significant that that court quoted from the
letter at length in the opinion, as well as saying that it indicated that
Joe's opposition to war was not religious. If I had to try to explain
the decision, I would say that in my admittedly biased opinion the
court's approach to the issue of reopening, which was before it, was
colored by its view of the substantive question of whether Joe was a
conscientious objector, which was not before it. Because the court did
not consider Joe to be a conscientious objector, it would have been
difficult for it to accept my procedural argument. It is said that,
hard cases make bad law, and after Muloy the "law" of the Sixth
28 8 Id. at 426.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 425.
'19'Id. at 426. My "other arguments" related principally to the denial of a full
and fair hearing.
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Circuit on the issue of reopening was "bad," at least from the stand-
point of a registrant trying to assert that procedural defense.
c. Vindication by the Supreme Court
I will not try to speculate on the factors which may have caused the
Supreme Court to grant certiorari. It had never before granted cer-
tiorari in a case involving the day-to-day operations of a local board,
and I was not optimistic that it would do so in Mulloy. But it did,
and I could see no reason for its so doing except to reverse the deci-
sion of the Sixth Circuit. The fact that the Supreme Court decision
was unanimous would lend some credence to this view.An analysis of a case by the winning lawyer may not be any more
persuasive than one by the losing lawyer. I do think it is fair to say,
however, that the Supreme Court fully accepted the proposition that
we had been asserting from the beginning: that the board was re-
quired to reopen because Joe had made out a prima facie case for
classification as a conscientious objector and that it could have refused
to open only by engaging in evaluative consideration of the claim on
the merits. The Court, through Mr. Justice Stewart, stated:
Where a registrant makes nonfrivolous allegations of facts that have not
been previously considered by his Board, and that, if true, would be
sufficient under regulation or statute to warrant granting the requested
classification, the Board must reopen the registrant's classification unless
the truth of these new allegations is conclusively refuted by other reliable
information in the registrant's file. [citing United States v. Burlich'92]
For in the absence of such refutation there can be no basis for the Board's
refusal to reopen except on evaluative determination adverse to the reg-
istrant's claim on the merits. And it is just this sort of determination
that cannot be made without affording the registrant a chance to be heard
and an opportunity for an administrative appeal.193
In the Supreme Court the government had virtually conceded that Joe
had made out a prima facie claim for conscientious objector status.
It now argued that the board could have found that Joe was not sin-
cere. This was a complete departure from its previous position, which
was that the board assumed he was sincere, so that there was no eval-
uative consideration. 9' The Sixth Circuit, in my opinion, assumed
that he was not sincere, and I am sure that the board members as-
sumed it too; after all, he did not fie when he was 18 and he was a
"social activist." Since the original theory of the government's case,
however, was that there was neither a prima facie showing nor eval-
uative consideration, the board members testified that they assumed
Joe was sincere. The Supreme Court gave the insincerity argument
short shrift, observing that:
192 257 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
193 398 U.S. at 416.
1941 strongly emphasized the government's departure from its previous position
both in my Reply to Brief in Opposition to Certiorari and in my main brief.
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There is, however, but scant evidence in the record that the board's action
was based on any such grounds. And, in any event, it is on precisely such
grounds as these that board action cannot be predicated without a reopen-
ing of the registranles classification, and a consequent opportunity for an
administrative appeal.195
The Court concluded:
Since the petitioner presented a nonfrivolous, prima facie claim for a
change in classification based on new factual allegations which were not
conclusively refuted by other information in his file, it was an abuse of
discretion for the board not to reopen his classification, thus depriving him
of his right to an administrative appeal. The order to report for induction
was accordingly invalid, and his conviction for refusing to submit to in-
duction must be reversed. 196
With the decision in. Multoy, the law applicable to pre-induction re-
opening should be substantially clearer.
I want to comment on the references to "nonfrivolous allegations of
fact" and "allegations conclusively refuted by other reliable informa-
tion in the registrant's fie." Justice Stewart had used the phrase
"not clearly frivolous" in the opinion in Townsend v. Zimmerman,197
and also observed in a footnote to Mul oy that the board need not
reopen when the claim is "plainly incredible."198  In his questioning
from the bench he used the example of a registrant claiming that he
was a United States Senator. I agreed that the board would not be
required to reopen in those circumstances and drew the analogy to a
motion for summary judgment-a board is not required to reopen
when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Using the
same analogy, I said that the board would not have to reopen in a case
such as the one where a registrant claimed he was a student at a par-
ticular university as of a certain date, and there was a letter in his
file from the registrar of that university stating that he was dismissed
on that date. 99 In other words, a reopening is required where the
new facts, if true, would entitle the registrant to the claimed classifica-
tion and it cannot be said that "there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact." That would encompass both the situation where the
registrant claimed to be a United States Senator, which is "clearly
frivolous," and the situation where the eligibility for the classification
depends on verifiable facts which have conclusively been established
to be untrue. Except in these extremely limited circumstances the
board must reopen upon the presentment of a prima facie case.
195 398 U.S. at 417 (emphasis added).
190 398 U.S. at 418.
197 237 F.2d 376, 377 (6th Cir. 1956).
218 398 U.S. 410, 418 n.7.
1O9 This would cover the example used by the Sixth Circuit in Mulloy, of the
registrant claiming a fatherhood deferment who, in fact, was no longer living
with his family.
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d. Unresolved Issues
There are now two remaining problems in this area. The first is the
determination of what is sufficient to establish a prima facie case.
The second involves determining when there has been a request for
a reopening.
(1) Prima Facie Case
Murfloy, a case which is not limited to conscientious objector situa-
tions,2° ° says that a registrant seeking conscientious objector status
establishes a prima facie case when, based on his answers to the Form
150 and the supporting information, if any, he comes within the statu-
tory standard. This requires that on the basis of his religious training
and belief he must be opposed to participation in war in any form.20°
In other classifications, the sufficiency of the information will depend
on the basis for the deferment sought. It may also make a difference
whether the request for the same classification has been made previ-
ously.20 2 Most of the cases here involve requests for ministerial or
hardship deferments. As to ministerial deferments, the standard is
"full-time minister of religion" and, as is known, most of the minis-
terial cases involve Jehovah's Witnesses, all of whom are considered
"ministers" by the sect, but not by draft boards or the courts. A re-
fusal to reopen the classification of a Jehovah's Witness has been sus-
tained where the evidence did not show that he was working enough
hours to qualify as a full-time minister. Thus, in Robertson v. United
States"3 the court found that the registrant had been spending only
between 30 and 40 hours per month as a Vacation Pioneer and that
the Watchtower Society itself would not contend for a IV-D classifica-
tion for such persons.20 4 In Fore v. United States205 the registrant
sought a reopening on the basis of a letter showing that he was ap-
pointed to serve as a Vacation Pioneer and that he intended to work
75 hours per month at his ministry. The court held that he did not
establish a prima facie case because "expression of future intent does
20 The district judge in Mulloy, however, has held that it is not applicable to
requests for occupational deferments, since the board has "discretion" to refuse
an occupational deferment. Watson v. Birdsong, Civil No. 6673 (Wi). Ky., Sept.
18, 1970). The case is now on appeal and it will be interesting to see how the
Sixth Circuit views Mulloy.
201 MSSA § 6(j), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (Supp. V, 1970).
2021 emphasized that Joe had not claimed conscientious objector status previ-
ously and gratuitously conceded a higher standard of sufficiency for a claim
previously made. Cf. Woo v. United States, 350 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1965).
203 417 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1969).
204 Id. at 445.
205 395 F.2d 548 (loth Cir. 1968).
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not satisfy the requirements for a regular and ordained minister. '1206
In these cases it appears that the court's review of the failure to re-
open does not differ materially from its review of whether there was
a basis in fact for the substantive classification.207 This seems justi-
fiable, however, because the new facts, even if true, would still not
entitle the registrant to the claimed classification. So long as it is
clear that the registrant is not devoting enough time to the ministry
to be considered a full-time minister, the refusal to reopen would be
proper. But if there is an element of judgment involved, in that the
amount of time might under the circumstances be sufficient to qualify
him for a ministerial exemption, the board must reopen so that the
registrant can establish sufficiency at a personal appearance and so that
the appeal board can make the same evaluative consideration.
A more difficult question is presented when the board refuses to
reopen upon the presentment of a claim for a hardship deferment.
The deferment standard is one of "extreme hardship, ' ' 20 and this ap-
parently has caused some courts to demand a fairly high standard of
proof before the registrant can be said to have made out a prima facie
case. In United States ex rel. Luster v. McBee,2 0 a pre-Mulloy case,
the registrant had made the hardship request four times previously
and had failed to comply with the board's request that he provide a
statement of the incomes and expenses of himself and his mother
whom he claimed as a dependent. He did indicate that his sister could
not contribute to the mother's support because she had a child of her
own for which she could barely provide. The board did cancel an
order to report for induction and did grant the registrant a courtesy
interview. The court found that nearly all of the information which
he presented concerned the financial status of his sister and nephew,
whom he was not claiming as dependents. The information which he
presented on the financial status of his mother, according to the court,
"[w]as substantially the same as the board had before it when it de-
nied his request for a Il-A deferment in the fall of 1968."210 The
court also observed that he failed to supply the board with the re-
quested income statements and concluded that the new information
which he presented did not make out a prima facie case for a Il-A
deferment.
06 Id. at 554. See also Merritt v. United States, 401 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1968).
207 See, e.g., McCoy v. United States, 403 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1968); Jones v.
United States, 387 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1968). In Robertson the court relied on
McCoy. Robertson v. United States, 417 F2d 440, 445-47 (5th Cir. 1969).
208 32 C.F.R. § 1622.30 (a) (1971). The former fatherhood deferment is abolished
except for registrants holding such a deferment at the time of abolition.
200 422 F.2d 562 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 91 S. Ct. 74 (1970).
210 Id. at 569.
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In contrast, in United States v. Grier2l1 the claim for a hardship
deferment had been made for the first time when the board refused
to reopen. The court there found:
Grier's letter requesting a hardship deferment and his subsequent Selective
Service Form No. 118 questionnaire set out for the first time the facts
that his mother was a mental invalid, that his brother was enrolled in
school, and that his family was, for the most part, dependent upon him
for support. No prior information of this nature appeared in Grier's
Selective Service file. Thus, Grier's request for a hardship deferment
presented new facts not previously considered which would have made
out a prima facie case for a hardship classification.212
The board had conducted an extensive investigation and then voted
not to reopen. Since the registrant had made out a prima facie case,
and the board had obviously engaged in evaluative consideration of
the claim on the merits, the refusal to reopen was manifestly improper,
and the conviction was reversed.2 1 3
In Winfteld v. Riebel,21 4 a post-Mulloy Sixth Circuit case, the court
sustained a refusal to reopen on the ground that the registrant had not
made out a prima facie case for a hardship deferment. The registrant
had claimed a hardship deferment in 1968, and the board conducted
an investigation at that time. As a part of this investigation the board
asked a public welfare agency for information about the registrant's
family. The agency replied that the registrant's mother had informed
the agency that he had never sent any money home for the support
of his family and that he had written her that he was telling his board
that he supported his brothers and sisters in order to avoid being
drafted.21 5 He was classified I-A by the board and by the appeals
board. In July 1969 his mother sent a letter to the board asking that
her son's classification be reopened on the ground that the original
report of the welfare agency was erroneous. Eventually the board
interviewed the mother and some members of the welfare agency, and'
received money orders, receipts, and checks which the registrant pro-
duced to prove his contributions to the family. The board refused to
reopen on the ground that the registrant had failed to make out a
prima facie case. In sustaining the board's action the court detailed
the amount of contributions the registrant had made and showed that
they were exceedingly small; the most he contributed in one year was
$382, and the family's needs were estimated at $324-328 per month.21 6
211 415 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1969).
212 Id. at 1100.
213 Id. at 1100-01.
214 438 F.2d 271 (6th Cir. 1970), 3 SEL. Saav. L. REP. 3534.
215 Id. at 277. He previously had a student deferment and had received a post-
ponement of his induction. Id. at 276.
2 1 6 Id. at 278. The court also observed that there was no indication that the
registrant's contributions could not be replaced by some other family source. Id.
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I cannot disagree with the decisions in Winfield and Luster. Because
of the insignificance of the contributions in Winfield, it could not be
said that the registrant had made a substantial contribution within the
meaning of the regulation2' 7 and certainly not that his family would
suffer extreme hardship from his induction. There was simply not
enough in the new facts to require the board to engage in evaluative
consideration before refusing to reopen.21 s Luster is a little harder,
but can be justified because of the fact that the same claim had been
made four times previously and the new evidence was not substan-
tially different. The request of the board for specific additional infor-
mation and the refusal of the registrant to furnish it should also be
significant. These cases may involve degree questions concerning
whether the registrant introduced sufficient evidence so that the board
would have to engage in evaluative consideration of the merits in order
to deny the requested classification. Clearly this test was satisfied in
Grier, and the refusal to reopen was improper. The factual differences
between Grier on the one hand and Winfield and Luster on the other
may indicate the point at which the degree of sufficiency will be
reached. Perhaps another way to put it, as the Ninth Circuit did in
Howze v. United States,219 is: Would the board have a basis in fact to
grant the claimed classification on the basis of the information the
registrant submitted?220 If so, the registrant has made out a prima
facie case and the board must reopen.2 1 In light of Mulloy and the
procedural policy which the Court enunciated there,2 22 any doubts
should be resolved in favor of requiring a reopening. 22
(2) What Constitutes a Request?
In some instances boards have justified their refusal to reopen a
classification on the ground that the registrant has not made a written
2171d.
2 18 See id. at 279. The court distinguished Miller v. United States, 388 F.2d 973
(9th Cir. 1967), on the ground that there the claim had been made for the first
time and that a prima facie had been presented. Winfield v. Riebel, 438 F2d 271,
279-80 (6th Cir. 1970).
210 409 F.2d 27 (9th Cir. 1969).
220Id. at 28.
2 21 By approaching the problem in terms of a prima facie case, there is no need
to consider de facto reopening. If a prima facie case is established, the board
must reopen; if it is not established, the board cannot be said to have engaged
in evaluative consideration.
222 398 U.S. 410, 415.
223 In Straight v. United States, 413 F2d 263 (9th Cir. 1969), the registrant
advised the board that he smoked marihauna, used LSD, and considered himself
disloyal to the government of the United States. This was held insufficient to
establish a "valid prima facie claim for exemption!' on grounds of unsuitability.
Id. at 264-65.
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request for a reopening. Section 1625.2 of the regulations does pro-
vide that the board may reopen the classification "upon the written
request of the registrant" or other specified persons. 224 That section
also provides, however, that the board may reopen the classification
upon its own motion. In addition, under section 1625.1 (c) it is pro-
vided that "[t]he local board shall keep informed of the status of
classified registrants." It would seem, therefore, that a logical reading
of the regulations would require the board to reopen whenever it is
apprized of the fact that a registrant might be entitled to a different
classification. The board does reopen on its own to classify a registrant
I-A whenever it has reason to believe that the registrant is no longer
entitled to an exemption or deferment. For example, when it is noti-
fied by an educational institution that a registrant is no longer enrolled
in school, the board will invariably reopen the classification. When
it is the registrant, however, who claims that his classification should
have been reopened to consider his claim for an exemption or defer-
ment and his reclassification from I-A, the board often replies, "He
didn't ask for it in writing."
What is surprising is that some courts have indicated their accept-
ance of this narrow viewpoint. In Taylor v. United States225 the regis-
trant sent the draft board information that he had become a vacation
pioneer, but did not specifically request that his classification be re-
opened. The Ninth Circuit held that there was no request, stating that
"[h]e advised, but he did not request."2 2 6 It recently made the same
statement in a brief per curiam opinion, stating that the registrant
"sent the board some information, but did not ask for a reclassification
or assert in any way that he should be reclassified. ' 227 In United States
v. Tucker228 the court referred to a particular letter, which indicated
that the registrant had done vacation pioneering and had put in 75
hours per month preaching, as not constituting a request for a reopen-
ing. Rather, the court said it constituted an unsuccessful attempt to
comply with instructions listed in the classification questionnaire. The
court also noted that the registrant must have been aware of the
procedures for requesting a reopening, since he had requested one
before.2 29
Such an approach is very questionable and has increasingly been
22432 C.F.R. § 16252 (1971).
225 285 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1960).
226 Id. at 704. See also Shaw v. United States, 264 F.2d 118, 120 (9th Cir. 1959).
227 United States v. Robley, 423 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1970).
228 374 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1967).
2291d. at 733. There were other letters relating to his ministerial work, but
they came after the order to report had been issued. Id. at 734.
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rejected. In Townsend v. Zimmerman230 an oral communication was
held sufficient. In United States v. Thompson 231 a letter styled as an
"appeal" was held to constitute a written request to reopen.3 2 More
importantly, so long as the board is on notice that there may be new
facts entitling a registrant to a different classification, it should be
required to consider reopening. If the information is sufficient to show
that the registrant has made out a prima facie case, it should reopen
immediately and obtain such further information as may be necessary
to determine the merits of the claim. If the information is not suffi-
cient, it should advise the registrant to submit additional information.233
A good illustration of the need for inquiry is United States v.
Pollero.234 The registrant, who had been classified as a conscientious
objector, was sent Form 152, which required him to supply three types
of civilian work he might perform in lieu of induction. He returned
the form uncompleted, but submitted a letter saying that he intended
to refuse civilian work and that he was " . .. going to be ordained a
Jehovah's Witness soon and begin the pioneer work." There were
subsequent communications in which he indicated that he was enrolled
in the theocratic Ministry School. The district court directed a judg-
ment of acquittal on the ground that the board had arbitrarily refused
to reopen. In the court's view the board was required to make an
inquiry as to the nature and extent of the registrant's studies in order
to determine whether he was entitled to classification as a ministerial
student. In regard to the absence of a specific request for reopening,
the court stated:
I do not consider it significant that Pollero did not indicate in so many
words that he was seeking a IV-D classification. The local board was on
notice that Pollero intended to refuse civilian employment and that he
sought its aid in allowing him to proceed to become a Pioneer. Only a
reclassification from his I-0 status could accomplish what defendant
sought, and the personnel at the local board were well aware of that fact.
Where the registrant has not purposely or negligently declined to request
a classification, the standards binding the board are no different than they
would be had the registrant specifically asked for the reclassification. 235
In United States v. Ford236 the facts requiring a reopening came
from other sources, and the registrant had made no request at all. His
Doctor had sent a letter to the board stating that the registrant was
neurotic and that induction might have severely destructive results. His
230 237 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1956).
231 431 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1970).
232 Id. at 1270. The Court also found that the board treated the letter as a re-
quest for a reopening and in effect had denied it. Id, at 1270-71.
233 This is clearly its responsibility. See 32 C.F.R. § 1625.1 (c) (1971).
234 300 F. Supp. 808 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
235 Id. at 811 n.4.
238 431 F.2d 1310 (1st Cir. 1970).
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psychiatrist sent a letter stating that the registrant had a pathological
personality and that military service would harm him and possibly
others. The clerk forwarded the letters to the induction center, where
an army psychiatrist, after examining the registrant, found him accept-
able. In holding that there was a violation of section 1625.2 of the
regulations, the court read Mulloy as requiring a reopening upon the
presentment of a prima facie case even though no request for a reopen-
ing had been made. It emphasized that under section 1625.1(b), the
board could reopen on its own motion and that the quantum of proof,
which is the presentment of a prima facie case, was the same whether
the registrant made the request or the board acted on its own. Because
of the right to a personal appearance and appeal attendant upon re-
opening, "[t]he effect of a board's failure to reopen upon receipt of
new information is a denial of these essential procedural rights."23 7
Thus, said the court: "We see no logical basis for differentiating be-
tween cases where the registrant files a request based on non-frivolous
grounds and those where, from other sources, information of equiva-
lent weight is supplied. In either case 'whether or not a reopening is
granted is a matter of substance'."238 The failure of the board to con-
sider the letters was not cured, of course, by the subsequent psychi-
atric examination, since the failure to reopen denied the registrant his
procedural rights under the regulations.
In practice, this requirement may mean that the clerk must review
all communications from registrants2 9 to determine whether the regis-
trant is providing information that would, if true, entitle him to a
different classification. The clerk cannot simply file them unless they
specifically request a reopening of the classification. This burden will
not be great, however, and seems to be required by the clear import
of section 1625.1 (c) and section 1625.2.
The ultimate effect of Mulloy, then, will be to sustain the procedural
defense of pre-induction failure to reopen so long as the registrant who
has requested a reopening has presented new facts which, if true,
would entitle him to the claimed classification or, even when the reg-
istrant has not made a specific request, 'if the board is in the possession
of new facts which might entitle him to a different classification.240
237 Id. at 1312 (emphasis added).
23s Id. at 1312-13.
239 Some anti-war registrants try to "educate" the board and can become pro-
lific letter-writers. This raises the question of whether the duty to examine the
communications extend to such registrants.
'20 Where the board is put on notice that the registrant may have a valid claim
for a different classification, the burden should be on it to make further inquiry,
such as directing the registrant to submit more information. See 32 C.R. §
1625.1 (c) (1971).
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2. Post-Induction Reopening
Section 1625.2 of -the regulations distinguishes between a reopening
prior to the receipt of an order to report for induction or civilian work
and a reopening following the issuance of such an order.241 Both with
respect to requests for reopening and reopening on the board's own
motion, the regulation provides:
[T]he classification of a registrant shall not be reopened after the local
board has mailed to such registrant an Order to Report for Induction (SSS
Form 252) or an Order to Report for Civilian Work and Statement of
Employer (SSS Form 153) unless the local board first specifically finds
that there has been a change in the registrants status resulting from
circumstances over which the registrant had no control.2 42
In light of this distinction, then, when the request for reopening 243 is
made post-induction, the board is required to reopen only if (1) the
registrant made out a prima facie case for the claimed classification
(Mulloy), (2) the facts giving rise to the claim were due to circum-
stances beyond the registrant's control, and (3) the facts giving rise
to the claim occurred substantially contemporaneously with the issu-
ance of the order or thereafter.2 4 4
a. Circumstances Beyond the Registrant's Control
The distinction made by section 1625.2 between pre-induction and
post-induction reopening has been upheld as a proper exercise of the
power of the Selective Service System to make reasonable timeliness
rules for the presentation of claims for exemption or deferment .2 4
Most of the post-induction cases have involved the question of whether
the facts giving rise to the claim were "due to circumstances beyond the
registrant's control." In Clark v. Volatile2 4 the registrant sought an
occupational deferment on the ground that he had been offered a
teaching position after the issuance of the induction order..2 47  He
24132 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1971).
242 Id.
243 1 will assume that a specific request has been made. What I have said, how-
ever, about the duty to inquire may be equally applicable here.
244 If the facts had occurred earlier and were not reported to the board, the
board may be justified in refusing to reopen on that ground. See United States
v. Beaver, 309 F.2d 273, 276 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963);
Keene v. United States, 266 F.2d 378, 384 (10th Cir. 1959); United States v.
Lemmon, 313 F. Supp. 737, 738 (D. Ad. 1970); cf. McKart v. United States, 395
U.S. 185 (1969). Under 32 C.FR. § 1625.1(b) (1971), the registrant is required
to report new facts within 10 days after they occur. But so long as they were
reported pre-induction, it is doubtful if the failure to comply with the "10 day
rule" would have any effect.
24G Ehlert v. United States, 91 S. Ct. 1319 (1971).
246 427 F2d 7 (3d Cir. 1970).
247 Id. at 9.
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argued that the availability of the position was generated by the
emergency withdrawal of the teacher whose job he had assumed2 48
The Third Circuit observed that the registrant had voluntarily ac-
cepted the teaching position so that his becoming a full-time teacher
was not involuntary nor beyond his control.249 The court felt that his
teaching status did not result from the sudden vacancy but from his
voluntarily choosing to fill that vacancy.250 In Kurjan v. Local Board
No. 58,251 however, a district court case in the same circuit, the court
found that a change of status from a graduate student to a salaried
employee in an essential occupation which occurred after the issuance
of the order, could constitute a change due to circumstances beyond
the registrant's control.2 52 Since the board did not make the specific
finding as to circumstances beyond the registrant's control, the refusal
to reopen was held to be improper.2 3 These cases illustrate possible
differing interpretations of circumstances beyond the control of the
registrant in what I call the ordinary classification case.
Practically all of the litigation, however, has revolved around post-
induction claims for classification as a conscientious objector, and this
issue has been settled by the Supreme Court's decision in Ehliert v.
United States.254 Prior to the decision in Ehiert, the lower courts were
split on the question of whether post-induction crystallization of con-
scientious-objector beliefs constituted a circumstance beyond the
registrant's control. The Second Circuit answered this question in
the affirmative in United States v. Gearey,255 holding that the induc-
tion order could be a catalyst, causing a registrant "finally to crystallize
248 Id.
2491d. at 10.
250 Id. The court also found that the evidence was "insufficient' to establish a
de facto reopening. Id. at 11.
251 314 F. Supp. 213 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
252 Id. at 220.
2531d. at 220-21. The court also found-that the board had engaged in evaluative
consideration, thereby reopening de facto. Id. at 221-22. See notes 294-98 infra
and accompanying text. As to post-induction reopening of claims for hardship
deferments, see Lane v. Allen, 307 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Ohio 1969). In United States
v. Dell'Anno 436 F.2d 1198 (9th Cir. 1971), it was held that the registrant's post-
induction impregnation of his fiancee and his subsequent marriage to her was not
"due to circumstances beyond the registrant's control" so as to entitle him to a
"fatherhood" deferment. Id. at 1200. However, in Wright v. Selective Service Sys-
tem Local Board No. 105, 319 F. Supp. 509 (D. Minn. 1970), it was held that where
the conception occurred prior to the issuance of the induction order, but was not
discovered until afterwards, there was a change in status "due to circumstances
beyond the registrant's control" Id. at 514-15.
2491 S.Ct. 1319 (1971). 7 - ' I
255368 F.2d 144 (2d Cir12 1966) - See alo United States v. Gearey, 379, F2d 915
(2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 959 (1967).
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and articulate his once vague sentiments.""2 6 The Gearey doctrine had
been accepted in the Third,257 Seventh,258 Tenth, 59 and District of
Columbia Circuits, 2 60 and rejected in the Fourth,26 ' Fifth,262 Sixth,263
and Ninth Circuits.
2 6
4
In Eldert the Court refused to "take sides in the somewhat the-
ological debates about the nature of 'control' over one's own conscience
which the phrasing of this regulation has forced upon so many federal
courts.126 Instead it upheld the regulation as applied to post-induction
claims of conscientious objection on the ground that these claims could
be asserted through military channels after the registrant had sub-
mitted to induction.26"1 Although the applicable Army regulation26 7
refers only to conscientious objection that "develops subsequent to
entry into the military service," the Court accepted the assurances of
the government that claims that arose post-induction, but pre-entry,
would be processed as well. Since the Court viewed the statutory
exemption for conscientious objectors as being one from "combatant
training and service," and since the registrant would not be required
to undergo combatant training until his claim had been processed by
the military authorities,268 it found that it was "reasonable" to require
the registrant to present his claim to the military authorities rather
than to his local board.26 Therefore, under the "reasonably, consist-
ently applied administration-interpretation" test, it was able to hold
that section 1625.2 barred board consideration of post-induction con-
scientious objection claims, and that this bar did not violate any
statutory rights of the registrant. Justice Douglas dissented on the
2556 United States v. Gearey, 368 F.2d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 1966).
25 7 Scott v. Volatile, 431 F.2d 1132, 1135 (3d Cir. 1970).
258 United States v. Nordlof, No. 18051 (7th Cir., Jan. 5,1971), 3 SE.. Szav. L. RP.
3546 (1971). The court overruled United States v. Schoebel, 201 F.2d 31 (7th Cir.
1953), and later cases which were based upon it.
259 United States v. Long, 435 F2d 830, 832 (10th Cir. 1971).
26
0 SAft v. Director of Selective Service, No. 24,137 (D.C. Cir., filed Mar. 16,
1971).201 See United States v. Al-Majied Muhammad, 364 F.2d 223 (4th Cir. 1966).
202Davis v. United States, 374 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1967).
263 See United States v. Jennison, 402 F.2d 51, 53-54 (6th Cir. 1968) ,cert. denied,
394 U.S. 912 (1969). However, the court also was of the view that the registrant's
views had likely matured prior to the issuance of the order to report. 402 F.2d
at 54.
264 Eblert v. United States, 422 F.2d 332, 335 (9th Cir. 1970), af'd, 91 S. Ct. 1319
(1971).
26 91 S. Ct. at 1323.
26 Id. at 1323-24.
267AR No. 635-20, 3, cited in Ehlert, 91 S. Ct. at 1324 n.10
26 See DOD Dir. No. 13C0.6 § VI(B), cited in Ehlert, 91 S. Ct. at 1324 n.9.
269 91 S. Ct. at 1322-23.
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ground that the registrant should be able to present his claim to
civilian rather than military authority.2 70 Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall dissented on the ground that there was no "consistently applied
administrative interpretation," as found by the majority.271 The three
dissenters also argued that crystallization of a belief in conscientious
objection was a "circumstance beyond the registrant's control."
On its face, the decision in Ehiert merely seems to say that a regis-
trant whose beliefs matured post-induction must assert his claim in
service rather than before the local board. The Court apparently
was sympathetic to the government's argument that the Selective
Service System was in danger of being engulfed by post-induction con-
scientious objector claims. The decision, however, cuts much more
deeply in the context of draft resistance, and it is difficult to believe
that the Court was unaware of this fact. The draft resister and the
true conscientious objector will not submit to induction. He will not
give the military authorities the opportunity to pass on his claim and,
in effect, the power to subject him to military control if the claim is
denied.2 7 2 Since he will not submit to induction, his only hope of
avoiding imprisonment is to defend successfully the criminal prosecu-
tion for refusal to submit, and one of the most effective defenses-
the board's refusal to reopen a classification-has been taken away
from those resisters who have filed a conscientious objection claim
post-induction. From this standpoint, then, Ehlert represents a retreat
from Mulloy, and in an important class of cases weakens the vitality
of the procedural defense.
b. Filing Before Issuance of the Induction Order
It will now become crucial to determine whether a particular claim
was filed prior to the issuance of the induction order. This is not as
simple a question as it would appear to be. In Blades v. United
States,273 for example, the registrant was to report for induction on
August 30. On the night of August 29, he mailed the completed Form
150 to the board.2 7 4 The envelope was postmarked August 30, and the
Form was received by the board on August 31.275 On August 30 he
refused induction.2 7 6 The court could have held that the Form was
270 Id. at 1328.
271 Id. at 1330-31.
2721 would speculate that a registrant might have a better chance with a military
Conscientious Objector Review Board than he would with most local boards. But
admittedly this is pure speculation, and in any event, the registrant with whom
we are concerned will not submit to induction.
273 407 F.2d 1397 (9th Cir. 1969).
274 ICL at 1398.
275 Id.
276 Id.
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untimely since it was not mailed until after the order for induction
was sent. Instead, the court went off on the ground that it was not
received until after the date the registrant was to report.2 7 7 In any
event, it did hold that a document has not been filed until it is actually
received by the board .2 7  Applying this reasoning to the issuance of
the induction order, the claim would not be considered pre-induction
unless it was received by the board prior to the time the induction
order has been issued.
In Mizrahi v. United States279 the same court was confronted with a
situation involving the following facts: 28' the registrant's letter request-
ing a reopening of his classification so that he might claim conscientious
objector status and asking for the Form 150 was dated February 26,
postmarked February 27, and was received by the board on February
28; the order to report for induction was mailed February 28; the
Form 150 was mailed on March 2; the completed form was received
by the board on March 8. February 27, the date of the postmark, was
on a Sunday, and the court said that it was reasonable to assume that
it was received on the 28th in the first mail delivery.28 ' It was likewise
reasonable to assume, said the court, that the order to report was pre-
pared and mailed during the day after the registrant's letter was
received.2 8 2 Any doubt was resolved in favor of the registrant. The
sending of the letter requesting the reopening and asking for the Form
150 was held to be enough to meet the requirement of "any other
written statement claiming that he is a conscientious objector" con-
tained in Local Board Memorandum 41,283 so that the registrant was
considered as having claimed conscientious objector status prior to
the issuance of the order to report for induction.2 s 4 Thus, it appears
that there are questions which remain for judicial decision in this area.
It will also make a difference whether the board has cancelled or
postponed an outstanding induction order. In United States '0. Mat-
277 Id. at 1399-1400.
278 The court observed that it was not deciding what would happen if a registrant
were to mail the Form in sufficient time to be received in the ordinary course of
the mails but it was lost or delayed in transit. 407 F.2d at 1399 n-1. See also
United States v. Daniell, 435 F.2d 834 (1st Cir. 1970).
279 409 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1969).
280 Id. at 1220-23.
281 Id. at 1223-24.
282 I8 at 1224.
283Local Board Memorandum 41, now rescinded, provided that a registrant should
have been considered to have claimed conscientious objector status if he had com-
pleted Series VII in the Classification Questionnaire, completed the 'Form 150, "or
filed any other written statement claiming that he is a conscientious objectdr."284 These cases demonstrate to me the artificiality of the distinction drawn by
the proviso to 32 C.. § 1625.1 (1971).
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tinez 85 the registrant was ordered on March 19 to report for induction
on April 9. On March 29, his induction was postponed until May 9.-86
He requested and received the Form 150 on April 9, and filed it on
April 19.287 There were subsequent postponements, the last until Oct-
ober 24. The one on May 21 postponed the induction until further
notice. If that order amounted to a cancellation, the Form 150 would
have been filed pre-induction. The court held that it did not, since
the board again notified him to report for induction on June 18 .2-
Under the regulations the local board is authorized to postpone induc-
tions for a total of 120 days.2 9 Since the period between the two
notifications was only 28 days, the court concluded that there was no
cancellation despite the reference to "until further notice. ' '29 0
In United States v. Lonidier,291 however, the defendant had been
ordered to report for induction on January 10. He indicated on the
security questionnaire 2 92 that a relative had once been a member of
the Communist Party. He was sent home and heard nothing further
from his board. On November 6 he filed the Form 150 with the board.
Eight days later the board informed him that it had voted not to re-
open because it did not specifically find that there had been a change
in circumstance over which he had no control. It also informed him
that his induction date had been postponed earlier, but that he was to
report on December 6. The court found that the board had postponed
his induction indefinitely-in point of fact for 328 days-and that this
had the effect of cancelling it.293 Thus, the Form 150 was filed pre-
induction and the board was required to reopen upon the presentment
of a prima facie case.2 94
289 427 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 91 S. Ct. 122 (1970).
2S6 Id. at 1359.
287 Id.
2
ssId. at 1360.
289 32 C.F.R. § 1632.2(a) (1971).
200 427 F.2d at 1360. The 120-day period was the basis for the decision in Hamil-
ton v. Commanding Officer, 328 F.2d 799 (9th Cir. 1964), and Parrott v. United
States, 370 F.2d 388 (9th Cir. 1966).
291427 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1970).
292 Id. at 31.
2931Id.
294 As to cancellation of one order by the issuance of another with the result
that a claim for reclassification was made pre-induction, see White v. United
States, 422 F.2d 1254, 1255 (9th Cir. 1970). See also United States v. Rundle, 413
F.2d 329 (8th Cir. 1969), where the court held that the board was required to
reopen upon the presentment of a prima facie case for a student deferment, even
though the school quarter would end a few days later. 413 F.2d at 332. In finding
prejudice because of the failure to reopen and cancel the induction order (the
claim was for a I-S deferment), the court noted that he had filed a claim for I-A-Q
classification shortly before he was to report for induction, so that if the induction
19711 1169
Thus, it would appear from these two cases just discussed that an
extended postponement of the induction may constitute a cancellation
in the eyes of a court. Since the regulations allow a 120 day post-
ponement, it is reasonable to assume that other courts faced with a
similar issue would follow Martinez and would not hold invalid an
induction postponed for less than that period. It is an open question
what the result would be with a period of over 120 days. A court
could follow the Lonidier rationale and hold that a de facto cancel-
lation had occurred. It could also rule, however, that the error was
harmless. In any event, the issue is a defense which may prove valu-
able and should be attempted whenever possible.
In view of Ehlert, it may now be asked what course is open to the
lawyer faced with a case where the registrant has sought a reopening
of his classification after an order to report has been issued. Ehlert,
it must be remembered, is limited to post-induction conscientious ob-
jector claims and does not necessarily cover what I have called the
ordinary-classification case. A post-induction claim for a hardship or
employment deferment, for example, would still raise a question as to
whether the circumstances giving rise to the claim were beyond the
registrant's control. Or suppose that following the issuance of the
order to report, the registrant "sees the light," and wants to become
a minister.29 5 If he is admitted to a seminary, must the board reopen
and classify him as a ministerial student? These questions are not
answered by Ehiert.
Most cases, of course, will involve post-induction conscientious-ob-
jector claims, and Ehlert has destroyed the failure-to-reopen defense
in those cases. But perhaps it may give rise to another defense in this
context, that of the failure to advise a registrant of his rights. As we
will see subsequently, misleading advice on the part of the clerk or
the board that was prejudicial to the registrant does constitute a de-
fense to the criminal prosecution.2 6 Affiative duties have also been
placed on the board, such as advising a registrant that an appeal agent
was available,297 or advising him to complete the Form 150 when it
appears that he may be entitled to classification as a conscientious ob-
jector,29 or responding to a request for a reopening, even though the
registrant may have been ineligible for the particular classification
order was cancelled, his I-A-O claim would be pre-induction rather than post-
induction. 413 F.2d at 332-34.295 In his dissent in Ehlert, Justice Douglas used the example of the conversion
of the Apostle Paul. 91 S. Ct. at 1325. Similar examples could be given of clergy-
men who have "received the call."2 96 See authorities cited notes 384-424 infra and accompanying text.
297 See authority cited note 424 infra and accompanying text.
298 See authorities cited notes 366-70 infra and accompanying text.
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that he sought. 99 It now appears arguable that if the board cannot
consider a post-induction claim for conscientious objector status, but
the military authorities can, the board is under a duty to advise the
registrant of this fact when it refuses to reopen. How else is the
registrant to know of his in-service remedy unless he is so advised
by the board? If he is so advised, he may well decide to submit to
induction, knowing that he can raise his claim afterwards. I would
contend that since the Supreme Court in Ehlert relied on the availa-
bility of the in-service remedy to justify the power of the boards to
refuse to consider such claims on grounds of "untimeliness," the same
justification imposes an affirmative duty on the boards to advise the
registrant of his rights in this regard.
Certainly an argument to this effect should be made in the post-
induction conscientious-objector cases. Its essential fairness should
appeal to many judges, and I would argue that it is the logical corollary
of Ehlert. In Ehlert, the Court observed that "... if... a situation
should arise in which neither the local board nor the military had
made available a full opportunity to present a prima facie conscientious
objection claim for determination under established criteria . . . a
wholly different case would be presented."300  If the board does not
advise the registrant of this right, it is difficult to see how it can be
said that this "full opportunity" has been made available to him. Since
advising him of this right imposes no burden on the boards, it should
be required.
If this defense is recognized, it will frequently be successful. Prior
to Ehlert, it was not "working knowledge" that post-induction claims
of conscientious objection could be asserted in the military, and it is
doubtful if many boards would have advised the registrant to this
effect. It may be then, that the failure-to-advise defense will serve
the same function for post-induction claims as does the failure-to-re-
open defense for claims made pre-induction. At least the effort should
be made.
B. Giving Reasons for the Classification
Unlike administrative agencies which are subject to the requirements
of the Administrative Procedure Act, selective service boards are not
required by statute to "give reasons for the denial of an application. 301
Nor does any regulation affirmatively require that the board give
reasons for its decision.302 The absence of reasons for decisions neces-
299 See authorities cited notes 371-74 infra and accompanying text.
800 91 S.Ct. at 1325.
so
3 See the discussion in Paszel v. Laird, 426 F.2d 1169, 1175 (2d Cir. 1970). See
also note 255 supra.
30 2 See United States v. Curry, 410 F.2d 1297, 1299 (1st Cir. 1969).
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sarily leaves the registrant in the dark. He can consult his file, of
course. 03 Furthermore, it is possible that reasons for a particular
decision may be contained in the board minutes"4 or otherwise gleaned
from the file. Very frequently, however, the reasons for a board's
decision will be unknown. Suppose, for example, that a registrant
applies for classification as a conscientious objector. He can be denied
that classification either on the ground that he does not satisfy the
statutory criteria or that, in the opinion of the board, he is not sincere
in his beliefs. Even if he knows which of these broad grounds was
the basis for the denial, he probably will not know the specific reasons
why the board thought he did not satisfy the statutory criteria or
was not sincere. It is perfectly possible that the minutes will have
read: "Board voted to classify registrant I-A." Similarly, a registrant
who is denied any other classification will not know the precise rea-
sons unless the file so indicates or he is told by a board member or
the clerk. Furthermore, there is no way by which he can discover
why the appeal board decides as it does, since the notification from
the appeals board merely states the classification and the vote.305
If the registrant does not know the reasons for the local board's
decision, he is not in a position on appeal to take advantage of the
provisions of section 1626.12 of the regulations, which states that:
The person appealing may attach to his appeal a statement specifying
the matters in which he believes the local board erred, may direct atten-
tion to any information in the registrant's file which he believes that the
local board has failed to consider or to give sufficient weight .... 30c
As a practical matter, the uncounselled registrant is not likely to be
aware of this provision anyway. Even if he were aware, it would not
be of much utility to him. More significantly, ignorance of the board's
reasons limits the ability of the courts to determine whether or not
there was a basis in fact for the board's substantive classification. I
would imagine that in the pre-Vietnam cases most courts would assume
that the board decided on the basis of valid reasons and would try to
find a basis in fact to support the decision on any possible ground.
It has been established, however, that when a reason for the decision
is given by a board, the decision must be sustained on that basis.
So, in the rare case where an appeals board gives a reason for its
303 32 C.F.R. § 1670.8 (a) (1) (1971).
30 4 The boards are required to keep a record of each meeting on lhe Minutes
of Local Board. 32 C.F.R. § 1604.58 (1971).
305 32 C.F.R § 1626.27 (a) (1971). "There is no statute or regulation requiring
the appeal board to make any findings of fact or conclusions of law or in any
other way indicate reasons for its decision." Gatchell v. United States, 378 F.2d
287, 291 (9th Cir. 1967).
306 32 C.F.R. 1626.12 (1971).
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decision, and there is no basis in fact 3°7 for a decision based on that
reason, the classification will be without basis in fact, even though
it might have been sustainable on other grounds.308 But if no reasons
for the decision are contained in the file or are otherwise available,
all that defense counsel can do in a criminal prosecution is call the
board members as witnesses and try to elicit the reasons from them.0 9
This will help to establish the two substantive defenses of no basis
in fact and erroneous standard of law.
Taldng administrative action without providing reasons for such
action would seem to offend elementary notions of due process of
law.1o But in the past some courts have not seemed to be particu-
larly troubled by this consideration in draft cases.311 What has hap-
pened, however, as the subsequent discussion will indicate, is that the
principle that boards need not give reasons for their action has been
gradually eroded. At least in cases involving conscientious objector
claims, an afftlmative requirement of giving reasons has now been
imposed. Some courts have held that the absence of reasons in the
particular case made it impossible to determine whether there was
a basis in fact for the classification, and have found, therefore, that
there was not.312 At least one court has found that the failure to give
reasons effectively denied the registrant his right of appeal,313 stating
that:
In permitting an appeal from the decisions of a Local Board, the regula-
tions governing the Selective Service System provide that the registrant
may specify claimed errors. 32 C.F.R. § 1626.12. The opportunity to rebut
allegedly incorrect conclusions-here, that defendant was insincere-is
essential to a meaningful appeal... . Where no facts or inferences upon
which the Local Board's conclusion is based are stated, effective rebuttal
is impossible. No advocate can persuasively assert grounds for reversal
307 See United States v. Harris, 302 F. Supp. 1194 (D. Ore. 1968), where the
board rejected the registrant's claim for conscientious objector status because he
had not been baptized in his religion. This, concluded the court, did not provide
a basis in fact for the board's finding of insincerity. Id. at 1196.308 See Gatchell v. United States, 378 F2d 287, 292-93 (9th Cir. 1967).
300 They may not remember at all or they may "bluff it." More likely, if some
notation has been made, they will probably try to expand upon it. The oppor-
tunity for "points" on cross-examination is extensive.
310 See generally Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. United States, 295 U.S. 193, 201-02
(1935).
311 The general view has been that so long as there is a record from which the
court can determine whether there was a basis in fact for the decision, the
absence of reasons for the decision is not violative of clue process. See the dis-
cussion in United States v. Morico, 415 F.2d 138, 143 (2d Cir. 1969), vacated on
other grounds, 399 U.S. 526 (1970).
312 See, e.g., United States v. Abbott, 425 F.2d 910, 913 (8th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Bryant, 293 F. Supp. 922, 933 (WD. Ark. 1968).
313 United States v. St. Clair, 293 F. Supp. 337, 345 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
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when the bases for the decision below are unknown. The right of appeal
from an administrative decision, guaranteed by the regulations, was in
effect denied. 1 4
The right-of-appeal argument, however, does not appear to have
been picked up by other courts. Rather, at least in the case of
conscientious objector claims, the courts have related the giving of
reasons to judicial review of the board's substantive classification.
So long as the Department of Justice hearing procedure was in effect,
the courts would at least have the report of the hearing officer. 15 It
was recognized that the task of the courts would be more difficult
when that procedure was abolished.31  Since the repeal of the Justice
Department hearing procedures, the courts have generally dealt with
that difficulty by requiring the boards to give reasons for their de-
cision. Now it appears that the failure to give reasons should be per se
improper and should constitute a defense to the criminal prosecution.
The matter has been well stated by the Ninth Circuit in United States
v. Haughton:17
The local board may have concluded that Haughton was insincere in his
claim, or that Haughton's religious training and beliefs did not, by them-
selves, lead him to his opposition to war. The board may have relied on
information not in the record, contradicting the allegations in Haughton's
form 150. Or the board may have erroneously concluded that Haughton's
allegations, even if true, did not entitle him to his requested classification.
Since the board has not stated the basis for its decision, we cannot de-
termine whether Haughton was properly denied conscientious objector
status.s1
And as the Fourth Circuit observed in United States v. Broyles:3 19
In any case where the board fails to disclose the basis for its decision,
we risk blind endorsement of a mistake of law. Where it is clear that a
prima facie case was established, we conclude that in conscientious ob-jector cases, it is es3ential to the validity of an order to report that the
board state its basis of decision and the reasons therefore, i.e., whether it
has found the registrant incredible, or insincere, or of bad faith, and
Vhy. 320
In addition to the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, the requirement of
giving reasons in conscientious objector cases32' has been recognized
14 Id.
315 1 would imagine that they assumed that the draft board followed the recom-
mendation of the hearing officer, if the Department of Justice recommended denial
of the claim.316 See the discussion in United States v. Back, 409 F2d 1318, 1320 (2d Cir. 1969).
317 413 F.2d 736 (9th Cir. 1969).
318 Id. at 742.
-19 423 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir. 1970).
$20 Id. at 1304.
3211 am assuming that, the courts which have required the giving of reasons
for the rejection of post-induction claims would also, on an a fortiori basis, re-
quire the giving of reasons for the rejection of a pre-induction one. This has
been the case in the Second Circuit where Deere, a pre-induction case, relied on
Paszel, a post-induction one.
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by the Second, 22 Third, 23 Seventh, 24 and Tenth3 2 Circuits, and may
be recognized in the Eighth Circuit.3 26  It has been rejected in the
First Circuit, at least in the context of deprivation of the right of
appeal.3 27  However, a district court in the First Circuit has held it
applicable in the context of determining the basis for the board's
decision3 28 Reasons need not be given where the registrant has failed
to make out a prima facie case3 29 for the claimed classification.3 1
In terms of the effect of the failure to give reasons, the Second Cir-
cuit refuses to treat the giving of reasons as essential to the validity
of the induction order. 31 It treats the issue of disclosing reasons as
one which is related only to the court's ability to determine whether
there was a basis in fact for the classification. Instead of ordering the
dismissal of the indictment, the Second Circuit remands the case to
allow the government to establish the reasons by calling the board
members.3 3 2  I would disagree with this approach. It should be
recognized that the refusal to give reasons may have prejudiced the
registrant with respect to his right of appeal. Moreover, the motiva-
tion of the Selective Service System to implement the requirement
of disclosing its reasoning will be increased if courts relate compliance
with the requirement to the validity of the induction order.
It remains an open question whether the requirement of publishing
reasons will be extended to the non-conscientious objector cases. In
Lenhard v. Officer,33 3 a case involving a claim for hardship and oc-
cupational deferments, the court found that the failure to give reasons
for the denial of the deferments prejudiced the registrant. The ration-
ale was that the registrant could have supplied additional information
if he had known why he was denied reclassification. The failure to
give reasons also made it difficult for the court to determine whether
or not there was a basis in fact for the board's action. There appears
322 See United States v. Deere, 428 F2d 1119, 1122 (2d Cir. 1970); Paszel v.
Laird, 426 F.2d 1169, 1175 (2d Cir. 1970).
323 Scott v. Volatile, 431 F.2d 1132, 1137-38 (3d Cir. 1970).
324 United States v. Lemmens, 430 F.2d 619, 624 (7th Cir. 1970).
325 See United States ex rel. Brown v. Resor, 429 F.2d 1340, 1343-44 (10th Cir.
1970).
326 United States v. Abbott, 425 F.2d 910, 913-14 (8th Cir. 1970) strongly indi-
cates that it would be.327 United States v. Curry, 410 F2d 1297, 1299-1300 (1st Cir. 1969).
328United States v. Prince, 310 F. Supp. 1161, 1165-66 (D. Me. 1970).
329 This means a prima facie case under the Mulloy standard.
330 See United States v. Wallace, 435 F.2d 12, 16 (9th Cir. 1970); United States
v. Weaver, 423 F.2d 1126, 1127 (9th Cir. 1970).
331 See United States v. Deere, 428 F.2d 1119, 1122 (2d Cir. 1970).
332 d.
333 Civil No. 70-C473 (E.D.N.Y., May 18, 1970). 3 SE.. SEnv. L. REP. 3111 (1970).
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to be no reason why this requirement should not be extended to all
cases. The registrant may often be prejudiced by the refusal to give
reasons, both in terms of supplying additional information to the
board and in terms of exercising his right of appeal. No burden is
imposed on the board by making it conform to the basic principles of
administrative procedure. The failure to give reasons may turn out
to be one of the most effective of the procedural defenses, particularly
if the courts extend it fully to the non-conscientious objector cases.
C. Improper Action of the Board During the Classification Process
1. Prejudicial Effect
In this section a number of defenses can be summarized which arise
from the day-to-day action of the boards and which often involve
conduct on the part of board employees such as the clerk. Because
of the routine nature of many of these actions and the likelihood of
mistakes occurring in any large organization, the registrant will have
to establish that he was potentially prejudiced by the action which
he contends is improper. This is perhaps best illustrated by the pre-
Vietnam case of United States v. Lawson.3 34 Among other contentions,
defendant alleged that the order to report was signed by the clerk
with a rubber stamp in violation of the regulations. 35  In rejecting
the assertion of this procedural defense, the Court stated:
It is true that the signature of the Clerk on the order was by rubber
stamp. It is equally true that the regulations disapprove rubber stamps.
Failure, however, to conform to the regulations and to other similar pro-
cedural provisions cannot be held to deprive the Board of its jurisdiction
as appellant contends. Absent some showing of prejudice to appellant due
to the failure on the part of the Board to comply with the formal pro-
cedural directive of a regulation, an order of the Board, otherwise within
its power to issue, will not be invalidated. 336
The burden of showing such prejudice has traditionally been put
on the registrant. Thus when a registrant, contending that the names
of the advisers to registrants were not conspicuously posted in the
board's offices as required,337 did not show that he was not informed
about his rights or that he could have presented his case more com-
pletely than he did, it was held that he could claim no violation of
procedural rights.3 3 8  Other examples of harmless error include the
334 337 F.2d 800, 812 (3d Cir. 1964).
335 Id. See 32 C.F.R. § 1606.24 (1971).
336 United States v. Lawson, 337 F2d 800, 812 (3:1 Cir. 1964).
337 32 C.F.R. § 1604.41 (1971).
338 See United States v. Sturgis, 342 F.2d 328, 331 (3rd Cir. 1965). See also
United States v. Helienek, 275 F. Supp. 579, 581 (E.D. Pa. 1967), wherein the
court found that the registrant was not prejudiced by the failure of the board
to notify him of the availability of the government appeal agent.
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failure to specifically notify the registrant that his appeal has been
sent to the National Appeal Board,3 9 the sending of a reclassification
notice on Selective Service Form 110,340 and the failure to notify a
registrant of the board's decision not to reopen when the registrant
knew his status at all times.341 The extent to which the requirement
of prejudice can extend is illustrated by Yeoman v. United State, 342
wherein the board failed to notify the registrant that his request for
reclassification as a minister was denied.3 43 The Court found that the
registrant was not prejudiced by the board's failure to notify him
since the only recourse open upon a refusal to reopen was to ask
review by the state and national director, both of whom had reviewed
his file. In addition, the Court said that he should have known of
the board's refusal to reopen when he received the order.3 44
One situation in which prejudice may be presumed occurs when
adverse information has been placed in the registrant's file when it
is sent to the appeals board and the registrant has no knowledge of
that information or opportunity to rebut it. The principle of Gonzales
v. United States, 345 requiring the opportunity to reply to adverse
information, is not limited to the former procedure for classifying
conscientious objectors. The fair hearing requirement is equally ap-
plicable to board proceedings. Thus, in United States v. Cabbage, 46
when an FBI report concerning certain political activities of a regis-
trant was sent to the appeals board considering the registrant's claim
for conscientious objector classification, there was "a denial of a fair
hearing required by the due process clause of the Federal Constitu-
tion," which rendered the notice to report for induction void.34-7 The
report stated that the registrant was trying to organize Black-power
followers and was being watched by the FBI. In United States v.
Gustavson,348 also involving a conscientious objector claim, the clerk
included in the file sent to the appeals board an Oral Information
Report. The report stated that the "[b]oard knows that registrant
was in a fight while going to Illinois State University and resulted in
339 United States ex rel. Lipsitz v. Perez, 372 F.2d 468, 469-70 (4th Cir. 1967).
340 Thompson v. United States, 380 F.2d 86, 88' (10th Cir. i967).
34' Jones v. United States, 387 F.2d 909, 912 (5th Cir. 1968).
342 400 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1968).
343 Id. at 796. Such action is required of the board whenever it denies a request
for a reopening. 32 C.F.R. § 1625A (1971).
344 Id.
345 348 U.S. 407 (1955).
346 430 F.2d 1037 (6th Cir. 1970).
s47 Id. at 1041. See also Nevarez Bengoechea v. Micheli, 295 F. Supp. 257 (D.P.R.
1969), wherein the State Director sent statements to the appeal board which were
prejudicial to the registrant's claim for an occupational deferment. Id. at 259.
3 43 No. CR 69-374 (N.D. Ill., Dec. 23, 1969), 3 Sm. SERv. L. REP. 3099 (1971).
19711 1177
breaking a Wesleyan student's jaw." In United States v. Owen3 4 the
board, in clear violation of the regulations, had allowed a minister to
see the registrant's file, and when the appeal board was considering
the registrant's conscientious objector claim the minister's adverse
comments were forwarded to it.3 50 In these cases it was the inclusion
of the adverse information without allowing the registrant the op-
portunity to rebut, which furnished the basis of the due process vio-
lation. Presumably if the registrant has been advised of the informa-
tion and given the opportunity for rebuttal, there will have been
nothing improper in sending the information to the appeals board. 5"
Moreover, when it has been established that the communication con-
tained nothing derogatory to the registrant or prejudicial to the
classification which he was seeking, the refusal to furnish him with
a copy has been held not to violate due process. 52
2. Rights of Appearance and Appeal
Sometimes a board may improperly deny the registrant the right
to a personal appearance or an appeal, particularly if he has not clearly
articulated which procedure he wants. Selective Service System
Form 110 advises the registrant that he has the right to a personal ap-
pearance or an appeal, but does not make it clear that he is entitled
to both. He may have a personal appearance3 3 and, if that is unsuc-
cessful, he has another 30 days in which to appeal.5 - In United States
v. Olkowski3 55 the registrant sent a letter in June stating that "[s]ub-
ject to the right of personal appearance, I appeal my I-0 classification
to the local board of appeal.' ' 6 The clerk treated this as a request
340 415 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1969).
350Id. at 389. See also Striker v. Resor, 283 F. Supp. 923, 925 (D.N.J. 1968),
where memoranda containing anonymous information, which allegedly the board
did not consider, were placed in the file when it went to the appeal board.
351 See United States v. Salamy, 253 F. Supp. 616 (W.D. Okla. 1966), aff'd, 379
F.2d 838 (10th Cir. 1967). As to the failure to include a reply submitted by the
registrant, see United States v. Bellmer, 404 F.2d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 1968).352 See Storey v. United States, 370 F2d 255, 258 (9th Cir. 1966); United States
v. Mendoza, 295 F. Supp. 673, 680 (E.DN.Y. 1969). Cf. United States v. Moore,
423 F.2d 556, 558-59 (9th Cir. 1970). In Winfield v. Riebel, No. 20292 (6th Cir.,
Dec. 24, 1970), 3 Sm. SEarv. L. REP. 3534 (1971), the registrant was not. informed
by the board that the board had prejudicial information which was not in the
registrant's file. The court held that this could constitute a denial of due process,
but that the registrant was not prejudiced because the board reconsidered his
case after he was made aware of the adverse information.
35332 C.F.R. § 1624.1 (a) (1971).
35432 C.FL § 1626.2(c) (1971).
355 248 F. Supp. 660 (W.). Wis. 1965).
B56 Id. at 663.
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for a hearing before the local board. The registrant was retained in
the same classification in August and did not subsequently appeal.
Following a conference between the clerk and the state director, the
clerk wrote the registrant asking him if by his earlier letter he had
intended to request both a personal appearance and an appeal. He
replied that he did not want his August classification to be reviewed
by an appeal board, and it was not. The court held that the June
letter should have been treated as a request for review by an appeals
board. It first pointed out 357 that section 1626.11 states that the written
notice of appeal "need not be in any particular form" and that "the
language of any such notice shall be liberally construed in favor of
the person filing the notice so as to permit the appeal."35s 8 It found
that the subsequent communications did not clarify what the regis-
trant wanted in June. Because the registrant was denied the right
of appeal, he was acquitted. 59
The present regulations permit an appeal within 30 days after the
board mails the Notice of Classification. 60 A registrant may also re-
quest a personal appearance within that time. 8' The sending of the
form has been held to constitute sufficient notice to the registrant of his
rights.3 6 2 Likewise he is required to appeal within the specified time,
and it is no excuse if the registrant, through his own neglect, fails to
receive the notice in time to appeal.3 63 The board has the discretion to
permit a late appeal prior to the issuance of an order to report if it finds
that the failure to appeal "was due to a lack of understanding of the
right to appeal or to some cause beyond the control of [the person
having the right to appeal].""'
3. Failure to Provide Forms
Procedural rights may also be violated by the failure to furnish a
registrant with a Form 150 to enable him to apply for conscientious
3571d. at 664.
358 32 C.F.R. § 1626.11 (1971).
359 248 F. Supp. at 665. As pointed out earlier, the same confusion existed on
the part of Joe Mulloy's board when he sought to appeal from his classification
in June, 1967. His board, however, eventually processed the appeal and cancelled
the order to report. Compare United States v. Dyer, 390 F2d 611, 612 (4th Cir.
1970), where an appeal was properly treated as a request for reclassification as
a minister. The board denied the claim, and the registrant did not appeal further.
Unlike the request for a personal appearance, there was nothing for the registrant
to appeal until the board denied the claimed classification.
360 32 C.F.R. § 16262 (1971).
36132 C.F.R. § 1624.1 (1971).
362E.g., Carson v. United States, 411 F.2d 631, 634 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 865 (1969); United States v. Jones, 384 F.2d 781, 783 (7th Cir. 1967).
363 United States v. Haseltine, 415 F2d 334, 336 (9th. Cir. 1969).
36432 C1F.R. § 1626.2(d) (1971).
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objector status. The failure to respond to a request for a reopening
of the classification may also violate a registrant's rights. To some
extent this is related to the matter of request for a reopening dis-
cussed earlier.3 65 A registrant cannot have his claim for conscientious
objector status considered unless he completes a Form 150. It has
been held, therefore, that apart from any requirement that a registrant
request a reopening, the registrant must be furnished with the form
when the board is aware that a registrant may be trying to claim
conscientious objector status. In United States v. Sobczak,366 the board
was informed that the registrant was a Jehovah's Witness, a sect whose
members are classified as conscientious objectors. On at least two
other occasions he notified Selective Service that he was in effect
claiming conscientious objector status.: 7 He was never advised to
execute the Form 150. In holding that his procedural rights were
violated, the court referred to section 1621.13 of the regulations,38
which provides that "[w]hen a registrant's Classification Questionnaire
... omits needed information, contains material errors, or shows that
the registrant failed to understand the questions, the local board may
return the Classification Questionnaire ... to the registrant for cor-
rection and completion .... -'69 The court observed that the de-
fendant's questionnaire "did omit needed information and did show
that the registrant failed to understand his rights, but the board did
not return to him Form 100 to be amplified, nor direct him to attach
thereto Form 150."370
When the registrant has made a specific request to have his classifi-
cation reopened, his rights may be violated by the board's refusal to
respond to that request. In United States v. Cioeta,3 7 ' the registrant
requested a IH-S classification under advanced graduate study status.
He was not eligible for that classification. The board did not reply,
but instead issued an order to report for induction. The court held
that section 1625.4, which directs the board to advise the registrant
when it has refused to reopen, required the board to reply to his
request before it issued the order to report.372 The government argued
that the registrant was not prejudiced by the board's failure to comply
with the regulation.3 The court disagreed on the ground that "[a]
365 See notes 225-40 supra and accompanying text.
.366 264 F. Supp. 752 (NfD. Ga. 1966).
367 Id. at 754.
36s Id. at 755.
36 32 C.F.R. § 1621.13 (1971).
370 264 F. Supp. at 755.
371No. CR 70-112 (. Ore., July 1, 19710); 3 SEL. SIMV. L. REP. 3309 (1971).
372 3 SEL. SEv. L. PEr. at 3310.
73 Id.
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proper communication would have given [him] an opportunity to
'ask for a reconsideration of the board's decision. It would also have
given him an opportunity to apply for a different classification for
which he might have been eligible. 3 74 Thus the possibility of pre-
judice was sufficient. In United States v. Seeley, 75 the registrant
claimed to have sent a letter to the board stating that he was a
Jehovah's Witness. The board said that the letter was never received,
and the court concluded that it must have been lost in the mail. Be-
cause the case involved a criminal prosecution, the court put the risk
of loss on the board. Since the court believed that the registrant was
telling the truth, it held that the letter was sufficient to require dis-
missal of the criminal charges in order to allow the board an op-
portunity to consider classifying the registrant as a conscientious
objector.170  The letter was sent prior to the issuance of the order to
report. The court also held that when the registrant later asked the
clerk for the Form 150, the clerk, who had told him that his induction
date was imminent, had a duty to advise him of the necessity for
prompt filing of the form and to assist him with it if he requested. At
the very least the clerk should have told him about the availability
of the government appeals agent. Finally, the court said that the
clerk should have informed him that the form had to be received
prior to the date of induction.Y7
In United States v. Bowen3 78 the court dealt with the mailing of
Form 150 by the board and the claim of the registrant that he never
received it. There the board sent a Form 150 in response to the
registrant's request, and when it was not returned after about four
months, it sent another one. The registrant testified that he did not
receive either of the forms, although he did not deny receiving other
forms from the board. When no reply was received from the regis-
trant, the board issued an order to report for induction.3Y9 The
registrant did not comply, but after having been contacted by an FBI
3741d.
375 301 F. Supp. 811 (D.R.I 1969).
3761d. at 818.
377Id. A diametrically opposite result was reached in United States v. Price,
397 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1968). There the court held that even if the letter was
received and was lost by the board, there was no denial of due process. Id. at
386. There was, however, no record of the letter having been received. Id. at 385.
3 414 F.2d 1268 (3rd Cir. 1969).
379The board also advised him that it had refused to reopen his classification,
that he would be ordered for induction, and that other notices would be mailed
to him. The court suggested that this letter might have caused him to be "un-
certain about the continuing validity of the notice of induction," so as to give him
a defense to a charge of willful refusal. 414 F.2d at 1270.
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agent almost a year later, he went to the board and requested a Form
150. The clerk refused to give it to him and upon telephoned instruc-
tions from the state director, ordered him to report for induction the
next day. The court first observed that the failure to give a registrant
the Form 150 on or prior to the date of induction was improper and
was sufficient to vitiate a conviction for failure to report.380 It reversed
the conviction, however, on the ground that the board violated its
mandatory duty to furnish the registrant with a Form 150 at the
earlier time.381 Of course the government contended that the board
had actually furnished the Form on the earlier dates. The district
judge instructed the jury that under section 1641.3 of the regulations,
the mailing of any form to a registrant constitutes notice to him of
the contents whether he actually receives it or not. 3 2 The court held
that the regulation was violative of due process of law insofar as it
purported to create an irrebuttable presumption.3 8 3 This means that
a registrant may always show that he did not receive a communication
which was purportedly sent.
4. Improper Advice
The cases just described indicate how the failure of the board to
furnish the Form 150 or to respond to requests for reclassification
may be successfully asserted as a defense, even when it may be un-
likely that the registrant would have been able to obtain the desired
classification on the merits. A registrant's rights may also be violated
when he has received misleading advice from the clerk or other board
officials on which he has relied to his detriment. Although the regis-
trant is mailed certain information about his rights and duties after
he registers, and a pamphlet and notice of personal appearance and
appeal rights when he is classified,38 4 in practice he will often rely
quite heavily on advice he receives from the clerk and other board
employees. Indeed, he is instructed to contact his local board for
information and advice. It has been shown, however, that "institu-
tionally" the registrant will not be informed about certain rights.38 5
Although boards have discretion to appoint advisers to registrants,
380 Id. at 1271.
381 Id. at 1271-72.
3s Id. at 1272. The jury was also instructed that there was a presumption that
mail was received. Id.
383 Id. at 1273. Thus, the registrant was entitled to a new trial. The court
suggested that it would be proper for the board to allow him to complete Form
150 and to consider his claim. Id. at 1278 n.19.
3S4 See Note, An ExamnnatiOn of Fairness in, Selective Service Procedure, 37
GEo. WASH. L. Rv. 564, 572-3 (1969).
385 Id. at 573.
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the practice among boards varies considerably. 3 8  Therefore, while
some registrants may be able to obtain outside counselling, it is fair
to say that for the great majority of registrants their primary informa-
tion about their rights and duties comes from personal contact with
the clerk or other board employees.
A government appeal agent must be appointed for each local board,
who, if possible, shall be a lawyer.3 8 7 He does not act like a lawyer
in the sense of owing undivided loyalty to a client, however, because
the regulations require him to represent both the registrant and the
Selective Service System. 8" He has the duty to appeal from any
classification given a registrant which, in his opinion, should be re-
viewed by the appeal board. He is also the board's legal adviser. His
duty is "[tlo be equally diligent in protecting the interests of the
Government and the rights of the registrants in all matters."3 89 In
practice most boards will make an appointment with the government
appeal agent at the registrant's request, and the registrant is advised
of the right to an appointment when he receives the notice of
classification.
a. Futility of Appeal
When the clerk of the board has improperly advised a registrant
that an appeal or personal appearance or the filing of a claim would
be futile, and in reliance on such advice the registrant has failed to
exercise his rights, the action of the clerk has been held to be violative
of due process of law. 90 This has meant not only that the registrant
was not barred from obtaining judicial review of his substantive
classification on exhaustion grounds, but that the order to report itself
was invalid. In United States v. Williams..l the registrant, who
initially had been given a Il-A fatherhood deferment, notified the
board that he was a Jehovah's Witness and requested the Form 150.
When he returned the completed form to the board he was advised
by the clerk that the board could not consider the conscientious ob-
jector request since he was presently in a lower classification392 The
registrant's wife later filed for divorce, employing as her attorney the
3s8 See Note, Procedure and Objectives Within the Selective Service System, 2
JoMa MARSHALL J. PRAc. & Psoc. 122, 139-40 (1968).
387 32 C.F.R. § 1604.71 (1971).
388 Id.
38932 C.F.R. § 1604.71(d) (5) (1971). See Tigar & Zweben, supra note 50, at
524-25.
39o Unite States v. Williams, 420 F2d 288, 292-93 (10th Cir. 1970).
891 Id.
392 Id. at 289-90. 32 C.F.R. § 1623.2 (1971) provides that the registrant shall be
placed in the lowest class below I-A for which he is eligible. 1-0 is higher than
II-S.
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board's appeal agent,393 and the registrant was then classified I-A.
After receiving a notice to report for a physical examination, the
registrant went to the board and again requested the Form 150. His
uncontradicted testimony indicated that the clerk advised him that
".... it wouldn't make any difference... that my efforts would be just
wasting my time... they (the draft board) wouldn't give me a con-
scientious objector classification."3 9 He did not appeal the I-A classi-
fication and was subsequently ordered to report for induction.
The government contended that the failure of the registrant to
exhaust administrative remedies precluded him from urging both a
denial of due process and the invalidity of the substantive classification.
The court recognized that "[t]he facts that would give rise to the ex-
haustion exception here, likewise go to the contention that a lack of
procedural fairness was afforded the [registrant] by the board."39
The court noted that the particular registrant believed that his local
board and his appeals board were one in the same and that "a local
draft board, in most instances, as far as a registrant is concerned, and
from his contacts with it, is personified by the clerk of the board,
acting as its executive secretary and running its office from day to
day."' 39 It then stated as follows:
From the facts before us there would seem to be no question concern-
ing the fact that the appellant was affirmatively misled by the clerk's
statement concerning the futility of trying to obtain a conscientious ob-jector's exemption. All the appellant knew, or should have known from
reading the back of his classification card, was that he had the right to
appeal. He also knew that his classification card referred him to any local
board for information and advice regarding any questions he might
have.... [He] was plainly justified in relying on her [the clerk's] advice
and apparent agency and authority to render such advice.
In view of the fast sequence of the incidents of induction from the draft
board level, appellant's belief that his wife's attorney was a member of
the draft board, and the statement of the clerk of the board concerning
the futility of a further effort to pursue the conscientious objector status,
the groundwork was well laid in the subjective mind of the appellant that
that he had exhausted his administrative remedies before the board, in-
cluding appeal. The factual situation here presents a proper exception
to the exhaustion rule.
It also appears from the same facts that the appellant was denied due
process by the failure of the draft board to affirmatively consider his ap-
plication for a conscientious objector's status, and the misleading state-
ments of the clerk oi the-draft board.397
The court ordered that a judgment of acquittal be entered.
A similar situation was presented in United States v. Bryan.93
393 United States v. Williams, 420 F.2d 288, 290 (10th Cir. 1970). Apparently
with "malice aforethought."
394 Id. at 290.
395 Id. at 291.
390 Id. at 292.
37 Id. at 292-93.
398 263 F. Supp. 895 (N.D. Ga. 1967).
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There the registrant was also a Jehovah's Witness who had claimed
conscientious objector status, indicating that he had done some
"pioneering" and that he was trying to become a full-time Pioneer.
The board denied the claim and advised him by letter of his right to
appeal.399 He then went to the board office and talked to the clerk.
She talked about the Jehovah's Witness ministry and when he informed
her that he was not yet at the "pioneering" level, she advised him that
it would be fruitless to appeal .40 The court found that the registrant
was justified in relying on her advice, and that by failure to pursue
his remedies further he lost not only an appeal but the opportunity
for a personal appearance, all relative to his conscientious objector
claim.40 1 Thus, the board's discouragement of the registrant's perfec-
tion of his administrative rights constituted a denial of due process and
rendered invalid the order to report.
b. Unavailability of Appeal
There may also be a denial of due process when the clerk errone-
ously advises a registrant that an appeal is not available, as in Powers
v. Powers.40 2 There the clerk advised the registrant that he could
not appeal his I-A classification on medical grounds, but would have
to wait until he was ordered for a physical examination or to report
for induction.43 Likewise in Striker v. Resor4 4 the court found that
the instructions concerning the right of appeal were thoroughly con-
fusing.405  It has also been held that due process is denied when a
registrant is effectively discouraged from applying for a particular
classification because of erroneous advice. In United States v. Burn4 6
the registrant, who was discussing his classification with the clerk,
asked what recourse one had if he were a pacifist and did not believe
in killing.407 The clerk asked him if he had any religion and the regis-
trant replied that he had been raised as a Catholic.40  The clerk then
said that there were Catholic priests in the front lines, and that he "had
399 Id. at 897.
400Id. at 898.
401Id. at 898-99.
402 400 F2d 438 (5th Cir. 1968).
4031d. at 440. The district court was instructed to make findings of fact concern-
ing the registrant's claim. If it found against him on that issue, it was directed to
consider whether the board was required to reopen the classification on the basis
of the information that was presented to it. Id. at 441-42.
404 283 F. Supp. 923 (D.N.J. 1968).
405 Id. at 926.
406 431 F.2d 1070 (10th Cir. 1970).
4
07Id. at 1071.
4 08 d.
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no excuse.""' She did not offer to give him the Form 150.410 The
erroneous nature of the advice was obvious, and the court concluded
that the erroneous advice given by the clerk, "[s]o misled him that
he believed it was useless to file a claim for exemption as a conscienti-
ous objector.""'
On the other hand, the court refused to sustain the erroneous advice
defense in United States v. Lansing.412  On December 21, 1967, the
registrant sent a letter to the board requesting the Form 150.413 The
board mailed the form with instructions indicating that it was to be
completed and returned within 10 days from the date of mailing.414
When it was not completed, the board sent what seemed to be es-
sentially a form letter advising the registrant that his classification
was not reopened.415 The registrant was in the process of completing
the form when he received the letter, and he testified that he ceased
completing the form because of his feeling that "[i]t wouldn't do any
good anyway, that they had already rejected me, and they hadn't
seen any information or anything."'416 In an approach which seems
totally contrary to the approach generally taken in erroneous advice
cases, the court likened the erroneous advice to the defense of en-
trapment in the ordinary criminal case.417 It stated that the registrant,
like any other defendant accused of criminal conduct, had to show
that his reliance on the misleading information was reasonable. 18 This
would require an objective determination that a person sincerely
desirous of obeying the law would have accepted the information as
true, and would not have been put on notice to make further inquiries.
The court observed that no such showing had been made, and con-
cluded that:
409 Id.
410 Id.
41, Id. at 1074.
412 424 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1970).
423 Id. at 226.
414 Id. at 227. The indication was probably a "suspense date."
415 Id. at 226 n.2. The letter read as follows:
Re: SSS Form No. 150, Special Form for Conscientious Objector, not
returned
Dear Sir:
This will acknowledge receipt of your communication relative to your
selective service status. The information contained therein has been con-
sidered by this board and it is of the opinion that the facts presented do
not warrant the reopening or reclassification of your case at this time.
Yours very truly,
FOR LOCAL BOARD NO. 94 Id.
416 Id. at 226.
417 Id. at 226-27.
418Id. at 227.
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The SSS Form 150 clearly indicated on its face that it was to be returned
within 10 days. The letter sent by the local board states prominently
that its subject matter was "SSS Form No. 150, Special Form for Con-
scientious Objector, not returned." This was sufficient to put a person
sincerely desirous of complying with the law on notice of the fact that the
board's action reflected the failure to return the completed form within
ten days, rather than an out-of-hand denial of the conscientious objector
claim. Under these circumstances, and especially in view of the ease
'with which appellant could have inquired of the board and learned the
true status of his claim, we do not think it unreasonable to hold that he
had no privilege to remain in ignorance.419
The court, however, disregarded the fact that it would have been
equally reasonable for the registrant to assume that it was too late
to file the form since the 10-day period had elapsed. It would also
have been equally possible to hold that the letter should have advised
him of the fact that the classification was not reopened only because
he had not filed the Form 150, and that he could still do so. The
language in the opinion indicates that the court was not sympathetic
toward the particular registrant, and this may have influenced its
decision. The present tendency is to put the burden on the boards
to properly advise registrants of their rights. It is difficult to reconcile
the approach of the court in Lansing with the approach of most other
courts dealing with the erroneous advice case.
Despite Lansing, however, it would appear that the defense of
misleading advice will often be successful. In another case of mine,
United States v. C-'ump,420 I was prepared to argue misleading advice
on the part of the government appeal agent who effectively prevented
the registrant from taking an appeal. Again, this was both for the
purpose of satisfying the exhaustion requirement to obtain judicial
review of the substantive classification and of establishing an independ-
ent defense. John Crump's request for conscientious objector status
was denied by his board in Maysville, Kentucky,421 and he sought to
appeal. He met with the government appeals agent, an attorney, and,
according to John, was told that in order to appeal he had to write
"about ten pages to the appeals board telling them why [he] should
be classified 1-0." Such advice would clearly be erroieous, since
under the regulations an appeal may be taken merely by filing a notice
with the board; a statement of reasons why the board erred is
optional.422 It is understandable why a 19-year old registrant would
be deterred from taking an appeal after receiving such advice. I
subpoenaed the appeals agent, and when he called me relative to the
419 Id. at 227.
420 Crim. No. 10709 (E.D. Ky., Sept. 17, 1969).
421 The denial was on the ground that he failed to produce supporting letters
from a minister. I was also prepared to argue "erroneous interpretation of the
law."
42232 C.F.R. §§ 1626.11-.12 (1971).
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subpoena, I explained why he was being called. Not unsurprisingly,
he denied having made the statement. The potential lawyer-versus-
lawyer cross-examination was avoided when John was acquitted on
other grounds.423
I have not come upon any cases involving erroneous advice on the
part of appeal agents. In United States v. Davis, 424 however, the court
reversed a conviction on the ground that the local board failed to in-
form the defendant that an appeal agent was available to advise him
of his rights, including the right of appeal. Local Board Memorandum
No. 82, which had been issued to local boards 10 days before the regis-
trant had been mailed his notice of classification, required that at the
time such notice was mailed the board was to notify the registrant of
the name of the government appeal agent and inform him that the
agent was available to advise the registrant on his legal rights. The
memorandum also required the board to arrange a meeting if the
registrant desired. The court held that since the board failed to ad-
vise the registrant of his rights in this regard the latter was not barred
by exhaustion grounds from challenging his classification. More im-
portantly, since the registrant did not have the advice he was entitled
to and thus may have failed in his appeal, the induction order was
invalid and an acquittal was directed.
5. Denial of Full and Fair Hearing
Another area of improper action by the board during the classifi-
cation process is seen in the denial of a full and fair hearing. This
relates to the kind of consideration that the board gives to the regis-
trant's claim and the way that a particular registrant is treated. This
was one of the major issues in Mulloy, although as it turned out it was
unnecessary for the Court to reach it.
When a board composed of unpaid lay volunteers meets, perhaps
once a month, with many cases to consider, it cannot be expected that
the board will be in a position to give detailed consideration to all of
the cases. Since the majority of cases are routine and will have been
screened by the clerk beforehand, it is understandable that many of
these cases can be disposed of at a single sitting. But what of the
more complex cases? Will the board members carefully review all
of the information in the registrant's file before deciding those cases?
Or will they, particularly when the registrant has appeared in person,
base their decisions on their personal impression of him? In con-
scientious objector cases, will they carefully read the detailed answers
to the questions on the Form 150 and the additional material many
423 See text accompanying notes 448-52 infra.
424 413 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1969).
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college-educated registrants supply? Perhaps with some boards these
questions can be answered in the affirmative. But when board mem-
bers are questioned about the consideration which they gave to the
claim of a particular registrant, as in Mulloy, it will often appear that
scant consideration was given at best. This may lend credence to the
position of many draft resistance lawyers that careful consideration of
a claim is the exception rather than the rule.
When a court reviews the substantive classification under the basis-
in-fact test, it assumes that the board members have carefully read
the file. The government's attorney probably does carefully read the
file, and usually can come up with a fact here, an inconsistent state-
ment there, and argue that there is a basis in fact for the board's
action. The court, confined to the basis-in-fact test, is limited in how
far it can or will second guess the board. Therefore, even if the board
has in fact not carefully considered the claim, or if it has not evaluated
all of the relevant information in the file, the registrant may lose. If
in conscientious objector cases the board has not read the Form 150
with any degree of care, it is still possible that nowhere in the admini-
strative and judicial process will the merits of the registrant's claim
receive full consideration. In no other area of federal administrative
law are "life decisions" made in these circumstances. The right to a
full and fair hearing is a matter of due process; it cannot be com-
promised on "the footing of convenience or expediency."425 Presum-
ably this applies to draft board hearings too. There is little precedent,
however, for holding that a draft board has denied a registrant due
process by the superficial consideration that it gave to his claim.
A lawyer defending a draft case would be well-advised to subpoena
the draft board members and ask them about the case and how much
consideration they gave to it. Very likely they will be unable to re-
member it. One lawyer has conducted a study of the board's proceed-
ings on the day it decided his client's case and discovered that in 41/?
hours the board passed on 643 cases, spending an average of less than
30 seconds on each. 26 The same kind of study can be done of the
proceedings of an appeals board by -obtaining the minutes of the par-
ticular meeting. In United States v. Wallen,427 a study of this nature
was conducted. The evidence indicated that 122 cases were disposed
of in two hours-an average of 59 seconds each. The court, observing
that the case "presented a novel question upon which there was no
direct authority," concluded that the review, or lack thereof, was
violative of due process. 428
4 25 0hio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 305 (1937).
426 See Margolis, supra note 121, at 103.
427 315 F. Supp. 459 (D. Minn. 1970).
428 Id. at 462.
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The requirement of a full and fair hearing means that the board
must receive and, theoretically, consider all new information offered
by the registrant. In the Korean war case of Davis v. United States
4 29
the registrant sought classification as a conscientious objector and as
a minister. He requested a personal appearance, and when he ap-
peared he told the board that he had prepared one-half hour of oral
evidence. The chairman told him that he was not eligible for a minis-
terial classification, and when the registrant said that he wanted to
discuss his conscientious objector claim, he was told to file a letter
with the board for the appeal board and to file a notice of appeal.
The court invalidated the induction order, stating: "If a local board
refuses to consider new information offered by the registrant at the
time of his personal appearance or refuses to receive new information
which the registrant endeavors to offer, he is thereby denied due
process of law.'4 30 The court emphasized that the essence of a per-
sonal appearance is the right of the registrant to talk over and explain
his case to the board members. Likewise, another court held that the
board could not refuse to decide the case and simply turn it over to
the appeals board.43 1 It was to receive the information the registrant
wished to submit and to make an informed decision. In other words,
the registrant had the right to have his case decided by his local board
as well as the right to an appeal. However, the burden of presenting
information was laid on the registrant. If he failed to take the initi-
ative, he could not contend that he was denied a fair hearing because
the board decided the case on the basis of what information it had in
the file432 or because they failed to ask him particular questions.433
Assuming that the board received the evidence and did not auto-
matically refer the case to the appeals board, which is not likely to
occur today, in order to show the denial of a full and fair hearing, the
registrant would essentially have to show that either there was not
time to consider the claim fully, as in United States v. WaUen,434 or
that in fact the board did not do so. In Mulloy I argued that Joe was
429 199 F.2d 689 (6th Cir. 1952).
430 Id. at 691.
4 31 Bejelis v. United States, 206 F.2d 354, 358 (6th Cir. 1953).
432 United States v. Davis, 279 F. Supp. 920, 922 (D. Conn. 1967), aff'd, 390 F.2d
879 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 896 (1968).
43 Lingo v. United States, 384 F.2d 724, 726 (9th Cir. 1967). A separate defense
is the bias of the board members against the registrant. In the rare case in which
this can be successfully established, the registrant has been denied the right to
a full and fair hearing. See Niznik v. United States, 173 F.2d 328 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 337 U.S. 925 (1949). See also United States v. Peebles, 220 F2d 114
(7th Cir. 1955).
434 315 F. Supp. 459 (D. Minn. 1970).
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denied a full and fair hearing because the board members did not con-
sider the claim fully. In particular I argued this because they did not
read the Form 150 with any degree of care and because they lacked
a minimum understanding of the applicable statute and regulations
so as to be unable to pass intelligently on his claim. I have set out
the testimony of the board members in the earlier discussion of the
case4 35 in order to place the case in the context of reality, and will not
repeat it again here. As I pointed out earlier, Joe's courtesy interview
lasted about 10 or 15 minutes. At the conclusion of the interview, the
board decided not to reopen. It was brought out that no board member
examined the Form 150 prior to the meeting and that, at best, it was
scanned by some members during the interview. In other words, at
least with Joe's board, and I would suspect with many others, the stand-
ard operating procedure is to look at the evidence only when the
registrant appears or when the board is making its decision. If an
administrative agency determined a public utility rate increase without
advance consideration of the evidence, there would be no doubt that its
action would be violative of clue process. In Mulloy I argued that the
same was true in conscientious objector cases, and that unless the board
members carefully read the Form 150, they could not claim to have
given the registrant a full and fair hearing.436 The questioning from
the bench during the Supreme Court argument indicated some agree-
ment with this position. I also argued that the demonstrable incom-
petence of the board members denied Joe a full and fair hearing. I
could not have asked for more cooperation in building the record on
this score.437 Although the Court decided the case on the narrow
issue of reopening, I believe that the broad-based issue, which was
the denial of a full and fair hearing, influenced the result at least as
to the initial granting of certiorari. The decision in United States v.
Wallen438 should encourage draft resistance lawyers to review the
actual meetings of local and appeals boards and to call board members
to the stand in an effort to establish the denial of a full and fair hearing.
6. Failure to Meet
Finally, I want to discuss the procedural defense of failure to meet.
This relates to an order of the board which is invalid because it was
not preceded by a meeting as required by the regulations. The general
435 See notes 156-58 supra and accompanying text.
4361 drew an analogy to Zenith Int'l Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 291 F.2d 785
(7th Cir. 1961), where it was held that administrative officials had to view a film
in its entirety before declaring it to be obscene. Id. at 789.
437 See notes 164-69 supra and accompanying text.
438 315 F. Supp. 459 (D. Minn. 1970).
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requirement of a meeting is set forth in section 1604.56 of the regu-
lations, which provides in pertinent part:
A majority of the r~aembers of the local board shall constitute a quorum
for the transaction of business. A majority of the members present at
any meeting at which a quorum is present shall decide any question or
classification. Every member present, unless disqualified, shall vote on
every question or classification13 0
The board is also required to keep minutes of each meeting.440 When
a quorum is lacking, the board has no jurisdiction to act. So when
four of the six members are present and one disqualifies himself in a
particular case, the board's classification of the registrant would be
invalid.4 4 1
I was presented with the "meeting" question in United States v.
Crup,442 when the board members acted over the telephone instead
of at a formal meeting. John Crump had been ordered to report for
a physical examination and failed to report. The clerk then called five
of the six members by telephone and said in effect: 443 "John didn't
show up for his physical today. Shouldn't we classify him as a
delinquent and order him to report for induction?" They agreed, and
the clerk issued the order to report. The criminal prosecution arose
out of John's failure to comply with that order.4 4  On this issue I
argued essentially that the regulations precluded the board from doing
business over the telephone. I pointed out that the board had dis-
cretion not to declare John a delinquent despite his failure to take the
physical,445 and I contended that this discretion could only be exercised
by the board as a body coming together for a meeting as required in
the regulations. Implicit in section 1604.56, I said, is that the board
at all times must meet and act as a board. The court agreed, empha-
sizing the discretionary nature of the decision to classify John as a
430 32 C.F.R. § 1604.56 (1971).
44032 CY.F. § 1604.58 (1971).
441 Application of Shapiro, 392 F.2d 397, 400 (3d Cir. 1968). The court specifically
held that a member who disqualified himself could not be counted as part of the
quorum. Id.
442 Crim. No. 10709 (E.D. Ky., Sept 17, 1969).
443 brought this out in my cross-examination of the clerk. Since the govern-
ment must always call the clerk to make out its case, defense counsel can begin
to establish his defense (luring the government's case-in-chief, and may be able
to obtain a judgment of acquittal at the close of the government's case.4 44John reported for induction and went through with the physical examination.
He was disqualified on the hearing test. They tested him two more times, and
he still failed. While he was waiting for the bus to take him from the induction
center, he was ordered to take it a fourth time, and he refused. It may have
been significant that John told the personnel at the induction center that he
intended to refuse to submit. The board issued subsequent orders to "complete
processing," which John refused to obey.
445 See 32 C.F.R. § 1642.4(a) (1971).
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delinquent and to accelerate his induction, 446 and held that the order
to report for induction was invalid.
The same situation was presented in United States v. Walsh,447 invol-
ving a request for a reopening. The clerk discussed the request over
the telephone with three out of the four members, but never read the
registrant's letter in full. In holding the action improper, the court
did not consider whether the registrant established a prima facie case
for the classification. Again, the point was that the board could not
do business over the telephone. In United States v. Norman,448 how-
ever, the court found that the falure to meet to consider a request for
an occupational deferment was not prejudicial where the alleged facts,
even if true, did not justify an occupational deferment. The request
to reopen had been made by the registrant's employer. The board
minutes indicated that the chairman told the clerk that he had dis-
cussed the matter with the other board members and that all of them
felt that the request should be denied. The court first observed that
the registrant had failed to notify the board of his change in occupa-
tional status within ten days after it occurred.449 It then found that
the request did not make out a prima facie case for an occupational
deferment because it did not state that the registrant could not be re-
placed. The decision was affirmed on appeal without discussion of
this issue.450 Apart from the fact that the court may well have been
wrong on the prima facie issue,451 its rationale totally ignored the
thrust of the regulations. The regulations require a quorum present
for a meeting and requires that the board meet and act as a board.
There was no indication that all the members saw the letter or that
they even considered whether the registrant made out a prima facie
case. If, as the court went on to say, the responsibility for classifi-
cation rests with the boards and not with the courts, it was for the
board rather than the court to decide whether the registrant had made
out a prima facie case. The regulations provide a procedure by which
this is to be done. If a regulatory agency, for example, had denied a
446With the decision in Gutkmecht v. United States, 396 U.S. 295, 307 (1970),
the issue cannot arise again in this precise form.
447 279 F. Supp. 115 (D. Mass. 1968).
448 301 F. Supp. 53, 60 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), aff'd, 413 F.2d 789, 792 (6th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1018 (1970).
449Id. at 59. This is required by 32 CYF.R. § 1625.1(b) (1971). The 10-day
requirement has generally not been enforced by either the boards or the courts.
450 See United States v. Norman, 413 F.2d 789, 792 (6th Cir. 1969).
451 It said that he did not make out a prima facie case for an occupational de-
ferment because he did not allege that he could not be replaced. It would seem
that, since the request for his deferment was made by his employer, this factor
could be implied.
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utility rate increase following a telephone discussion among its mem-
bers, it cannot be imagined that a court would uphold its action. Why,
then, should it do so when a selective service board is involved?
452
The decision in Norman is completely unjustifiable, and I would pre-
dict that most courts would agree with the approach in Walsh and
Crump and the other cases that have prohibited the doing of business
over the telephone. The requirement of a meeting, however, is only
applicable to board action requiring an exercise of some judgment.
A board meeting is not required for the issuance of ordinary induction
orders. Induction is governed by the order of call regulations, 53 and
the issuance of an induction order is a purely ministerial task which
it is proper for the clerk to perfornm454
Another aspect of the requirement of a meeting relates to the issu-
ance of orders to report for civilian work. The procedure for issuing
orders to report for civilian work is as follows. The registrant is
directed to submit tD the local board three suggested types of civilian
work.4 5 5 If he does so and the board deems any one of the three types
of work appropriate, it can order him to perform that work or, more
accurately, that job assignment. 45 6 If he does not, or if the board finds
that the work suggestions he submitted are not appropriate, the board
submits three possible types of work to the registrant. He must make
a choice within 10 days.45 7 If the board and the registrant are unable
to agree, the State Director or his representative "shall meet with the
local board and the registrant and offer his assistance in reaching an
agreement."458 If after that meeting the board and the registrant are
still unable to agree upon a job assignment, the local board, with the
approval of the National Director, designates appropriate civilian
work and issues an order to report for such work.459
In Brede v. United States,'" the meeting between the board, the
registrant, and the State Director was held, but no agreement was
reached. At that time, however, the board decided on a job assignment,
and the clerk, at the direction of the board, made a request of the
National Director for authority to order the registrant to perform it.
452 See, e.g., United States v. Sloan, Crim. No. 42461 (N.D. Cal., March 26,
1969), 2 SEL. SEuv. L. R' p. 3004 (1970).
453 See 32 C.F.R. § 1631.7 (1971).
454Segal v. United States, 423 F2d 658, 659 (7th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Baker, 416 F2d 202, 204 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Powers, 413 F.2d 834,
839-41 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 923 (1939).
4 5 5 As defined in 32 C.F.R. § 1660.1 (1971).
458 32 C.F.R. § 166020 (a) (1971).
457 32 C.F.R. § 1660.20(b) (1971).
45s 32 C.F.R. § 1660.20(c) (1971).
459 32 C.F.R. § 1660.20 (d) (1971).
460 396 F.2d 155, modifed, 400 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1968).
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That authority was granted, and the clerk issued an order to report,
with which the registrant refused to comply. The Court held that,
"There was not an order issued or authorized by the board requiring
the registrant to report.461  In referring to the regulation which
governs controversies between the board and the registrant in this
situation, the Court stated: "This section requires the local board,
after receiving such authorization, to meet and order the registrant
to report for such civilian work."162 This would imply that two meet-
ings are necessary when the registrant refuses to accept civilian work:
the meeting between the board, the registrant, and the state direc-
tor;463 and a meeting of the board to order the registrant to perform the
civilian work after the board has received authorization from the
National Director to choose a job assignment for the registrant. The
court, however, also pointed out that the board had not authorized
the clerk to issue the order subsequent to the receipt of the National
Director's approval. At the request of the government on rehearing,
the court agreed that the second meeting was not necessary if the
board has previously decided that a particular type of civilian work is
appropriate. If it has done so, "an implied conditional order to report
was entered" and the action of the clerk in issuing the order to report
is ministerial1 64 In the case at bar the court found that the record did
not indicate that the critical exercise of judgment had been made at the
first meeting and, therefore, upheld its earlier decision reversing the
conviction. 465
The Brede approach has generally been followed elsewhere. At
the first meeting, then, or at some subsequent time, "[a] duly consti-
tuted majority of the board [must] deliberate upon and approve a
reasonably definite and precise proposition, namely, that a given regis-
trant is required to perform a given act.' 4 6 There has been some
disagreement as to how definite and precise this proposition must be.
In Brede the court did not find the exercise of judgment in the rec-
ord,467 and in Cupit v. United States,46 the district court held that
such a judgment could not be implied from the board's practice in
determining appropriate work at the time of the first meeting and
making the request of the National Director. According to the district
461396 F.2d at 157-58.
462 Id. at 157.
463 This means the meeting as provided for by 32 C.F.R. § 1660.20(c) (1971).
464 400 F.2d at 600.
465 Id.
466 Cupit v. United States, 292 F. Supp. 146, 151 (WM. Wis. 1968), rev'd, sub
no. Hestad v. United States, 418 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1969).
467 400 F.2d 599, 600 (9th Cir. 1968).
468 292 F. Supp. at 151-52.
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court in Cupit, the term "order" meant "an express and reasonably
definite and specific motion or resolution deliberated upon and ap-
proved by a majority of the local board, whether unconditionally and
after approval by the National Director, or conditionally and prior
to such approval and set forth clearly and understandably in some
readily accessible record maintained by the local board."469 The con-
trary view is that a decision by the board at the time of the first meet-
ing seeking the approval of the National Director to order the registrant
to perform a particular job assignment constitutes the critical exercise
of administrative judgment, and represents an implied conditional
authorization for the order to report. This was the position of the
Seventh Circuit in reversing Cupit and has been the position of other
courts. 470 Under this view, where the board makes a specific finding
at the first meeting such as, "The local board decid[ing] that regi-
strant should be offered employment with Virginia Department of
Highways, Ashland, Virginia, doing highway work," it will be found
to have "exercised its administrative judgment on that date." 47 '. Since
the board is not likely to hold a second meeting after receipt of ap-
proval from the National Director, the crucial question will be whether
it has exercised its administrative judgment at the time of the first
meeting. My guess would be that in the majority of cases the courts
would hold that the judgment was made at the time of the first meeting.
In this section of the article I have reviewed a number of errors
that can be committed by local boards during the classification process.
In the next section I will consider errors that can be made in regard
to the administrative appeal, and in the part following, particular
defenses arising out of the issuance of the induction order itself. It
should be remembered, however, that there is some overlap here, and
the three sections should be considered together.
D. The Administrative Appeal
The appeals board reviews de novo those cases which are brought
before it. Its consideration is limited to information contained in the
record received from the local board and general information concern-
469 292 F. Supp. at 152. See also United States v. Hicks, Crim. No. 1968-101
(W.D.N.Y., Mar. 27, 1969), 2 SE.. SEzv. L. REP. 3123 (1970).
470 See Hestad v. United States, 418 F.2d 1063, 1066-67 (7th Cir. 1969), rev'g sub
nom. Cupit v. United States, 292 F. Supp. 146 (W.D. Wis. 1968); United States
v. Crowley, 405 F.2d 400 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 904 (1969); Davis
v. United States, 400 F.2 577 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 908 (1969);
United States v. Mendomz, 295 F. Supp. 673, 677-78 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
47'United States v. Crowley, 405 F.2d 400, 404 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 904 (1969).
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ing economic, industrial, and social conditions.472 Earlier it was noted
that the registrant's rights can be violated by the local board if it in-
cludes adverse information in the file it sends to the appeals board
without advising the registrant of this fact and giving an opportunity
of rebuttal. 73 Likewise, the omission of material facts in the file sent
to the appeals board could violate the registrant's right to a fair hear-
ing on appeal.474 It should be noted, however, that the failure to
include complete summaries of oral testimony before the board, has
been held not to be improper when "all the material relevant to the
merits of the [registrant's] classification was in writing in the file."'4 75
The appeals board itself has been known to act in such a way as to
violate the registrant's procedural rights. As pointed out earlier, in
United States v. Wallen,476 spending an average of 59 seconds in dis-
posing of a case by an appeals board was necessarily violative of due
process.477 In Forsting v. United States,478 a case which involved the
former Department of Justice hearing procedure in conscientious
objection cases, the registrant wrote to the appeals board claiming
that the hearing officer was prejudiced and that his recommendations
were based on inaccurate information. The appeals board classified
the registrant I-A, and he was subsequently ordered to report for
induction. The court found that the registrant "was denied basic
procedural fairness before the appeals board" because there was
nothing to indicate that the board examined the registrant's charge
of bias and prejudice.479 It concluded that where there were detailed
and supported allegations of prejudice, the appeals board must examine
them if the report of the Department of Justice were to be given any
weight. Furthermore, the record must indicate that either the entire
report and recommendation were disregarded, or that the charge of
prejudice was examined and found to be without merit.480
The more significant aspect of violations of rights during the appeal
process relates to whether errors committed by the local board are
cured by the de novo review given by the appeals board. It is often
stated that "prejudice on the local level is cured by a fair consideration
on the appeal. ' 4' 8 ' In practice, however, this will not be true as to
47232 C.F.R. § 1626.24(b) (2) (1971).
473 See the discussion notes 345-52 supra and accompanying text.
4 74 See Niznik v. United States, 173 F.2d 328, 333-34 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 337
U.S. 925 (1949).
475 See Landau v. Allen, 424 F.2d 668, 673 (6th Cir. 1970).
476 315 F. Supp. 459 (D. Minn. 1970).
477 Id. at 462.
478 429 F.2d 134 (8th Cir. 1970).
479 Id. at 137.
480 Id.
481 See Clay v. United States, 397 Fl2d 901, 912-13 (5th Cir. 1968), vacated sub
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many procedural errors, such as the failure of the local board to
provide a personal appearance 482 or the absence of a quorum of the
local board at the time of the registrant's classification. s3 Similarly,
where: 1) the obvious bias of the board members toward the regis-
trant's claim of conscientious objection was noted in the file; 2) the
board asked the appeals board to give the case "quick action because of
its [the case's] morale status in the community, which [the board felt
was] undermining the integrity of the Selective Service and the Local
Board members; and 3) the appeals board complied, denying the claim
shortly thereafter without waiting for the Department of Justice
recommendation; it was held that the prejudice was not cured.48 4 As
one court has observed, "A survey of the cases indicates that the
rule [that errors of the local board are cured by an appeal] is
applied only where it appears from the nature of the deficiency or from
other circumstances in the record that it is reasonable to assume that
the defect in local board proceedings was in fact cured by appellate
reclassification. '485
Most of the cases involving cure by de novo review relate to the
application of an erroneous standard of law by the local board, a topic
which is beyond the scope of the present article. Some courts, how-
ever, are now holding that the error is not cured unless the record
supports the conclusion that the appeals board applied the correct
standard. The Ninth Circuit has held that where the record is silent
regarding the standard applied by the appeals board and there is
nothing to support an inference that its standard differed from that
nom. Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 310 (1969), and the authorities cited
therein.
482 Davis v. United States, 410 F2d 89, 93-96 (8th Cir. 1969). But see Vaughn
v. United States, 404 F.2d 586 (8th Cir. 1968), vacated on other grounds, 399 U.S.
506 (1970), where in a "unique factual situation" the board refused to reopen,
but also allowed an appeal, which brought into play the Department of Justice
hearing procedure. 404 F.2d at 593. In upholding the board's refusal to reopen
because of failure to present a prima facie case, the court looked to the investiga-
tion in connection with the review by the appeal board, and found that it sup-
ported the conclusion "that the local board did not act arbitrarily." Id. The
point was, as the dissent pointed out, that the registrant was denied a personal
appearance and that this wvas not cured by de novo review. Id. at 395. The court
would be clearly wrong in its interpretation of what is necessary to present a
prima facie case in view of Mulloy v. United States, 398 U.S. 410 (1970). Pre-
sumably the "cure" part of the opinion is overruled by Davis v. United States,
410 F.2d 89, 93-98 (8th Cir. 1969).
483 Application of Shapiro, 392 F2d 397, 400 (3d Cir. 1968).
484 United States v. Peebles, 220 F.2d 114, 118-20 (7th Cir. 1955); cf. Clay v.
United States, 397 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1968), vacated sub noma. Giordano v. United
States, 394 U.S. 310 (1969).
485 United States v. Peebles, 220 F.2d 114, 118-20 (7th Cir. 1955).
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applied by the local board, the error is not cured.4 6 The Eighth and
the Third Circuits have held that the error is not cured where the
appeals board gave no reasons for its determination and where the
local board's rejection of the claim was based, at least in part, on an
erroneous standard of law.4 7 The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand,
has presumed that the error was cured by de novo review "unless
there is evidence in the registrant's file that went to the appeal board
showing that an erroneous standard had been applied."4 8 In the
absence of such a showing, "the presumption that the appeal board
will review anew the entire record of a registrant and apply the
correct standard in determining whether to grant a requested classifi-
cation must prevail." 489 The issue is one which may be expected to
arise whenever an erroneous standard of law has been asserted and
an appeal has been taken. It is another tool with which the draft-
resistance attorney may be able to defend his client.
E. The Validity of the Order to Report
Another area which may give rise to the procedural defense con-
cerns the issuance of the order to report itself and the order of the
call. An order to report may not be issued during the period in which
a registrant may apply for a personal appearance or take an appeal
or while such personal appearance or appeal is pending.4 90 If it is
issued during that period and the registrant exercises his rights, the
order to report must be cancelled.49 1 There may be some question,
however, of whether or not such an order would be invalid if the
registrant did not exercise his rights during the alloted time.492 We
have also seen earlier that in certain circumstances a lengthy post-
ponement4 93 may in effect amount to a cancellation. 9 ' An induction
order must be cancelled upon a reopening of the classification, whether
486 United States v. Atherton I1, 430 F.2d 741, 744 (9th Cir. 1970). See also
United States v. French, 429 F.2d 391, 392 (9th Cir. 1970), involving a Department
of Justice recommendation based upon an erroneous interpretation of law.
48 7 See Caverly v. United States, 429 F.2d 92, 94-95 (8th Cir. 1970). For a
similar holding in the Third Circuit see United States v. Carroll, 398 F.2d 651,
654 n.5 (3d Cir. 1968).
488 United States v. Rose, 424 F.2d 1051, 1053 (6th Cir. 1970); cf. United States
v. Tichenor, 403 F.2d 986, 990 (6th Cir. 1968).
489 United States v. Rose, 424 F.2d 1051, 1053 (6th Cir. 1970).
490 32 C.F.R. §§ 1624.3, 1626.41, 1627.8 (1971).
491 As was pointed out earlier, this is what happened in 1967 when Joe Mulloy
was issued the "first!' order to report.
492 Cf. United States v. Spiro, 384 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
956 (1968); United States v. McDonald, 301 F. Supp. 79, 84 (N.D. M11 969).
493The conditions under which a postponement may be granted are set forth
in 32 C.F.R. § 1632.2(a) (1971).
494 See the discussion notes 272-78 supra and accompanying text.
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pre-induction or post-induction, 495 but the acceptance of a request for
reclassification after the registrant has refused induction has no effect
upon the original order. 96 The regulations require that the date of
reporting shall be no less than 10 days after the order to report was
mailed. 9 7 At least one court has held that a violation of this pro-
vision invalidated the order to report. 98
One defense going to the induction order which has been completely
unsuccessful has been an attack on the clerk's authority to sign the
induction order. Under section 1604.59 of the regulations,499 official
papers issued by a local board may be signed by the clerk of the local
board if he is authorized to do so by resolution duly adopted and
entered in the minutes of the meetings. Registrants whose induction
order was signed by the clerk have contended that the clerk lacked
the authority to do so. The contention has been rejected on the
grounds that the burden is on the registrant to overcome the pre-
sumption of regularity and show that the clerk was unauthorized to
sign, the requirement is directory rather than mandatory, and the
registrant is not prejudiced anyway.50 Similarly, although the order-
of-call regulation formerly referred to preparation of induction lists
by the board,9 0 ' the fact that the clerk rather than the board prepared
the list was no defense. The preparation of the list per se was con-
sidered a ministerial iask
.50 2
Since the statute requires a knowing refusal to report or submit,503
it is, of course, a defense that the registrant never received the order
to report.504 In one case, however, it was held that the fact that he
was in jail at the time he was to report was not a defense, since he
495 32 C.F.R. § 1625.14 (1971).
496 United States v. Smogor, 411 F.2d 501, 503 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
972 (1969). See also United States v. Kroll, 400 F2d 923, 926 (3d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1069 (1969).
497 32 C.F.R. § 1632.1 (11971).
408 See United States v. Brown, 290 F. Supp. 542, 550 (D. Del. 1968).
-11 32 C.F.R. § 1604.59 (1971).
B0o See United States v. Crowley, 405 F.2d 400, 403 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 904 (1969). See also United States v. Powers, 413 F.2d 834, 838-39 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 923 (1969); United States v. Smith, 291 F. Supp. 63,
67 (D.N.H. 1968).
50132 CF.R. § 1631.7(a) (1971) now provides that the clerk may prepare lists
if so authorized.
502 Segal v. United States, 423 F.2d 658, 659 (7th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Powers, 413 F.2d 834, 840 (1st. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 923 (1969).
503MSSA § 12(a), 50 t.S.C. App. § 462 (a) (Supp. V, 1970).
504 See Graves v. United States, 252 F.2d 878, 880-81 (9th Cir. 1958). It is
presumed that the registrant received the .communication and the burden is on
him to show otherwise. See United States v. Bowen, 414 F.2d 1268, 1276 (3d
Cir. 1969).
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could have informed the board of his situation prior to the reporting
date. 5 The registrant who defends on the ground that he never
received the order risks a subsequent prosecution for failure to keep
the board informed of his address, but he cannot be convicted of that
offense in the prosecution for failing to submit.0 8
It is now appropriate to consider the order-of-call defense. There
are two aspects to the order-of-call regulations, one relating to orders
to report for induction and the other relating to orders to report for
civilian work. The order of call for induction is covered by section
1631.7 of the regulations, which now provides for induction of regis-
trants in different categories according to lottery number. Formerly
the order was determined according to date of birth, with the oldest
being selected first.50 7 The order of call for induction is applicable to
orders to report for civilian work. Specifically, it is provided that no
order to report for civilian work shall be issued prior to the time that
the registrant would have been ordered to report for induction if he
had not been classified in Class I-0, unless he has volunteered.50 8 It
is not disputed that a violation of the regulations relating to the order
of call invalidates the induction order. The problems have revolved
around the burden of proof of violation.
In some of the earlier cases, lower courts held that the government
had the burden of proving compliance with the order of call regula-
tions and that its failure to do so entitled the registrant to an ac-
quittal.50 9 This idea was soon negated by the appellate courts, and it
now appears settled that the burden of establishing the defense is on
the registrant.51 0 He must raise the issue at trial, and if he does not
do so, the government can prevail on the basis of the presumption of
regularity. Except in the rare case in which the registrant can show
that someone who should have been called before him was not, his
505 United States v. Ebey, 424 F2d 376, 377 (10th Cir. 1970).
506 See Graves v. United States, 252 F.2d 878, 882-83 (9th Cir. 1958).
50 32 C.F.R. § 1631.7 (1971). Under the current regulations registrants below
the First Priority Selection Group are not likely to be called in the "ordinary
board."
508 32 C.F.R. § 1660.20 (a) (1971).
509 See, e.g., United States v. Lybrand, 279 F. Supp. 74, 81 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
510 See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 404 F.2d 462, 466 (1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 925 (1969); United States v. Sandbank, 403 F2d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 1968);
United States v. Norman, 413 F.2d 789, 791-92 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1018 (1970); Greer v. United States, 378 F.2d 931, 933 (5th Cir. 1967). See
also United States v. Weersing, 415 F.2d 130, 132 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
987 (1969); Little v. United States, 409 F2d 1343, 1345 (10th Cir. 1969). This does
not apply where the registrant was inducted as a delinquent. In such a case
the government must prove that the registrant was inducted in the proper order
without regard to his delinquency. See United States v. Dobie, 429 F.2d 32 (4th
Cir. 1970).
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only recourse is the examination of the clerk. Since the clerk must
testify in any event, as was observed in Yates v. United States,"'
"There is little extra burden on the government to have him pre-
pared to testify on the order of call."5 2 The defense lawyer should
subpoena the Form 1.02, which is a public register of all registrants
and their current classifications, and the induction lists for the periods
preceding and following the time his client was ordered to report.
He must try to show that registrants who were I-A and who were
higher in the order of call than the defendant were not inducted prior
to the time that he was, then ask the clerk why this was so. The
clerk usually can give various reasons such as "appeal pending" or
"induction postponed" which would justify the failure to induct. It
should be obvious that the burden of establishing the defense will
not be an easy one.
One case in which the defense was successful was United States v.
Smith.51  At the time the registrant there was ordered to report for
induction, the board had received a call for seven men. The board's
procedure for ordering men for induction was as follows. All the
files of registrants classified "I-A Acceptable" were put in a drawer
arranged in chronological order by date of birth. 14 When the notice
of call was received from State Headquarters, the clerk would physi-
cally take from the drawer in order a sufficient number of files to fill
the notice of call. The clerk, however, had also removed from the "I-A
Acceptable" drawer the files of those registrants who had not been
given a physical examination for a year or longer or for whom in-
formation had been supplied which would indicate a possible change in
their classification. It was the operating procedure of the board to
require a second pre-induction physical for registrants whose last
physical was one year or more prior to the date of notice of induction.
The court held that there was nothing improper in removing the files
of those registrants who might be reclassified (6 out of the 9 "non-
inductees" who were older than the registrant were in that category).
It found, however, that the practice of removing the files of those who
had not been given a physical examination for a year or more was
improper, since they would be examined at the induction center and
since a second pre-induction physical was not authorized by the regu-
lations. The practice of the clerk "had the inevitable effect of post-
poning the induction of some registrants and accelerating the induction
of younger men further down on the list."515 Since three men older
521 404 F.2d 462 (1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 925 (1969).
612 Id. at 466.
513 291 F. Supp. 63 (D.N.H. 1968).
GUAt that time induction was on the basis of "oldest first."
525 291 F. Supp. at 68.
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than the registrant were not included in the call, the court found a
violation of the order-of-call regulations.516
More recent decisions have talked in terms of the registrant's prov-
ing that the manner of selection was arbitrary and capricious. In
United States v. Weintraub,517 the examination of the Form 102 showed
an apparent departure from the order of call in that the registrant
was called prior to 18 others who appeared by the Form 102 to be
subject to call before him. This was enough to call for an explana-
tion, which the government sought to do by having the clerk testify
from the registrants' files as to the explanation for each. Six were
New Mental Standards Cases (registrants found acceptable under the
post-Vietnam reduced standards) who were to be inducted under a
"special order of call,"518 eight were listed ahead of the registrant as
a result of clerical errors in the Form 102, and four were registrants
either with appeals pending or unresolved requests for hardship de-
ferments.519 The explanation was adequate to show that the manner
of selection was not arbitrary and capricious. Likewise, it has been
held not improper for the board to order the induction of delinquents
in addition to the number of men necessary to meet the quota.',
Since the experience in the state indicated that few delinquents re-
sponded to the orders, the alternative would merely have been to
increase the calls.
The above discussion should demonstrate that the order-of-call
defense will be very difficult to sustain. Still, it is one which should
be tried, and cases may occur in which it can be successfully asserted.
F. Improper Composition of Local Boards
Section 10 (b) (3) of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967 re-
516 Id. In United States v. Baker, 416 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1969), the registrant
produced evidence that six registrants older than he were carried in the Form
102, and were not inducted when he was. Since he was the youngest of the men
included in the particular delivery list, he would not have been ordered to report
at that time if any of the six had been called. The government then called the
State Director who testified that reasons existed for each of the six, as indicated
in their files. He refused to produce the files on the ground that their contents
were privileged. The registrant objected when the Director attempted to orally
give the reasons, and the government ceased further questioning. Since the
objection was well-taken under the "best evidence rule," and since the govern-
ment did not rebut the presumptive violation of the order of call, the order to
report was held invalid.
517 429 F.2d 658 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 91 S. Ct. 572 (1970).
518 See 429 F.2d at 660-6L
519 The court held that defense counsel was entitled to inspect the Form 102.
Id. at 661. Although the lower court did not allow full inspection, this was found
to be harmless error, since the basis for the board's determination in the case of
each registrant passed over was sufficiently pointed out to counsel. Id.
520 United States v. Jones, 431 F.2d 619, 621 (9th Cir. 1970).
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quires that board members be residents of the county or corresponding
political subdivision in which the board has jurisdiction. 521 By regula-
tion in effect until September 2, 1970, it was also provided that: "The
members of the local boards shall be citizens of the United States who
shall be residents of a county in which their local board has jurisdic-
tion and who shall also, if at all practicable, be residents of the area
in which their local board has jurisdiction. '1S 22 Quite early in the
"Vietnam resistance" it was discovered that the statute and regulation
simply were not followed in practice. Board members who, after
their appointment had moved to suburban counties, remained on local
boards within the city. In many cases in which there was more than
one board within a county, as would be the case in all urban areas,
scant attention was paid to the requirement of area residency. In
San Francisco, for example, it was judicially established that not one
board was properly constituted.5 23 Judging by the frequency with
which the claim is asserted, it is reasonable to assume that the same
is true for many other boards. As pointed out earlier, very few
Blacks serve on local boards,5 and this is so even though the board
is located in a predominantly Black area. These facts then would
suggest the availability of the defense of improper composition of the
board with respect to the residency of its members. In the case of
Black registrants, the defense of racial exclusion, analogous to the
exclusion of Blacks from jury service, would also appear to be
available.2
5
I have had two cases involving this defense, Collins v. United
States,5 26 in which I was unsuccessful in securing Supreme Court re-
view, and United Stares v. Dudley,527 which is now on appeal to the
Sixth Circuit. Walter Collins' board was Board No. 156 in New
Orleans, Louisiana. It served an area which is at least two-thirds
Black in population. Prior to May 1967, no Black person had ever
served on the board. At that time the first Black was appointed, and
he continues to be the token Black on the board. The chairman had
moved from Orleans Parish, in which the board was located, to St.
Tammany Parish some years previous.52 8 Prior to May 1967, there
121 MSSA § 10(b) (3), 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b) (3).
V2232 C.F.R. § 1604.52(c) (1970). The amendment simply removed the require-
ment of area residency.
523 United States v. Machado, 306 F. Supp. 995, 1001 (ND. Cal. 1969).
524 MAs REroRT 19.
525 Cf. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
526 426 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 91 S. Ct. 172 (1971).
52 7 CriM. No. 10110 (E.D. Ky., Feb. 1, 1971).
52 8 After Walter raised the issue at his trial, the chairman was removed from
the board.
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were four members plus the chairman, only one of whom resided in
the area served by the board. In May 1967 the membership was in-
creased to five plus the chairman, and assuming that the new Black
member lived in the area, there were now two out of a total of six
who did so. Kenneth Dudley's board is in Lexington, Kentucky, and
is one of two in Fayette County. At the trial I brought out that one
member, a lawyer, lived on a farm in an adjoining county, although
he claimed to have a legal residence in Fayette. Of the three other
members present at the time the order to report was issued, only one
resided within the area of the board's jurisdiction. I did not check
the residence of the other member. It was undisputed, however, that
three out of the five did not live within the area, and that another
member was not a "resident" of Fayette County in the ordinary sense
of the term.
Because of the implications resulting from the successful assertion
of the defense that the order to report is invalid if the board was im-
properly constituted, the government has resisted it fiercely. There
appear to have been five lines of argument used by government at-
torneys: (1) that a registrant may not assert improper composition
of the board as a defense to a failure to report, since this is a collateral
attack; (2) that a registrant who has failed to appeal from his I-A
classification is barred from asserting improper composition by his
failure to exhaust administrative remedies; (3) that a board im-
properly constituted is a de facto board whose orders are valid by
analogy to the acts of a malapportioned legislature; (4) that the
registrant must show prejudice resulting from improper composition
of the board, either as to residency or exclusion of Blacks; and (5)
against the attack of improper composition with respect to area
residency, that the requirement of the regulation is discretionary
rather than mandatory notwithstanding the use of the word "shall."
While the collateral-attack argument has not met with any success
for the government in cases in which board composition was at issue,52 9
the others have proved effective in varying degrees.
It is difficult to see how exhaustion of remedies would be applicable
here after the decision in McKart v. United States . 30 Not only could
the defense of improper composition of the board not be raised during
the administrative process, but the board would not even have furn-
ished a registrant with the information on which to base such a claim.
Under the applicable regulations, selective service officials must refuse
to divulge the addresses and other personal data of the board mem-
529 See United States v. Williams, 317 F. Supp. 1363, 1367-1370 (ED. Pa. 1970);
United States v. Machado, 306 F. Supp. 995, 998-1002 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
530 395 U.S. 185 (1969).
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bers even under court order to do so.5 31 One should not, therefore,
be charged with failing to pursue administrative remedies which do
not exist.5 3   In DuVernay v. United States, 33 however, the Fifth
Circuit held just that with respect to a claim of systematic exclusion
of Blacks. Since the registrant had failed to appeal from his I-A
classification, he was barred from asserting such exclusion as a defense
to the criminal prosecution. 34 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
and set the case down for argument together with McKart. The
government filed a single brief on the exhaustion question, covering
its argument in both cases. Justice Fortas disqualified himself in
DuVernay, and the decision was affirmed by an equally divided Court.
In the opinion of counsel for the petitioner in DuVernay, the Court
divided on the merits rather than on the exhaustion question, 35 and
in light of its decision in McKart, it is difficult to see how it could have
been otherwise. When I petitioned for certiorari in Collins, I argued
that the Fifth Circuit had affirmed on exhaustion grounds both with
respect to area residency and the exclusion of Blacks, in reliance on
the decision in DuVernay. In its Brief in Opposition, the government
argued that I had misread the Fifth Circuit's opinion and that "the
basis of the decision was that petitioner's attack on the composition
of the board did nct entitle him to an exemption."5' 6 It may be as-
sumed, then, that the government is no longer arguing exhaustion
here.
Exhaustion came back to haunt me, however, in Dudley. In United
States v. Brooks,537 the Sixth Circuit, in reliance on DuVernay, held
that the registrant was barred from asserting improper composition
and exclusion of Blacks on exhaustion grounds, 53 although it also
went off on the de facto board ground. 39 The district judge in Dudley
was sympathetic to my argument that improper composition invali-
dated the order to report, but since Dudley had not appealed from
his 1-0 classification (he had no basis for so doing), the judge felt
bound by Brooks to reject the challenge on exhaustion grounds. This
53132 C.F.R. §§ 1606.62-.63 (1971).
532 See United States Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196, 210
(1945).
533 394 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1968), affd by an equally divided Court, 394 U.S. 309
(1969).
53. 394 F.2d at 981.
535 Interview with Benjamin E. Smith, New Orleans, La., counsel for petitioner
in DuVernay.
536 Collins v. United States, 91 S. Ct. 172 (1971), Brief for the United States in
Opposition to Certiorari, at 10, n.h.
537 415 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 969 (1970).
038 415 F.2d at 505.
030 Id.
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will be an important issue when I argue the case on appeal, and I
hope to be able to avoid that hurdle.5 4 0
The de facto board argument has met with considerable success.
It has been recognized by the Fifth,541 Sixth,542 Seventh,5 43 Eighth,5 44
and, in an earlier case, by the Tenth Circuits.5 45 As the Fifth Circuit
stated with respect to the argument of exclusion of Blacks:
The Government argues-and we agree-that a draft board system which
does not have a sufficiently representative number of Negro members is
comparable to a malapportioned legislature. The acts of such a legis-
lature are not invalid and the laws which it passes are not null and void.
The acts of a malapportioned legislature or local or county commission or
board are acts of a de facto political authority and valid despite their
failure to be apportioned in accordance with Baker v. Carr . . . and
Avery v. Midland County, Texas .... 546
The other courts have simply made approving reference to the de facto
analogy, although the Seventh and Eighth Circuits apparently limited
the analogy to the requirement of area residency and may have implied
that county residence is jurisdictional.-""
The de facto board argument has been rejected by some district
judges in the Northern District of California,5 48 and in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania in the recent case of United States v.
Williams.54 These courts have emphasized that the theory of the
Selective Service System is that the registrant will be classified by
"little groups of neighbors, 50 and that the residency requirement is
designed to implement this theory. This being so, an improperly
540 See United States v. Williams, 317 F. Supp. 1363, 1366-67 (ED. Pa. 1970).
541 Clay v. United States, 397 F.2d 901, 911 (5th Cir. 1968), vacated sub nom.
Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 310 (1969).
542United States v. Brooks, 415 F2d 502, 505 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 969 (1970).
543 Czepil v. Hershey, 425 F.2d 251, 252 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 91 S. Ct. 44
(1970).
544United States v. Chaudron, 425 F.2d 605, 611 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 91 S.
Ct. 93 (1970).
5 45 Jessen v. United States, 242 F.2d 213, 215 (10th Cir. 1957).
5 46 Clay v. United States, 397 F.2d 901, 911 (5th Cir. 1968), vacated sub nom.
Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 310 (1969).
54 7 In Czepil v. Hershey, 425 F.2d 251, 252 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 91 S. Ct. 44
(1970) and United States v. Chaudron, 425 F.2d 605, 611 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
91 S. Ct. 93 (1970), the courts referred only to area residency, and in Czepil,
the Court specifically referred to the requirements of county residency as
"jurisdictional."
548United States v. Lemke, 310 F. Supp. 1298, 1302 (N.D. Cal. 1969); United
States v. Machado, 306 F. Supp. 995, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1969); United States v.
Beltran, 306 F. Supp. 385, 388 (N.D. Cal. 1969). Contra, United States v. Nussbaum,
306 F. Supp. 66, 68 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
549 317 F. Supp. 1363, 1366-67 (ED. Pa. 1970).
530 United States v. Williams, 317 F. Supp. 1363, 1363 (ED. Pa. 1970); United
States v. Beltran, 306 F. Supp. 385, 387-88 (ND. Cal. 1969).
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constituted board cannot do what it is supposed to do. It cannot
classify registrants based on the personal knowledge of the members
which is deemed to follow from their residence in the area served by
the board.5 1 I also argued in the Petition for Certiorari in Collins
that the residency requirement does not go merely to the qualifica-
tions of the individual board member or to the process by which board
members are selected, as do the de facto-officer doctrine and the
principle of validity of acts of a malapportioned legislature. I con-
tended that the residency requirement goes to the essence of the
Selective Service System and the power of local boards to classify
registrants and order them for induction.
The recent Ninth Circuit decision of United States v. Reeb552 in
effect overruled the Northern District of California decisions both in
regard to the mandatory nature of area residency and in regard to
the showing of prejudice. Reeb held that, in the absence of a showing
of prejudice due to improper composition, the defense cannot be
sustained." 3 The cDntrary argument, as set forth in the now over-
ruled case of United States v. Beltran,554 is that:
[A] violation of a regulation whose purpose is germane to insuring the
accuracy of the decisional process should be considered prejudicial.
While it is true that one cannot know whether a registrant's classification
would have been different had the board been properly constituted, it is
also true that the registrants classification might have been different.555
Perhaps this is what the Ninth Circuit was trying to get at in Reeb,
and thereby destroy the defense of an improperly constituted board
entirely.
Since most of the cases involve a claim of area residency, the claim
can easily be disposed of by a court if it holds that the requirement
is discretionary rather than mandatory. This is what the Seventh,5 8
Eighth,57 and Ninth'558 Circuits have done. The Sixth Circuit, how-
55 However, this may not be true in practice. See United States v. Beltran,
306 F. Supp. 385, 387 (ND. Cal. 1969).
652 433 F.2d 381 (9th Cir. 1970).
553 Id. at 384.
554 306 F. Supp. 385 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
555 Id. at 388. In my Petition for Certiorari in Collins, I argued that in a
"racist' society, Blacks %vere necessarily prejudiced by the absence of Blacks on
local boards. Ironically, another federal judge in New Orleans held that the
requirement of area residency was mandatory and acquitted a white registrant
whose board was improperly constituted. United States v. Clinton, Crim. No.
31857-C (E.D. La., April 24, 1970).
55 Czepil v. Hershey, 425 F.2d 251, 252 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 91 S. Ct. 44 (1970).
5 United States v. Chaudron, 425 F.2d 605, 609-10 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 91
S. Ct. 93 (1970).
558 United States v. Reeb, 433 F2d 381, 383-84 (9th Cir. 1970).
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ever, has rejected this view and, in United States v. Cabbage,55 9 held
that the requirement was mandatory. The court stated:
As we read the regulation it can by no means be treated as purely
discretionary. The use of the word 'shall' is mandatory language. The
phrase, 'if at all practicable' should be read, we believe, as meaning
simply 'if there are qualified citizens available for appointment from the
Local Board area.'60
Because it also found other errors and could reverse the conviction
on that basis,"' the Sixth Circuit did not have to decide the effect of
improper composition upon the validity of the order to report. It
directed that the government move to reconstitute the board in ac-
cordance with the regulations and said that the registrant would not
be subject to reclassification until this was done. On September 2,
1970, the requirement of area residency was quietly removed from
the regulations, and the only present requirement is that the board
members reside in the county. However, since many cases will arise
in the future involving prior classification and induction by boards
improperly constituted as to area residency,5 6 2 the issue is still a vital
one for use in contesting induction orders.
The Supreme Court has so far refused to deal with the board com-
positioh issue, as evidenced by its denial of certiorari this Term in
the cases arising in the Fifth,563 Seventh,564 and Eighth565 Circuits. It
may not be difficult to understand why the Court is hesitant to deal
with the question. The essential thrust of the defense is that an im-
properly constituted board lacks jurisdiction to classify and induct
registrants.5 6 6 Thus, any order to report issued by such a board
would be necessarily invalid. If, as it appears, many boards have been
improperly constituted, a substantial number of registrants could avoid
550 430 F2d 1037 (6th Cir. 1970).
560 Id. at 1041. As to the mandatory nature of the regulation, see also the dis-
cussion in United States v. Williams, 317 F. Supp. 1363, 1367-8 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
561 430 F2d at 1041-42. For example, there was a failure to advise the registrant
of adverse information in his file. See note 346 supra and accompanying text.56 2 See United States v. Reeb, 433 F.2d 381, 383 (9th Cir. 1970).
56 3 Collins v. United States, 426 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1970), rehearing denied, 91 S.
Ct 451 (1971). In Clay v. United States, 430 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. granted,
91 S. Ct. 457 (1970), this issue was excluded from the grant of certiorari.
564 Czepil v. Hershey, 425 F.2d 251 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 91 S. Ct. 44 (1970).
565United States v. Chaudron, 425 F2d 605 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 91 S. Ct. 93
(1970).5 66 In most of the cases a majority of the members do not satisfy the residency
requirements. One court has denied the defense on a ground that a majority of
the members did satisfy the requirement. United States v. Fisher, 307 F. Supp. 7,
8 (D. Conn. 1969). I am prepared to argue that a board with a member who has
not satisfied the residency requirements is infected with an alien presence and.
therefore, loses jurisdiction.
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induction on this basis. Both the lack of jurisdiction and the con-
sequences of such a ruling were recognized in Williams,567 when the
court observed that:
Thus confronted with an authorized regulation, promulgated by the
President, mandatory in its terms to effectuate established policy, and
presented with no facts to suggest that it would have been impracticable
to abide by the regulation, we must find that the Board is not lawfully
constituted. Deprivation of liberty by means of an order issuing from an
unlawfully constituted body is a denial of due process, and in this case
results in invalidating the induction order.5 68
The defendant here cannot be judged guilty of a violation of 50 U.S.C.
App. §§ 454, 462, unless there was a valid induction order. A prerequisite
to a proper induction order is procedural due process. . . . Therefore,
draft board compliance with the applicable selective service regulations
is a necessary element of the Government's case. Consequently, (the
defendant) in his criminal defense must be allowed to show the failure of
the draft board to comply with the residence regulation.569
Since we have found 32 C.FR.. § 1604.52(c) to be a mandatory require-
ment and that the Government has failed to prove its compliance with
such regulation, it necessarily follows that the induction order, being
issued by an illegal board, was invalid. Accordingly, the defendant's
motion for judgment of acquittal is hereby granted.
The practical effect of our decision would appear to place in jeopardy
all proceedings of Local Board No. 133, as it was constituted in this case.
However, in our view, this result is dictated by law and policy and
serves notice on the appropriate authorities that they are obligated to
either abide by their own regulations or to prove why compliance with
such regulations was impracticable.7 0
The issue is as simple as that.
Thus far, this view taken by the court in Williams has not com-
mended itself to other courts except for some divisions of the Northern
District of California, and their decisions have been overruled by the
Ninth Circuit. The issue would appear to be still viable in the Sixth
Circuit, despite Brooks, in light of Cabbage. I will be trying to
persuade that court to adopt this point of view in Dudley if the matter
has not been resolved before then. The question does not appear to
have been passed on by the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Tenth
Circuits. I think that Supreme Court review is possible only if a
court of appeals accepts the Williams view. When a district court
invalidates an order of induction due to improper board composition,
and enters a judgment of acquittal, its decision is not appealabler 71
The question, therefore, can arise at the court of appeals level only
if a registrant, unsuccessful in the lower court, raises it on appeal.
At present, then, the defense is, as a practical matter, foreclosed in
the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. The Sixth will have
5 317 F. Supp. 1363 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
08 Id. at 1368.
M Id. at 1369 n.7.
570 Id. at 1371.
Ol United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 307 (1970).
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an opportunity to decide it in Dudley, if not sooner, and we can only
await the decisions of the other circuits if the issue arises there. This
defense has benefited some registrants when district judges have
recognized it. Perhaps because of its potential impact, however, it
has not been generally recognized. Most courts are not willing to
carry the procedural defense to these lengths and are not disturbed
by the fact that the government is itself violating the very law it
demands that young men obey under pain of five-year prison sentences.
G. The Induction Center
The failure to process the registrant in accordance with Army regu-
lations at the induction center may give rise to a defense to the prose-
cution for refusal to submit. Such a defense would not be possible
when the registrant has refused to submit to processing7 2 or has been
ejected from the induction center following a disturbance which he
created.5 7 3  When he has gone through processing, however, there
must be compliance with the Army regulations which, "like selective
service regulations, constitute part of the procedural framework
governing induction. 5 4  As with the selective service regulations,
minor departures from the prescribed procedure do not constitute a
defense so long as "the essential requirements of the induction process
were properly met. '57 5  The test is whether the departure from the
regulations was prejudicial to the registrant, and on the whole the
courts have been fairly liberal in finding prejudice whenever a failure
to follow the regulations has been shown.
When the registrant has received his pre-induction physical ex-
amination more than 180 days prior to the induction processing, the
regulations require that at the time of induction he be given a physical
"inspection," which is less rigorous than the physical examination.
576
In some instances induction station personnel have refused to give
physical inspections to registrants who indicated that they were going
to refuse induction. 57 7 This has been held to be a prejudicial violation
of the regulations,57 1 since there is a possibility, however slight, that
572 See United States v. Harris, 412 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1969).
573 See Callison v. United States, 413 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1969), vacated on other
grounds, 399 U.S. 526 (1970).574 Briggs v. United States, 397 F.2d 370, 373 (9th Cir. 1968).
575Edwards v. United States, 395 F.2d 453, 457 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
845 (1968).
576 AR 601-270, ch. 3, § MI, par. 69 at 3-23.
577The possibility of an error such as this at the induction center argues in
favor of a registrant's reporting for induction and submitting to processing, al-
though this is no longer necessary in order to exhaust administrative remedies.
578 Briggs v. United States, 397 F.2d 370, 373 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v.
Haifley, 300 F. Supp. 355, 357 (D. Colo. 1969).
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the registrant might be rejected.5 78 It should be noted, however, that
a registrant ordered to report for civilian work is not required to be
given a final physical inspection,580 and is not considered to have been
denied fair and equal treatment if not inspected since he "will not be
subject to the rigors of military life in a combat zone." ssl It is also
prejudicial to fail to give the registrant the DD Form 98,5s2 which is a
loyalty questionnaire, to fill out as required by regulations.- 83  The
rationale is that since the furnishing of certain kinds of information
will abort the induction process "pending completion of a thorough
investigation," it is possible that the registrant might be found
unacceptable.8 4
Induction personnel are now pretty well attuned to the procedure
to be followed when a registrant refuses induction, and it is not likely
that a material violation of the procedures will occur with any fre-
quency. I will, however, review the possibilities anyway. In essence,
the registrant must be given a warning of the penalties and a second
chance to step forward. 5 A failure to do so is considered prejudi-
cial, 88 because following receipt of the warning and the second op-
portunity the registrant might change his mind. S7 It is not required of
induction personnel that they give Miranda-type warnings before
asking the registrant if he will sign a statement that he has refused to
be inducted.8 8  The theory is that at the time the statement is re-
579 The rationale from these cases is that he might be rejected and, therefore,
that he is prejudiced by the refusal to perform the inspection.
580 He must be given the pre-induction physical examination, however. See
32 C.F.R. § 1628.10 (1971).
58 Shoemaker v. United States, 413 F.2d 274, 276 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 837 (1969).582 See Oshatz v. United States, 404 F.2d 9, 11-12 (9th Cir. 1968).
583 AR 601-270.
584 Oshatz v. United States, 404 F.2d 9, 12 (9th Cir. 1968).
58S The procedures to be followed are set forth in United States v. Kroll, 402
F.2d 221, 222 n.2 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1043 (1963).
G86 See Chernekoff v. United States, 219 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir. 1955).
587 Id, See United States v. Kurki, 384 F.2d 905 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 926 (1968). There the registrant appeared at the board, but refused to
board the bus. The court held that it was not necessary that the clerk give him
the felony warnings, and the second chance. Id. at 907. The dissent argued that
the board personnel should have been required to follow a procedure similar to
that required in Chernekoff, and that the failure to do so created a reasonable
doubt as to the wilfulness of the registrant. Id. at 908.
sss See Noland v. Unibd States, 380 F.2d 1016, 1017 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 495 (1967); United States v. Kroll, 402 F.2d 221, 222 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
383 U.S. 1069 (168); United States v. Shermeister, 286 F. Supp. 1, 4 (ED. Wis.
1968), rev'd on other grounds, 425 F.2d 1362 (7th Cir. 1970).
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quested the registrant is "neither in custody nor deprived of his
freedom."- 9
IV. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE PROCEDURAL DEFENSE
In order to complete the analysis of the procedural defense, it is
necessary to explore briefly how the assertion of the defense is affected
by the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies. It is
also necessary to consider whether the violation of procedural rights
can be the subject of pre-induction review. Since both exhaustion of
remedies and pre-induction review are quite complex areas,59 I will
not try to analyze either area in detail, but will confine the discussion
to the relation which each has to the procedural defense.
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies generally
has been asserted by the government as a prerequisite to judicial
review of the substantive classification. In this context the failure to
pursue administrative remedies could be said to amount to a waiver
of the right to judicial review. Because of his failure to pursue admini-
strative remedies-specifically the failure to appeal from the I-A
classification-the registrant could be said to have waived his right
to judicial review of the classification 5 91 In MIcKart v. United
States,592 however, it was held that the failure to appeal did not bar
a registrant from challenging his classification on the ground that he
should have received an exemption as a sole surviving son.5 93 This
demonstrates that even in the classification situation the requirement
of exhaustion is not absolute. In Gutknecht v. United States5 94 the
Supreme Court held that failure to appeal from a delinquency classi-
fication did not bar an attack on the delinquency regulations because
there was no right to appeal from a delinquency classification as such.595
Gutknecht, I think, indicates the general inapplicability of the exhaus-
tion of remedies principle to the assertion of the procedural defense.
This is correct for any of three reasons. Either the error itself was
sufficient to deny the registrant the right to appeal, the error was com-
589 Noland v. United States, 380 F.2d 1016, 1017 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 495 (1967).
590 See the comprehensive treatment of pre-induction review in Donahue, The
Supreme Court vs. Section 10(b)(3) of the Selective Service Act: A Study in
Ducking Constitutional Issues, 17 U.C.LA.L. REv. 908 (1970).
51 See United States v. Dunn, 264 F. Supp. 112, 114 (D. Mass. 1967).
592 395 U.S. 185 (1969).
593 Id. at 192-94.
594 396 U.S. 295 (1970).
595 Id. at 301-02.
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mitted during the appeal process, or the error was committed after an
appeal had been taken or was no longer available.
Thus, the exhaustion of remedies should be irrelevant when the
issue is a failure to reopen, since upon the board's failure to reopen
there is no right to a further appeal. It is the denial of the right to
appeal which makes the improper refusal to reopen invalid. When,
because of misleading advice, the registrant fails to take an appeal
or to otherwise exercise his rights, the same factors which should
excuse his failure to exhaust, provide the basis for the procedural
defense.20 In other words, unless administrative remedies are clearly
available to correct the error complained of,597 there can be no ques-
tion of failure to exhaust.
As pointed out previously, however, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits
have apparently held that the failure to appeal from a I-A classifica-
tion bars an attack on improper composition of the board.59  This
appears to be somewhat incredible, since there is no way in the admini-
strative process by which the error can be corrected. Furthermore,
the Selective Service System will not even furnish the information
by which such an attack can be made. With this possible exception,
failure to exhaust administrative remedies should generally pose no
problem with respect to assertion of the procedural defense unless the
error complained of was one which could actually have been cured
by the appeals board.
B. Pre-Induction Review and the Procedural Defense
The Supreme Court decisions on pre-induction review5 99 have all
involved challenges to substantive classifications. It is noteworthy
that in the successful challenges the classification was I-A "Delin-
quent."600  It can be argued that the language of section 10 (b) (3)
of the Act,6 10 which provides that "[n]o judicial review shall be made
of the classification or processing of any registrant . . . except as a
defense to a criminal prosecution," refers only to the registrant's
590 See United States v. Williams, 420 F.2d 288, 291 (10th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Davis, 413 F.2d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1969).
597 This might be the case, for example, in regard to the denial of a full and
fair hearing. But here too, if the registrant is entitled to a full and fair hearing
by his local board, it can be argued that the denial of same would not be "cured"
by an appeal, so that the registrant should not be barred by failure to exhaust.598 See notes 533-34, 537-38 supra and accompanying text.
599 Breen v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 16, 396 U.S. 460 (1970); Clark v.
Gabriel, 393 U.S. 256 (1968); Oestereich v. Selective Service Local Board No. 11,
393 U.S. 233 (1968).
600 See Breen v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 16, 396 U.S. 460 (1970);
Oestereich v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233 (1968).
60XMSSA § 10(b) (3), 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b) (3) (Supp. V, 1970).
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substantive classification. This would mean that section 10 (b) (3)
would not apply to violations of rights by the boards which render
the order to report invalid. Thus, the section would not prevent pre-
induction review of the procedural defense. Support for this view
can be found in Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Oestereich
v. Selective Service System,6 2 where he stated:
At the outset, I think it is important to state what this case does and
does not involve. Petitioner does not contend that the Selective Service
System has improperly resolved factual questions, or wrongfully exercised
its discretion, or even that it has acted without any "basis in fact," as that
phrase is commonly used in this area of law... He asserts, rather, that
the procedure pursuant to which he was reclassified and ordered to report
for induction-a procedure plainly mandated by the System's self-
promulgated published regulations, 32 CFR, pt. 1642-is unlawful.
.. I take the phrase "classification or processing" to encompass the
numerous discretionary, factual, and mixed law-fact determinations which
a Selective Service Board must make prior to issuing an order to report
for induction. I do not understand that phrase to prohibit review of a
claim, such as that made here by petitioner, that the very statutes or
regulations which the Board administers are facially invalid.603
Admittedly Justice Harlan was not dealing with the variety of pro-
cedural defenses which are the subject of the present article, and
which usually do not involve an attack on the regulations. The
contention in most cases is usually that the regulations were not fol-
lowed. Nonetheless, such contentions do not generally involve dis-
cretionary, factual, and mixed law-fact determinations either. It is
possible to argue that "classification" and "processing" should be read
together to refer essentially to judicial review of the substantive
classification only when the courts would be second guessing the
board. This would mean that the regulation was not intended to
prevent a court from making a pre-induction review of procedural
violations and invalidating an order to report.
This view had been accepted by some district courts. Relying on
Justice Harlan's language in Oestereich, the United States District
Court for the District of Delaware allowed pre-induction review to
challenge a violation of rights during the appeals procedure in Wiener
v. Local Board No. 4,604 stating:
Here, then; is recognition that when the Selective Service administrative
procedure is sufficiently irregular, pre-induction review, apart from that
permitted in a criminal case, is warranted despite Section 10(b) (3) of
the Act.605
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
602 393 U.S. 233 (1968).
603 Id. at 240-41.
604 302 F. Supp. 266 (D. Del. 1969).
605 Id. at 269 (emphasis in original). The procedure test apparently was the
basis of pre-induction review in Townsend v. Zimmerman, 237 F.2d 376 (6th Cir.
1956).
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has similarly held that a failure to reopen upon the presentation of
a prima facie case is not within a board's authority and, therefore,
that it may be the subject of pre-induction review.6 6
In Hunt v. Local Board No. 197,607 a panel of the Third Circuit took
the same position concerning a failure to reopen. The court referred
to the language in an earlier Third Circuit decision allowing pre-
induction review of a delinquency reclassification, which stated that
section 10 (b) (3) of the Act "bars pre-induction review only where
there is a challenge to the System's resolution of factual questions in
the classification or processing of a draft registrant. '60 S It also referred
to Justice Harlan's concurrence in Oestereiclh, discussed earlier, and his
concurrence in Breen where he stated that under the test put forth in
Oestereich, "The availability of judicial review turns, not on what
amounts to an advance decision on the merits, but rather on the nature
of the challenge being made."609 The Third Circuit in Hunt observed
that judicial review was authorized under either test and that it could
not perceive any distinction between a challenge to the delinquency re-
classification procedures and the ordinary reclassification procedures
challenged there. Finally, it concluded that what was complained of
"is not the board's determination of a factual issue, after a hearing in
compliance with the statute, but a reclassification procedure which in
numerous cases has been held to be invalid."610 The decision in Hunt,
however, was subsequently vacated, the opinion withdrawn, and the
case returned for consideration by the court en banc. In a 5-2 decision
the court en banc held that pre-induction review was proper.611 Three
judges treated the failure to reopen as involving simply "an undiluted
question of law, which is an established basis for pre-induction re-
view.1612  Judge Gibbons, who wrote the original panel decision,
repeated its rationale in his concurrence. "13 Chief Judge Hastie viewed
section 10 (b) (3) of the Act as inapplicable to actions for mandamus
and held that the allegations of the complaint were sufficient to make
out a case for that remedy.61 4 The dissenting judges took the position
606 Lulben v. Local Bd. No. 27, 316 F. Supp. 230 (D. Mass. 1970); Lane v. Local
Bd. No. 17, 315 F. Supp. 1355 (D. Mass. 1970). See also Barker v. Hershey, 309
F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
607 No. 18076 (3d Cir., Mar. 24, 1970), 2 SEL. SERv. L. RE. 3599 (1970).
60 8 Bucher v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 2, 421 F.2d 24, 27 (3d Cir.
1970).6 t Breen v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 16, 396 U.S. 460, 468 (1970). See also
Oestereich v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233, 239-45 (1968).
610 See 2 SEL. SEar. L. 1b2. 3601 (1970).
611 No. 18076 (3d Cir., Feb. 5, 1971).
612 Judges Freedman, Seitz and Adams. Id. at 18-20.
613 Id. at 2-18.
614 Id. at 20-33.
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that a failure to reopen and consider a claim for a hardship defer-
ment involved an "exercise of discretion," thus precluding pre-induc-
tion review.1 5
The general view has been contrary to Hunt, however. Most courts
have relied on section 10 (b) (3) of the Act to deny pre-induction
review of the procedural defense in the same manner as they have
denied pre-induction review going to the substantive classification or
other matters. In Fein v. Selective Service Local Board No. 1 616 for
example, the registrant claimed that the reversal of his conscientious
objector classification by the appeals board was violative of due proc-
ess. The registrant argued that he was not notified of the reasons
for the appeal by the state director, he had no opportunity to present
evidence to rebut the state director's appeal, and no reasons were
given by either the appeals board or the National Appeals Board for
denying his conscientious objector claim. The Second Circuit applied
the blatantly lawless test for judicial review of administrative action
and concluded that pre-induction review was not available, saying
that "[a]llegations of constitutional infirmities in the classification pro-
cedures [do] not bring this case within any exception to the bar of
§ 10 (b) (3) .,617 Pre-induction review has likewise been refused for
a claim of violation of rights by a failure to reopen in the Second,61 8
Fifth, '1 9 and Tenth620 Circuits. It has also been refused for claims
involving a violation of the order of call 62' and those involving im-
proper composition of the board.62 2
All things considered, the confusion attendant to pre-induction re-
view 623 has also applied to the assertion of the procedural defense.
An argument can be made that procedural invalidity does not come
within the prohibition of section 10 (b) (3) of the Act, but so far this
argument has met with limited judicial acceptance. If the procedural
invalidity argument is ever accepted, pre-induction review would be
greatly expanded.
615 Id. at 23-35.
616 430 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1970).
617 Id. at 380. Chief Judge Lumbard, dissenting, adopted the "procedural viola-
tion" test, and concluded that judicial review was not barred in these circum-
stances. See id. at 381-84.
61 8Ferrell v. Local Bd. No. 38, 434 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970).
619 Edwards v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 111, 432 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1970).
62 0Sloan v. Local Bd. No. 1, 414 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1969).
621 Green v. Local Bd. No. 87, 419 F.2d 813, 815 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1059 (1970).622 See Czepil v. Hershey, 425 F.2d 251, 252 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 91 S. Ct. 44
(1970).623 See generally the discussion in Donahue, supra note 590, at 925-46.
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V. Co cLusIoDr
In this article I have attempted to analyze the procedural defense
in draft resistance cases and to demonstrate its effectiveness in pro-
tecting young men who have chosen to embark upon the path of draft
resistance. I have traced its development and outlined the factors
which I believe have contributed to the recognition of the procedural
defense by the courts. I have then discussed in some detail the various
procedural defenses ":rom without and within." It is my submission
that in selective service prosecutions today the procedural defense has
become far more significant than defenses going to the substantive
classification of the registrant. If I am right, this is perhaps the most
important legal consequence which has resulted from resistance to
the "horror of Vietnam." In any event, the procedural defense has
been shown to be an effective tool for the draft resistance bar in their
efforts to defend those who have chosen not to submit.
